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im’HODUOïIOH
Relations between the United States and Latin 
America have long been analysed in terms of the 
inter-Amerloan system. A great number of
studies in the structure and operation of this 
system have boon written, and they, in their 
turn, have served to define a particular approach 
to the study of international politics in the 
Americas. Basically this approach concentrâtes 
on the relations of the United States with Latin 
American countries at the expense of relations 
between Latin American countries themselves*
So that while there are many studies of United 
States relations with any particular Latin 
American state there are virtually none of 
relations between Latin American states* Yet, 
it is apparent that to some extent the Latin 
American states do interact among themselves, and 
that the consequences of such interaction could 
well be the development of sub-systems within 
the Latin American sub-system. If such sub­
systems exist they could well have a considerable, 
if/
ill
If not a decisive influence on the develop­
ment of the inter-American system. The 
identification of suh-aysterns within the 
Latin American sub-system is therefore both 
a neocessary and a neglected task#
Sustaining this need for 'identification* are 
current developments in international relations 
theory. The division of the subject into 
contending rather than complementary partial 
approaches, foreign policy analysis and systems 
analysis, was perhaps necessary at first, but 
now constitutes a major limitation on further 
understanding. In particular, theory has only 
taken note of, rather than directly sought to 
explain, major theories of contemporary inter­
national politics centering around the emergence 
of the Third World. Where analysis in this 
direction has been undertaken many old concepts 
such as 'spheres of influence*, ’hierarchy* and 
’intervention* have had to be revised and ’new* 
areas of focus created. One of the most promising 
of these has been the ’region* and various approaches 
from a theoretical and a comparative viewpoint have 
recently/
IV
recently been made* The tentative findings 
from these studies so far suggest that ’local* 
factors strongly influence foreign policies in 
the Third World• Such a conclusion clearly 
warrants testing against the reality of Latin 
America, especially as there is no agreement as 
to whether Latin America is one or many regions 
with one or many distinctive sets of inter­
national politics*
The assumption on which this study is based, then, 
is that it is both meaningful and necessary to 
view the foreign policies of Latin American 
states from a regional perspective* Within Latin 
America one area in particular - the Caribbean 
basin - appears especially worthy of attention as 
it has, more than any other area, been at the 
centre of contemporary inter-American politics. 
Consequently, the approach of this study is to 
focus/
1. See, in particular, Louis J. Cantor! and 
Stephen L* Spiegel The International
\ivngxQwooa ujlxxxs , ew wex'seys en uxue
Hall Inc* 1970) and Jorge I. Dominquez "Mice 
that do Hot Roar) Some Aspects of Inter­
national Politics in the World’s Peripheries^
T97Ï. " " ■'........- f
V
focus oîi the Caribbean with the aim of 
illustrating the regional foreign policies 
of its states from a variety of aspects 
and at a number of levels* To this end, 
the study is organised in three major 
sections corresponding to particular areas 
of argument and interest. Thus, the major 
task of Part One is to show that from the 
Caribbean area In general it is possible to 
identify a region in particular. The major 
task of Part Two is to provide a brief and 
basic description of patterns of political 
interaction between states in this region.
And the major task of Part Three is to 
introduce the question of 'system* and then 
to further describe and account for the 
nature of international politics in the 
region* Finally, in the Conclusions, a few 
generalisations are offered and some particular 
cases discussed.
vi
ÏHE OARIBBBAW AS A REGIOH:
GEHERAE IHDICAIORS, PARIIOUMR IHDICAÎORS 
AMD BBFIMIÏIOH
gHE 0AEIBI3EAH AS A REGION: 
GHKtüHAE ÏNüIOASCESj îARÏÏOUMi
im.p:i:ga'jürs ato defdïiïioh,
The emphasis In international relatione research has been 
at either the independent state level - foreign policy 
research; or at the level of the international system as 
a whole-bi-poXarity, multi-polarity, etc. An intermediate 
level has generally been ignored# '
A major problem of the intermediate level is to specify 
what It Is! Is it groupings of States based on geography, 
military alliance, economic alliance, political performance 
in the international system, soolo-cultural similarities, 
recent history, etc? Examples, some being based on only 
one and others on more than one of the above criteria, are 
to/
1. This is particularly marked in respect of the Third 
World. Some major exceptions are the following:-
X». Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate 
International System", World 3?olitlcs, Vol.10., 
10.2., 1958.
L.W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of 
Southern Africa", International Studies Quarterly, 
vol. 12., No.3., IgW:......— ----------— ---
M. Breoher, "International Relations and Asian 
Studies, The Subordinate State System of Southern 
Asia", World Politics. Vol.15., No.l., 1963.
T. Hodgkin, "The Hew West Africa State System", 
ITnivorsit.v of Toronto Quarterly. Vol.31*, Ho.l.,
ïgsn
G. Modolski, "International Relations and Area 
Studios, The Case of South-east Asia", International 
Relations. Vol.2., 1961. "
W. giartmaim, "Africa as a Subordinate State System 
in International Relations", International 
OrRanigation# Vol.21., Ho.3* /"S "
2to be foimd in the International system*
What has generally been aocepted is the existence of Latin 
America as a region at the intermediate level*^ However, 
political scientists interested in the region are often led 
to pessimism as regards establishing a meaningful under­
standing other than one based on the study of the separate 
political process of each s t a t e H e r e  Binder’s remark 
that "the burden of proof that an area exists rests with 
the area specialist"^ becomes significant. Taking up this 
point, this section seeks to establish that a Caribbean 
region exists as a particularly marked eub-reglon, within 
Latin America? moreover, that for purposes of understanding 
its international relations it can be treated as a region 
proper. It does this by moving from the general indicators 
of a Caribbean area to the particular indicators of a 
Caribbean region - these indicators being used to define 
the region fairly rigidly.
2. Military Alliance - E.A.T.O., S.E.A.T.O., Warsaw
Pact, Rio Treaty.
EConomlc Alllance - E.E.O., C.0.H.E.C.0.E*, 
L.A.F.T.A., B.F.T.A.
Political Performance - the Western Bloc, the 
Eastern Bloc, the Ü.A.S., the the states at
the non-aligned conferences.
Sooio-cultural - the Arab States, Latin America.
Recent History - the Commonwealth, the Federations
of the West Indies, and of Malaysia.
3. A universal example of this is the recognition of 
Latin America as a region within the TJ.H. as provided 
for under Chapter 8 of the tJ.H. Charter
4. See, for examples J.Î). Marta, "The Place of Latin
America in the Study of Comparative Politics",
Journal of Politics Vol.28.# Ho.X.. 1966.
3m Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International 
System", p.410.
3The xnter-Ame5?ican system hae primarily been seoai as 
relations between the United States and the countries of 
Latin America rather than one of wider interaction between 
the countries in the system* By wider interaction I mean 
the relations between the Latin American states themselves 
exclusive of those with the United States* If the Latin 
American states have occasionally e d^iibited ’bloc’ tendencies 
vis-a-vis the United States they retain significant differ­
ences amongst themselves# That these differences may fall 
into patterns is revealed by two studies of the area. Both, 
using different methodologies, arrive at a somewhat similar 
conclusion - that there is enough evidence to venture the 
exietenoo of a Caribbean area.
Galtung, Mora and Schwartsmami base their study on social 
stratification variables. They find four levels which in 
descending order ares
1. the World level of ^^ reat Powore,
2. the inter-American system with the United 
States as Glass 1,
the Latin American Level with Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Chile in superior 
p o B i tione, and
4. the possibility of a Central American level 
with Costa Hiea and Cuba in superior 
posit ions.6
6. Johan Galtung, Manuel Mora y Arayo, Simon Schwartziaami, 
"El Sistema Latlnoamerlca de Hacioness un Analasis 
Estmictiiral", ^no 9. Bo.l p.84.
Eixssett bases liis study, over several time periods, on five 
crrlteria of a sooio-cultiiraX, political, économie and 
geographical nature* He finds that Latin America in the 
1950*8 possessed many of the attributes of an Internatlonal 
sub-system and that this was particularly marked In respect 
of Central America and Gran Colombia considered together 
from the rest of letin America, but that this coherence 
began to fall away in the early 1960*s* While considering 
the Central American states and the other continental states 
bordering the Caribbean to be a core group ho does not 
consider them to constitute a sub-system by themselves*
Apart from the obvious factor of geographic proximity the 
other criteria that Russett uses, when used by others, often 
define the particular cSiaraoteristice of the Caribbean area.
VekemanB and Segundo use a socio-economic typology to place
the greater number of countries in the Caribbean area in two
groups. One group consists of El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua and the Domlnian Republic. The other
group consists of Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Panama.
8For Latin America as a whole, six groups were needed*
Marta recognises the similarity of the political process 
wi thin/
7. BiniCG K. Ewasett,
(Chicago: Hand McMally & Co. 1967) pp. 175-1761:
8. Vekemons and Segimdo, "Essay of a socio-economic typology 
of Latin American countries" in E. de Vries and J. Medina
within the six states of the Central American Isthmus, and 
Peterson in respect of four of them - Guatemala, El Salvador,. 
Honduras and Nicaragua*^
Haas and S clorait ter note that the chanceB of moving towards 
economic and political Integration are greater in the 
G.A.G.M. than in I..A.S',ï!.a2'°
More importantly, however, the United States and the states 
of Latin America have seen the Caribbean as a special area*
The 0*A.S# has three times considered the Garibbean area as 
being a particular political problem. Firstly in respect of 
the study undertaken by the 1-A.]?*G. in 1949 on the general 
Caribbean situation. Secondly through lie action of the 
Provisional Organ of Consultation in 1950 in appointing an 
Investigating Committee to consider "the abnormal conditions 
prevailing in the CarB^ bean area" « Thirdly to consider "the 
grave situation that existed in the region of the Caribbean" 
the Fifth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers was called in 1959#
The Unitod States as the major external power in the Caribbean 
has/
9. J.D. Marta, JMJSâS^=S-™SM-^
(Chapel Hill, B.C.: University of North Carolina Press 
1959) and R. Peterson, "Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador 
and lioarafîim" in Burnett and Johnson (ed) Polltj.pal 
.^ p ||J = a ^ ||4 â - ,M s d -0 â  (C a lifo rn ia :  WaclBWorth ï'u to iisM ng
10. E.B. Haas and P.O. Solmltter, ."'Economies and Differential 
Patterns of Political Integration; Projections about 
Unity in I,a tin Amerioa". SSMSÎLf 
Vol.18, Ho.4. 1964.
V1 *1has pursued a specific Caribbean policy.’'*
Finally, the existence of conferonees and publications dealing 
exclusively with the Caribbean area indicate an academic
TO
awareness of its existence as a region.*'^
Given that the above are indicators of a Caribbean area, other 
than one of geography, the area nevertheless remains ill- 
defined# It could be as large as the geographic unit of the 
Caribbean itself, that is, at present, twenty sovereign states 
physically present and interacted - four of which, Great 
Britain, France, The Netherlands and the United States, are 
essentially external to the region# Or it could be very
small and fragmented, e#g# the Central American Republics by 
themselves,, the ex-British Colonies by themselves/
11* The literature on this policy is beginning to bo
extensive, and although there is often considerable 
disagreement over emphasis on aspects of policy, 
its general lines have been sketched out in J* Lloyd 
Mecham,
RolationiW.*Vs?aWEi!ett»#ww
12# The 17 volumes of the Caribbean Conference Series - 
Reports of Seminars held at the University of 
Florida 1951-196?* The Caribbean Scholars 
Conferences sponsored by the University of Puerto Rico 
and its quarterly "Caribbean Studies"# More narrowly, 
the quarterly "Social and Economic Studies" of the 
University of the West Indies*
13* By external is meant a state which does not, by reason 
of its geographical presence, have to be involved in 
the area* In this sense the United States, with a 
coastline open to Caribbean influence, is clearly lees 
external than the 3 European states# Nevertheless, 
the crucial distinction remains - it does not have to 
be involved in the area but chooses to be so for other 
reasons, e*g# political and strategic#
7themselTQSÿ etc# However, by Introducing the Idea of a 
core group defined, by particular indications as v;ell as 
by being brief and realietic about the recent history of 
the area a well defined region can be shown to exist which 
I refer to as the Caribbean region.
Recent history has shown the declining Interest of the
three external European states, vis-a-vis the United States.
The European states are now merely marginal in the sense
that they have particular interests with individual states
as such rather than a general interest in the overall area.
Althougli all throe states retain considerable economic
interests In the area it is largely confined to their
respective colonies and ex-colonies and not to the whole
a r e a , A t  the same time they maintain, at best, only
token military forces in the area designed to meet problems
within their omi colonies and ex-colonies and not in the
15area as a w h o l e * T h e s e  factors are reflected in the 
changing political relationship which is increasingly one 
of 'influence* related to a 'style* of internal government 
rather than a more pervasive one of control at all levels•16
A.,
14* The role which these 3 countries play in the economies 
of their ex-colonies or present colonies, is well 
sOTimai’ieea in Si:,? Harold Mitchell,
(Kdln'bm’gh and London! V/.R* Cham'faGrB Ltd, 196fT,
15* France - a total services strength of 2,500 made up of 
marines, naval and air unite.
Netherlands - an infantry bataillon, naval and air miits. 
Great Britain - a company of infantry and a naval 
squadron.
See David Wood, .
(London: The Institute of btravegic b-Gudxesî 
AÎlelphi Papers No.34, 1967) p. 19*
16. See Mi tohe11, 
Caribbean
e and also his Europe, is
B of G'g. Britaxn.Fr
âiassMeî».W!»s-*wrJ|rtTO*6i'£s«
the 20 inburgh ambers
Lvd,, X
8Tills has been shown most clearly by the participation of the 
ex:-Brltlsh colonies, Guyana excepted, in the O.A.8. The 
American interest is increasing and the United States is 
replacing the European states as the major external influence* 
So whilst the 3 European states retain an interest in the 
area, it is a declining one, For this reason the impact of 
these states on the overall area is limited and can generally 
he discounted - they do not form part of the region as I 
define it}
The decline of the British involvement in the area has resul­
ted in the creation of four new states since 1962 - Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados, The decision to
end the study in mld-1966 reflects this hy aiming at removing 
Guyana and Barbados from consideration as neither were inde­
pendent before mid-1966* This leaves Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago as independent states in the Caribbean over a four 
year period. Because both these states are not too dissimilar 
from the majority of other states in the area they qualify for 
inclusion on the basis of a common setting, but at the o ame 
time their participation for only a very short period creates 
problems as to how they should be handled, For this reason 
and because of their recent history differing from other 
states in the area, and the effect this had in the immediate 
post-independonce period, I have isolated Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago from the other states and treat both of them in a 
separate section vjhioii focuses on the response in the 
Oaribbean region to their participation in regional politics.
This/
This loaves the Umltecl States and the following twelve 
Latin American states - GoXoarbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras5 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela. With reference 
only to the Latin American states a number of character­
istics appear to be common to the majority of these states. 
The use of these common characteristics as the necessary 
criteria for any state to be said to belong to the region 
helps both to define a fairly tight region as well as to 
throw light on its functioning. The common oharaoteristios 
act as definers of the core group other than the more usual 
one of "system type activity" as it is not the existence of 
a system which is to be proved but only the existence of a 
region.
necessary criteria are fourfold s
1. The importance of the United States as the largest 
state to be considered by any 'regional state’ décision 
makers before formulating foreign policy.
2. The smallness of the else of states and the problems 
created by this for the 'regional state’ decision makers. 
Ill particular the problem created by the inability of any 
single state to control, or significantly alter, the 
immediate environment In which it operates.
3* The 'regional state’ as economically underdeveloped, 
characterised by dependence upon an undiversified econoray 
and foreign trade for economic growth.
4. The frequency of internal political instability and 
the role of personality and the armed fouaces in the 
political life of the 'regional state*.
10
These four necessary criteria are examined in the four 
following sections and the centrality or marginality of 
the twelve Latin American states to these criteria, in my 
opinion# is established#
17
The external power of the United States in the region by 
virtue of its military# economic and political interests 
is not comparable to the resources of any single state or 
allianoe of states in the region# The result is that the 
United States is# in the last resert# the major regulator
1 p
of inter-state political action in the region.
"The strategic importance of the Caribbean to the 
world# to Latin America and to the United 
States continues unabated both in total peace
17♦ The purpose of this section is not to spell out in 
detail the United States policy to the region# 
but to show the magnitude of its stake there# 
particularly in the economic and military spheres•
18. In some respecte this is the case for all the states 
of Latin America as Oarloe A# As^iz points out when 
he says that the United States role "constitutes at 
the present time the most important external limitation 
to the political processes involved in the making of 
foreign policy in the nations of Latin America",
TJhilst agreeing with Astie# I wish to emphasise the 
point in respect of the Caribbean* See his "The 
Latin American Countries in the International System"
in Carlos A, Astiz (ed) JiivMjn
4 mw run-h'f^A Dame, Ind^ university oi Notre iJame
Xi
and in total war* Tho control of the 
Caribbean and of the Panama OanaX remains 
of paraiiiount importance to the United 
States* Control is particularly vital 
during war*,
The Caribbean remains a crossroad of the 
world and a lifeline for all of Latin 
America" *
Weight has been given to this statement In three ways;-
1* By the United States maintaining sizeable armed forces 
In the region*
2* By the United States involving Itself intimately with 
the structure and training of the armed forces in the 
region# and
3* By the United States initiating and supporting military 
agreements and regional defence arrangements with# and 
between, various states in the region#
1# Total United States armed forces in the Caribbean region 
are around the 20,000-23,000 mark^
They are concentrated mainly in the Panama, Canal %one and 
Puerto Rico with bases in use at Guantanamo# Cuba and until 
recently/
19* R*II* del Mar, "Strategic OharacteristiGS of the
director of the inter-Ameriean Defense College in 
Washington, D.O#
20, Edwin Meuwen,
, (OlHo ata-ue Viiverslty
Press; The SooxaX Science Program of the Horsham 
Center for Education in National Security: The
Ohio State University: Pamphlet Series No,4# April
1966), PtlO*
A:d
n i
rG0ently Ohaguaramae # Trinidad.
Tiie United States also has military missions in most of
po
the countries amounting to 282 personnel in 1965* '^  As 
there are officially only Military Aid and Aeeiotarace Groups 
and Military Aid Program training teams in the countries 
south of Panama - apart from troops accredited to diplo­
matic missions - the great majority of United States armed 
forces in Latin America are in the vicinity of the 
Caribbean,
If it is remembered, as the intervention in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 showed, that in times of emergency United 
States force levels in the Caribbean can be multiplied 
rapidly by flying in troops from United States military 
installations, the ability of the United States to intervene 
militarily in any state in the Caribbean is not in doubt."
By contrast, the size of the armed forces of other states 
in the area are small.
TABLE Om /
21, The Guantanamo base has a permanent garrison of 
3,000 men which can be reinforced up to a level 
of 7,000 in times of emergency, The Trinidad 
base was fully vacated 1.10,1971.
22. I,:leu.w0n,
are sio
military missions in Hoxxco, Cuba or Haiti.
Table 1, page 14.
23# The United States had more than 20,000 troops in 
the Dominican Republic within clays of the 
initial landing.
TABLE ONE
Armed Forces in the Caribbean
Total Armed 
Forces
Colombia 63#000
Costa Hioa (para^ Eillitarey force) 1,200
Cuba 121,000
Domini can Eepubli o 19,300
El Salvador 5,630
Guatemala 9 ,000
Haiti 5,500
Honduras 4,725
Mexico 68,500
Nicaragua 7 ,1 0 0
Panama {para-ml11tary foro e) 3,400
Venezuela 30,500
Igures as at 1*1*1967.
âgyaaâs Wood, yymaa
g.i?l.ofl.» pp. 12-19
Only Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Venegwela keop foroo
levels above those kept by the United States in the 
Caribbean at any one time, Panama and Ooeta Rica do 
not have regularly constituted armed forces as normally 
considered. Although the figures show possibilities of 
military intervention by some of the states against 
other states effective action against the United States 
is ruled out* To state the obvious, In conventional 
terms the states of the area are dependent upon the non­
intervention/
14
non-interTentxon of the United States in the military
OA
sphere.
ocz # "Until about I960 military assistance programs 
for Latin America were oriented towards 
hemisphere defense* As it became clear that 
there was no threat of significant overt 
external aggression against Latin America 
eBipliasis shifted to internal capabilities for 
use against Oomumlst inspired subversion or 
covert aggression aid to civio-action projects 
designed to promote stability and strengthen 
interaal ee on omi g b ’
This shift of emphasis is clearly indicated in the increase 
in military aid to states in the area.
TABLE TWO /
24
25.
Ouba may be the exception to this insofar as 
there is a risk of intervention against the 
United States by the U.S.S.H. Also# 
guerrilla warfare may upset the calculations.
Statement by United States Defense Secretary# 
Robert S. FlcMamara - House Subcommittee on 
Appropriations* Hearings Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Act for 1964. 88th Ooiigrees: 
1st Sessions May# 1963, Uurt 2 - cited in 
Barber and Ronning,
. (Oolimwg; Ohio rybatQllHlvei’. 
si'Sy i’roBGj 1966), p.49s Kote 11.
TABLE TWO
Defence Expenditure and United States 
Military Aid in the CaribbeanI iN*i.WM'UW*»#i"'i«'mwaimmmmiW
Defence 
Expenditure 
19G5 
/ Million
Mil. Eq|.>t 
Grant Aid 
PY 1965 
/ Million
Mil, Bgpt 
Grant Aid 
1950-65 
0 Million
C olombia 69 5.7 51.3
Costa Rica 2*3 0*2 1.5
Cuba 214 5.5
I)omini can Bepublic 34 1*2 10.9
El Salvador 10 0*8 3.4
Guatemala 13 1.5 8*1
Haiti 7 0*2
Honduras 6*2 0.7 3*7
Mexico 153 0*2 1*1
Nicaragua 9 1*2 6.9
Panama 0*6 0*2 1*4
Venezuela 172 1*3 4.4
saffiiss,* ’^'fooa* AamW'^gm.J&Xm#mlail_âSE&Xmg2lsâ,
Sable 1. p.21, Sable 3, P.23.
For Colombia# Goata Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua, the grant aided military equipment from the 
United States represents between Bperoent to 13 percent of 
the defence ezpenditure for 1965, for Panama it is 33 per 
cent* Much military equipment ie also purchased from the 
United States/
J-U
o
United States out el de the grant aid program*""
The United States has played an equivalent and increasing 
role in respect of training* This has been of two types. 
By far the greatest stress has been on the purely profes­
sional military training of armed forces as 'specialists 
in violence’* This has been pursued mainly at the United
States Army School of the Americas at Fort Gullok, Banama 
27Canal Zone. ’ Training courses, taught in Spanish, are
in all aspects of internal seourity problems in Latin
America. At the same time its graduates familiarise them*
selves with American military doctrine and terminology as
on
well as American military equipment."'
Between I949«*1964sj 11,467 students from the Caribbean area 
graduated through the school.
TABLE /
26. Lieumen estimates this at /I,023,322,000 from 
1950-1965 for Latin America as a whole,. Bee
hi8 S}j»ua«ea..£:ba^0â,jml^
P'lt)
27* Befcre 1.7.1963 known as the Army Caribbean 
School in Banama.
28. Wood,
P*4.
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ïluîjibor of G-raduatepj from the 
Unitecl States Army Bohool of the Americas 
in the Caribbean, 1949^1964 Inclusive
a. ntMWm:MaJU>e:ix*:3isilPtv
Colombia 1,366
Costa Bica 1,639
Cuba 291
Dominican Republic 233
B1 Salvador 358
Guatemala 958
Haiti 30
Honduras 810
Mexico 178
Nicaragua 2,969
Panama 1,420
Venezuela 1,195
SsiESâ* Bajzbm? and Eoiming, .ÎS|.|Pâà.lâÇJ£iSl 
a&_È&Wâ3?Z_2S2Ê&, P
ll'hie represents 70 percent of the latin American
pitudeiits*^  ^ More striking is the fact that 8,194? 
or approximately 90 percent were from Central America, 
Given the relatively small else of their armed forces 
it moans a significant amoimt of United States
influence pO /
29, She total for all latin American students, 1949* 
1964 IG 16,343. Also 9,876 United States
students graduated# Barber and Eonning, 
Internal Security and Military Power, p.145
18
inf 1UG21G 0, 30
ï'iie other type of training has been in the Military Givic 
Action programmes* Military Civic Action has been 
defined officially in thé Dictionary of United States 
Military û?eraa for Joint Usage as -
"the use of preponderantly indigenous military 
forces on projects useful to the local 
populations at all levels in such fields as 
education, training, public works, agriculture, 
sanitation and others contributing to economic 
and social developments which would also serve 
to improve the standing of the military forces 
with the population* (U#S* forces may at 
times advise or engage in military civic 
actions in overseas areas)"
Designed as a doctrine related to the prevention of 
insurgency, it has had a varying impact on the area*
TABDB POUB /
30# The United States also supports a number of
other training programmes, but given the major 
rôle of the array in the armed forces of the 
Caribbean area consideration of these programmes 
does not add very much to the overall picture.
31. Oi-feecl la  B a rb e r and H o m iin e , IM S ia â L S sa H IÂ È a
SABLE I’OtIR
Outlay by United Ststto8 for Civic Action
in the Caribbean
1962-1964 1966
Colombia 4,452 5 %
Costa Eica 247 Bess than ^ 500
I)omiirlcan Republic 1,344 122
B1 Salvador 850 55
Guatemala 2,077 343
Honduras 308 71
Mexico 20
Nicaragua 59
Panama 2 22
Venezuela 23 59
sojasÊ* woodj .âimâJSfls
#&a» Sable
m m   _____
and Barber and
Ronning,
Bower* Table 7, p,239.
Relatively large amounts of money have been spent only 
in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, B1 Salvador, and 
Guatemala -» states where the army has always played 
an important role in the political process. Guatemala 
was the first countrj^  to receive a Civic Action Military 
Training Team in November, 1950* Military Civic Action 
has been less oignifleant in Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Yenesuela*
5. /
3. The United States bilateral military arrangements 
with states in the area arc numerous enough end far
3?eaching enough to ensure substantial influence* 32
te...-Aft. .ijaslMasm*
Mission Bilateral
Agreement 
(Army, Air,
.....Æz&L— ..
Military
Assistance
Internal
Security
0olombia Yes Yes Yes
Oosta Hioa Yes Yes
Dominican Hepublio Yes Yes •*•
El Salvador Yes Yes
Guatemala Yes Yes Yes
Haiti Yes •*
Honduras Yes Yea Yes
Nicaragua Yes Yes Yes
Panama Yes
Venezuela Yes
•'hiexioo has a Joint^Hexican-Unlted States Military 
Commission*
The Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement between the 
United States and Cuba has been repudiated by Cuba*
.§a2Sa§5 BarBer .and Eoiin liig j
®ablG 1 , p . 34
..mâ
32* Bor the texts of two ouch arrangements, one with 
Honduras on the 20.3*1934 oncl the other with 
Nicaragua *, on 19*11*1933 see Appendix A and 
.Appendix B respectively In Edwin ïdeuwen, Arms
aniX9ilM2ilJaXaaa (Bm-, York*
Braeger * Eevlsod edi tion 1963)«
More significant has been the United States promotion of
regional military arrangements with Central America wMoh 
are outside existing U#A*8* arrangements* A series of 
conferences on Civic Action have been held with delegations 
from Honduras, Guatemala, SI Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama 
at tending* The specif io military aspects have been 
organised within the C*A*'J).0* which is an organ of O.D.E.G.A
The structure of the C*A*i)*G# is such that the United States
has control at all levels**^^
The Caribbean area remains for the United States one of 
prime strategic importance* The United States national 
security interest is defended not only by its own armed
forces stationed in the area, but aleo by its ability to
influence,and in large measure, control the armed forces 
of the majority of states in the area* The control is 
achieved by the presence of United States pereonell at all 
levels and in all fields* This close involvement has had 
its effect by limiting the manoeuvrability of a majority 
of the area states in the international system. In the 
military sense these states cannot use their power to 
influence events in the Interna11ona1 system without prior 
United States eupporct unless they wish to break away com­
pletely from the United States with all that this would 
imply for the state’s continued viability#
33, The first conference was hold in 1952* Barber and 
HoBiiine> p . 134
34, See John Saxe*«*Bernandets, "The Oentral American 
Defence Council and Paz Americana" in Irving 
houia liorowitg, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi 
(eris) JIalln (%% York; Vintage
Books 1959) PP*91*^95*
The economic interests th a t the United States has in 
Latin America are well knovm hut they are not of the same 
magnitude throughout the continent* The countries of 
South America generally, have considerable economic ties 
with countries In Europe as well as with the United 
States whereas those in the Caribbean region have ties 
almost e x c lu s iv e ly  with the United States* The result 
is a marked dependence of the economies of the Caribbean  
region upon the United States* The extent of this 
dependence can be shown in two wayss
1* by considering the United States as a market for 
exporte from the Caribbean region, and
2* by considering the United States as a supplier of 
goods and c a p ita l  Investment to the Oail bbean region.
^  Latin America produces fo r  export* The clearest 
indication of this is that it exports well over 15 percent 
of its output which is a very high proportion the corres- 
ponding percentage for the United States is about 5 percent* 
Bor some states of the Caribbean area exports as a pex^centage 
of the Gross National Product are considerable*
TABLE SIX /
35, B. Benliam and II*A, Holley, A Short Introduction
^ TBonclons 
Oxford University Press5 1960) p *6 *
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ÏÏABLI'; SIX
SHE II€POEO!Aî!CE Of SHE OAEïBBîSAîI 
AEEA*S EXBOÏiæ BAEKIHG-a Ï0 GROSS 
lîAÏÏIOIïAIi PEOBÜOT IH 1957
(0 Ml 111 028 )
G.H.P.
Exports 
as # of 
G*1*P.
Colombia 2,370 520 21,9
Costa Eica 401 83 20.7
Cuba 2,800 845 30.2
Dominican Republic 656 161 24.5
El Salvador 612 138 22,5
Guatemala 645 114 17.7
Haiti 245 34 13.9
Honduras 344 65 18.9
Mexico 8,320 727 8.7
Nicaragua 282 64 22,7
Panama 300 64 21,3
Venezuela 6,416 2,366 36,9
i ^ n
t { t ‘ï*W>itS531liï*WwiiÉlÂîiWÉÿl ^  ^ ~ "  “• "" ^  ^
Revised Edition 1955) Table 2. p.29*
Differences in the position of the countries is shown 
clearly# Mexico is by far the most self-sufficient 
and the export dependence of the economies of Venezuela 
and Cuba is apparent* That for the Caribbean area an 
enormous proportion of these exports goes to the United 
States is sliavn in the following table which compares the 
importa that the United States takes from the area with 
the total that the area produces for export*
TABLB SEVEN
Total Amount of Exports and Amount of Exporte 
taken by the United States from the Caribbean 
Area «*«• 0 millions
pajatftraite: J|Niflrf«irAîWW.iiWi*d i# w .  1' iJWf*»
1956______ 1960
Total
Exports
(fob)
IMIIWmLhlPli.INIiaW
Importpk 
by U.S."
Total 
Exports 
( fob )
Imp 03: t a 
by U.S."
Colombia
ïtM,rKaptvM
395.6
i'=d<*i.i®*w*ryw/tis*'>*iNc=VWo<Wptia.fcfi
313.1 465.0 299.3
Costa Rica 55.6 24.6 86.0 34.9
Cuba 642.0 406*4 617.0 357.3
Dominican 
Republic 86,8 37.8 160.0 110.5
El Salvador 68.4 51.0 117.0 32.2
Guatemala 67.6 53.7 119.0 58.7
Hal ti 38.6 23.0 33.0 18.2
Honduras 21,5 20.2 64.0 33.6
Mexico 465.5 315,4 763.0 443.3
Nicaragua 26.6 19.5 56.0 20.8
Panama 10.6 9.7 27.0 24.1
Venezuela 1224.1 323.7 2432.0 947.7
fob country of origin,
Sources 3?;lgui?es for total exports for 1950 and I960 
from, respectively,
Nations, New York. Figures of United States 
imports 1950 and I960 from SiaMatlg.^
âkSjimoâ.^JÛML£nâÂSâ4jiââ^^ V ? • •
Department of Commerce Bureau of Census;
Table 1218.
Although the figures show a general trend away from the 
United States it was, in I960, still the market for 50 
percent or more of exports from Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, 
Haiti, /
2 5
Haiti, Honduras, Mexioo and Panama* Bor Venezuela the 
Bale of oil to the United States has increased the importance 
of the United States as a market* Overall, the increase in 
value of trade i l lu s t r a t e s  the continuing Importance of this 
trade to both the United States and the countries of the 
Caribbean area*^
The trade is p a r t ic u la r ly  valuable for the United States in 
that it contributes directly to the development of its 
industrial seo tor *
"In 1965 Mexico alone supplied a third of 
the United States imports of gra%)hite, 
three-quarters of importe of flucmpor, 
a quarter of imports of barium and two- 
thirds of imports of sulphur* The 
Caribbean region as a whole supplied half of 
the United States sodlmii chloride imports,
22 percent of iron ore and concentrates, 
practically all bauxite im ports, 2? percent 
of zinc ores, 38 percent of crude petroleum ,
77 percent of naptha, all j e t  fuel imports,
85 percent o f other fuel imports.
This is a very impressive list”
« • a •
37
It is c e r ta in ly  impressive if the national security interests 
of the United States in th is  trade is  considered* Many of 
the /
36* To some extent 1950 has to be regarded as a ’freak 
year’ as buying by the United States was heavy duo 
to the Korean War * The figures had previously 
been lower,
37. Juan D. Sanchez, "Resources of the Caribbean" in
vaiguB (sd) 2h § .jâ t ià le f f l i .™ îlg J iâ ite :û à s E la -E ^  
p.45.
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the above procluote are vital to the United States defence
industry and are on the lists of strategic materials.
The value of trade by the United States with the Caribbean  
is increasing not only in money terms, approaching three 
billion dollars worth of imports by the United S tates ..in  
1965» but alec for its contribution to the industrial growth 
and national s e c u rity  of the United States* Whilst tropical 
agricultural produce remains very important - the value of 
green coffee exports to the United States in 1965 was 
/^1,05B million representing 42 percent of its coffee imports «* 
there liae been a widening of the variety of exports from the 
area thereby in d ic a tin g  that the p ic tu re  of the area as just 
a supplier of tropical agricultural products is rather dated,"^ -^  
Nevertheless, these exports still all maintain the character 
of prim ary products embodying mostly local labour and resources 
which clearly marks the area as dependent upon exports, 
particularly to the United States. This dependence upon the 
United States varies from a "banana republic" type, as in 
Honduras and the Dominican Republic, where a state sells 
mainly one commodity to one market and relies on the shipping 
and other facilities provided by a few companies owned by the 
’market* country to the sophisticated type illustrated by 
Mexico and Venezuela where, apart from normal commercial 
considerations, the internal policy of the United States 
Government/
38. Bor a discussion of the importance of such materials 
to the United States defence planners, see Harry 
Ifegdoff, York; Modern 
Reader PaperUaokB, 1969), pp.50-54.
39. Figures for coffee exports from Juan D. Sanches, 
"Resources of the Caribbean", Table 4, p.50.
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Government is important in determining the size and the 
necessity of the market*
2. The Caribbean area Is an important market for United 
States goods, mainly mo, chiner y, transport equipment and 
other manufactured products* Although there has been a 
decline in the proportion of United States imports to the 
total imports of the area these still remain la rge  - over 
50 percent in I960 and nearly 2*9 billion dollars by value 
in  1965
ÏABIjE BIGHÏ /
40. Whilst this is only a small amount of the 
United States total and hence replaceable 
it must be remembered that the area has 
traditionally been one where United States 
goods are favourably received* In this 
sense selling th e re , is easier than selling 
anywhere else*
2 8
TADLB EIGHT
Total Amoimt of Importa and Amoimt of Importa 
from the United States for the Caribbean 
Area - / millions
1950 I960
Total 
Imports 
(cif )c, iTt'Wwu*#:: #vmwr
Experts 
by U.S. 
(fob)
Total
Imports
(cif)WJiS*e?w«sw#riWiR£l«aWu«r»«*>-
Exports 
■by Ü.S. 
(fob)
Colombia 364.7 232,1 519.0 246.1
Costa Hioa 46.0 27.1 110.0 44.0
Cuba 514.9* 461.4 808.0* 223.7
Dominican Republic 43.6» 42.1 87.0 41.4
El Salvador 48.3 32.6 122.0 42.4
Guatemala 71.2 44 # 0 138*0 62.9
Haiti 37.9 25,3 36.0 25.1
Honduras 34.1* 25.9 72.0» 34.5
Mexico 508.9 519.5 1136.0 819.6
Nicaragua 24.7® 18,8 72.0 29.6
Panama 61.1* 111,7 109.0* 88.9
Venezuela 595.5* 401.2 1060.0* 551.1
Figures fob; Cuban figure is for 1958 (i960)
Spiiraaî
rrom, respeovivexy,
1955, 3able 151 and
1965, Table 158, ^
Figures of United States exports 1950 fand I960
from 8^Astio&l,,,AMma&l..^^ 
1962, Table 1218.
These figures show olearly that proxirûity is an important
factor - the nearer the United States the greater the 
proportion of supplies bought from the United States.
During the 1950*8 fo3^  Mexioo this was over 80 peroent, of 
its ixaports, and for Cuba and the Dominican Republio about 70
percent.*”" /
2 8 a
percent h Inasimioh as the majority of the countries in 
the area remain slow In developing an industrial base, the 
future of large United States exports to the area renmins 
guaranteed.
The need for large and sustained capital investment In 
latin America is obvious. Previously much of this capital 
investment has come from the United States and has been 
both public and private# The public sector being of two 
types - one being Investment by way of the United State’s 
government’s economic assistance programmes and the other 
by way of its international economic assistance programmes.
The value of private long term direct investment in the 
Caribbean area has increased from 60 percent of the total 
for Latin America in 1950 to 68 percent in I960.
TABLE NINE /
United States Long Term Private Direct 
Investment in the Caribbean Area
(/ millions)
1950 ia§o
Colombia 193 424
Cuba 642 956
Mexico 414 795
Venezuela 993 2569
Oentral America, and 
Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic 432 891/
figures listed as for Central 
the West Indies
America and
Spjarg_e.: Plgiires for 1950 from StaMsMsal
AWm#_sjLÆ@.jMlgâ.àjmlââ,
1960. (U,8, Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Census) Table 1170 and 
for I960 from Sjiati^;Ga%_AM^
M_ËULjk#Sà±M^§jl*_l^, VT. ^
Department of Commerce. Bureau of 
Census), Table 1193#
The importance of the Venezuelan Investment is apparent - 
oao-third of all private United States investment in Latin 
America is in this country. Moreover, the p r o f its  from 
this Investment are over 50 percent of all the profits from 
Latin America. However, the proportion of United States 
investm ent in Central America to its Investment in Latin 
America/
30
America haa dropped - Guatemala from 2*4^ in 1950 to 
l^ Sfo in I960; Costa Hioa from 1.3^ to and Honduras
from X.4/Û to 1.3^ in the same period. Nevertheless, for 
the countries concerned these investments remain considerable? 
representing in Guatemala and Costa Eica about 15/« of the 
Gross National Product and about 30$^  in Honduras.
The Immediate future of United States private investment in 
the area remains guaranteed by the United States government 
which has always considered tliat the vested interests of its 
citizens are inseparably intertwined with the security of the 
nation. As such the United States has attempted to promote 
the role of private capital in the social and economic develop­
ment of Latin America and has seen in this a way of exerting 
political pressure upon. Latin American governments. That 
private United States capital has become an important facet
of the United States government’s policy to Latin America
has been pointed out by the Joint Economic Committee of the 
United States Congress which in its report concluded that 
private capital contributes to stability,
"(a) by supporting the rise and vitality 
of a solid, articulate middle class 
made up of managers, property owners and
small capitalists; and (b) by providing 
a bulwark in support of individual 
freedom against the rise of arbitrary 
power /
42. Figures from Table 26 of O.W, Anderson? Politics
âaâ„la.<2^i4&jgMnae™teÏ3. VanKostranâ Oo. inc. iWf),
power, an ever-present rlek under a 
‘ controlled economy
VIhen much of this private capital comes from the United 
States its influence is considerable, and extends to the 
internal, as well as external policies of Latin American 
governments who need to actively encourage United States 
private direct investment. Anderson has pointed this
out by showing the relevance of political attitudes to 
develcjment in Latin America and has noted that political 
conservatism by itself is not enough to attract capital# 
He concludes that
"development strategies in the postwar 
period, and the flow of foreign support 
was, at least, not paradoxical,
Policies designed to encourage foreign 
investment, and governments emphasizing 
public programmes with a technical 
assistance component did receive such
support ij44
Whilst the early 1960's saw caution among private United 
States investors in Latin America - in 1962 there was a 
disinvestment of 03S million ^ the attitude of the United 
States government changed dramatically* From 1946 to I960 
public investment in Latin America ran at about /25O million 
annually yet from 1961 to 1965 a total of /5,34B million was 
invested - over a billion dollars annually. In 1962 the 
United States made available /l,365*7 million in grants and 
credits,/
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships,
Privatc_AnvcsjmanjUr^ , (25,5.1964).
â'
44 • Andesaon,
America. Chp'c.ll, particularly pp.346-948.
credits, including military, to Latin America of which 
about one-third went to the Caribbean area* The dlotrl* 
bution of this is given in Table Ten#
Grants and 
to
TABIÆ:
5dits from the United States 
Caribbean Area, 1962
0 Million 
F»Y. 1Q62
Colombia 81*8
Oosta Bica 10*4
Dominican Hepublio 36.8
El Salvador 23.8
Guatemala 10,6
Haiti 8*0
Honduras 4*6
Mexico 142.4
Nioaojagua 14*7
Panama 25.5
Venezuela 76.0
âSMaSâ* J* Moya Mooliam, âJS£ZSX.^Ol3âi
pÆMâi.5iÆUiA!§wia
Sablé ?,
1. ons
The money has generally been made available as loans
rathe3? than grants - the figure of loans to grants has been
about 2 a X* Moreover, the loans have generally been tied
to the purchase of United States goods and the Alliance for
A 5Progress has clone little to change this pattern* As 
such/
45. How this is reflected in the Social Progress Trust 
Fund of the Alliance for Progress is shown by 
Sei’asGi, jBfeaJgEgalJ£Qay-.teJfeMa.^to93?Aoa. PP.2GG- 
267.
Bucia, the Incroaee of United States public assistance to 
Latin America has meant an increased stake in t he region 
and further dependence of Latin America upon the United 
States, The Caribbean Area does not o eem to have warranted 
any special attention by the United States government in 
respect of aid but has reflected the rest of Latin America. 
The size of the United States public investment in the 
Caribbean area since World War Two is given below - it 
excludes Cuba,
46
TABLE ELEVm
United States Public Investment in ' the 
Caribbean Area*
January, 1946 
to
iMâ™a2ju.Jî2ÊS.
£üUa4aEi
AID and predecessor 
agencies 1,077
Social Progress Trust fund 254
Food for Peace 356
Bxport-Import Bank long 
term loans 1,220
Other U*S, Bconomic Programmes 286
IsIâiJiasaoî^ 3,192
Military 231
3,424
of which - loans 2,316
- Gi'cmts 1,108
Includes a small element of the 
* Bur opean Oar ibbearn*
46, This has been generally to select key countries for 
development - in 1964? for example, two thirds of 
total development lending was confined to Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile and Central American cousit ries.
Sources Juan D» Sanchez "Besouroea of the Garihbean", 
Table 6, page 51.
"In addition to Its own economic assistance 
programme, the United States Is the major 
contributor to a variety of internatiomal 
agencies, which have supplied an average of 
/750 million for Latin American economic 
assistance since 1961. Well over half of 
this amount comes from the International 
Bank .tor H 00 ons true t ion. and Development 
(where U.S. subscriptions are 30 percent) 
and the Inter-Amerloan Development Bank 
(where U.S. subscriptions to 1965 were 43 
percent). In the fiscal year 1965, of 
Latin America’s total of ^830 million in 
economic assistance provided by international 
agencies, ^250 million was provided by I.D.B. 
and 0200 million by I.B.B.D. On March 24th, 
1965, the United States contributed /750 million 
to increase the resources of The Fund for 
Special Operations of the I.D.B."***
A Caribbean area perspective on this is shown in Table
Twelve.
TABLE TWELVE /
47. ïdeïiwon,
Jtan.B,.Â«§£4£a » P • 21
35
mA’OT'f:' mT*nj. J j. M JU V 4y
Amounts made available, 0 million, by the 
Major International Lending Organisations 
to the Caribbean Ar^ ea*
January, 1946 
to
World BaUÎs 1265
International Development 
Association 49
Interna 11onal Finance 
Corporation 32
Int er-Ameri can 1) evelopmen t 
Bank 278
U.H# Technical Assistance 
Programs 39
U.N# Special Fund 51
* excludes Guba, but inclusive email amounte 
to "European Caribbean".
3 our op t Juan I)# Sanchez, "HeeouroeB of the 
Caribbean", Table 9? page 53*
The proportion of the contribution by the United States 
to the international agencies, plus the amounts loaned 
to the Caribbean area, which are significant in terms of 
the size of the majority of the Caribbean economies, has 
clearly been to croate a further area of financial
dependence upon the United States.
48.
48
The political Implications of this type of 
dependence, and its operation lai respect of 
Latin America is to be found in Teresa Hayter,
(Hai'monctsworthi Ponguia
Books ajtd.T 1971.
The overall pattern of United States économie relations 
with the Caribbean area has not changed significantly 
since World War Two* Whilst there have been some modi­
fications within the pattern the economy of the Caribbean 
area still has a marked dependonce upon the United States 
as a market and as a supplier of imports and capital* 
Whilst the Caribbean area exports to the United States 
are now more diversified and the volume and value of 
this trade have increased, the stress on primary products 
has been mentioned* That the United States has supported 
this p a tte rn  by showing no real desire to change the con­
tents of trade - much of it still based on tropical agri­
cultural products - ie illustrated, for example, by the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which
"in a section ostensibly designed to 
benefit the tropical countries, the 
United States provided for the 
possibility of removing completely 
the trade barriers to various imports 
from these countries* But the 
coverage of the provision was limited 
to raw commodities and unprocessed goods*
And this provision, lAilch ostensibly was 
designed to favour the poor countries 
turns out to be a device for keeping 
them active in raw commodity production 
and suppressing their manufactures*"
By such a government regulation the United States not
49. Wendeii C, Gorâom.,
MitoJagEiSiA (Nev; Toric! OolumMa llnivereity 
Proas I9135) p,31
only safeguards its own liigh^ o^ost Industries from compe­
tition but also guarantees an overseas market for their 
consumption* And if the Caribbean area is only a small 
part of the United States market it has nevertheless been 
considered a fairly secure part*^^
The same holds true for United States investm ents , private 
and government, which if not la rg e , except for Venezuela 
and Mexico, are favourably treated* Oentral America is 
noted for th is  as a United States government report makes 
clear
"Hobtriotiens on the extent to which 
foreigners or foreign owned enterprises 
may engage in business; or on the kinds 
of business enterprises they may under- 
take, are minor, in Central America and 
are not serious l im it in g  factors for U*S# 
inve s t ora * " ^
To attract the foreign capital, at present necessary for 
development, states in the area have to adopt in te rn a l
52and external policies favourable to the United States.
50* Cuba provided only a temporary reverse noticeable 
mainly In the area of United States private 
investment flows to Latin America and this has often 
been overstated as is pointed out by Lelanu L. 
Johnson "United States frivate Investment in Latin 
America Sinoe the Rise of Castro"* 
aamsmlçLA:E&Ém. v o i . i a ,  «0 . 5 . ,  1964.
51. U.S. Daparteont of Oommerco,
Meriaat haalç.
(Washington D.0-. 1956) p.6.
52* An example of this is provided by the problem the 
Honduras Agricultural Reform, 1962, created for 
both the United Fruit Oo. and the United States 
Congress# See "We have the Sovereign Right to 
Protect our Investors Abroad" - A Case and a 
Commentary" from the 07th Congress, 2nd Session, 
Congressional Record 1962 in Marvin D, Bernstein
(eel). lapâmJsmatospli
m iaj Æ M M g a . (Ue-rf forks A.A. Itiiopfs 19667^
ao
The end result ;ia a Beo-colonialist situation distorting 
both capital importer and capital exporter. Given 
the reluotanee of the majority of e3.iteB in the Caribbean 
area to change the social and political constraints holding 
back development by domestic capital the oontinuance of 
this relationship is assured* ' Within the Caribbean 
area, as in the rest of Latin America, increases in United 
States private investments and the major economic commit­
ments of the United States government will mean a strength­
ening of this neo-colonial relationship rather than a 
weakening. As Plank lias noted;
"All of these states (the Caribbean 
area except for Cuba) are increasingly 
dependent upon the U.S. and Canada for 
whatever economic well-being they can 
achieve and for whatever social and 
political benefits they can derive from 
that économie well-being» North 
America is their market; increasingly 
North America is their provider...*" '
This section will not attempt to spell out in detail 
United States policy towards the Caribbean area as I
/
5:)« Pablo G-onaalez Casanova,
Bsoueia
Haoioaial de Economias institute de Inves'aigaciones 
Boonomicae, 1955). See, in particular, pp.172-177.
54. These cons traints are enumerated in Chapter 14 of 
Gordon,
55. Jolm N. Flank "Neighbourly Relations in the Caribbean" 
in WllgUB (ed)
P.168*
deal with this later; hut rather to estaTjlieli the image 
timt the United States has of the area and then to indicate 
the general pattern of its foreign policy towards the area#
Halle has noted, in his hook on American Foreign Policy,
"Foreign policy addressee itself to the 
external world as legend, to the 
external world that men. create in their 
imagination" - and that the legend «•
"is generally composed of#, # * .fallacies".
A large amount of the antagonisms that have manifested 
themselves in inter-Amerioan relations have been attributed 
to the "fallacies" in the " l e g e n d " , The "fallacies" 
would appear to be well entrenched in respect of the 
Caribbean area# Within the United States the image of the 
mass of ordinary people remains very crude# The United 
States government has also misunderstood events within the 
area as its mishandling of the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961? 
has clearly shown,
What is interesting is the concept of the persistent 
"general" image that the Caribbean, area has presented 
over/
56. louls J. Halle,
id on 3 George Allen & Unwin ltd. , (Lon s
pp7?Ti8ÿ 326* Halle was a former, member of 
the State Department’s Folloy Planning Staff,
57* See? in particular? Book One of Milton S# Eisenhower,
.
■America^,,-, (Garden City N, 1. s Doubleday and Co, Inc. 
1*5610* Di-*, M, Eisenhower was formerly Personal
Representative of Presiclexat Bisenhov^er and held the 
rank of Special Ambassador to Latin America.
58# See my case study ’United States Cuban Relations 
1959-1961’ in Part Three.
over time, This limge? the creation of the various 
major colonial powers through its history - Spain, Britain? 
France? Holland and the United States - is outlined by 
Morse as having six component parte
" “the Caribbean as a garden of Eden
“the Caribbean as a protectorate whose 
natives deserve sympathetic attention
-the Caribbean as a trading zone to be 
exploited by fortified commercial 
enclaves
“the Caribbean as a theatre for settlement 
and Imperial expansion
-the Caribbean as a natural "mediterranean"? 
a "dangel? zone" exposed to foreign attacks 
and posing broetd ' strategical problems to 
the military mind
“the Caribbean as a compound to be care­
fully patrolled lest it flare up in 
random insurrections," 59
Whilst all six points have been noticeable in the United 
States attitude to the area it is with the last two 
component parts of the Image that the United States has 
particularly concerned itself with since World War Two,
The major distinction between the Caribbean policy of the 
United States and its policy to South America would appear 
to be largely one of degree rather than kind. As such 
it forms part of the general pattern of United States 
policy towards Latin America, This pattern has been use­
fully summarised by Slater as being the following /
59, Richard M, Morse? "The Caribbean - Geopolitics and 
Geohistory" in Lewis and Mathewe (eds) Caribbean
(institute of Caribbean
!es? [InivefsjTty of Puerto Rico? Rio Pedras?
?,R, 1967)^
60, J* Lloyd Mecham? for example ? claims that 
American diplomacy has been so much concerned with 
the countries of the area (the Caribbean) that it 
is hardly an exaggeration to gay that most of its 
major policy decisions and actions relating to 
Latin/
"#####the primary political objective 
of the bnitecl States in its inter^
American policy has been the maintenance 
or attainment of political stability in 
Latin America* Stability, aa understood 
by United States polioy-makera, has three 
dimeneionas internal Latin American 
Political struoturoB, interstate relations 
within the hemisphere, and the relation­
ship of the hemisphere to the rest of the 
world* With regard to internal stability, 
the United States seeks to insure that no 
Latin American governments come to power, 
or remain in power, that represent a serious 
challenge to the security of the United 
States* In the context of the Cold War, of 
coursei internal stability refers to the 
exclusion of communism from the hemisphere*
In its Intra^hcmispheric dimension, 
stability requires the absence of serious 
interstate conflict* United States security 
can be best maintained in an atmosphere of 
tranquility; disturbances threaten the 
solidarity of the hemisphere under the leader­
ship of the United. States and may involve 
annoying expenditures of time, energy and 
resources* 'finally, stability requires the 
insulation of the lierai sphere from undesirable 
external political Influences (Iasi, Soviet, 
Red Chinese) and the preservation of the 
hemisphere as part of the United States 
"aphero of influeno e"«"
60* (contcl*)
Latin America originated in this region"* See
.P,
nivere
61* Jerome Slater,
y: (Ooiumbuo, Ohio? Ohio State 
res8 1967) pp*4™5*
It is clear that If United States policy is interpreted 
as above the Caribbean area has presented a ntmiber of 
serious challenges to this policy, Cuba has posed 
problems for the United States in the internal stability 
and ideological dimensions of the policy as well as 
threatening to upset the deterrence relationship that the 
United States had established in the international system* 
Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, in United States 
eyes, have both, in particular, overstepped the "internal 
stability" dimension and have been "intervened"# Pinally, 
the frequency of Interstate conflict has often involved 
the United States acting both unilaterally and via the 
O.A*8.
When these challenges to its general hem ispheric policies 
are coupled to the particular problems of the United 
States in  the Caribbean area, those of geographical proxi­
mity and the Panama Canal, the area becomes one of major 
concern to the United S tates;  and the magnitude o f the 
concern has been manifested in the direct and overt inter­
vention by the United States in the internal affairs of 
the Caribbean states as against a weaker and more indirect 
approach in respect of South America* Intervention 
appears as the persistent policy of the United States in 
the area* An example of this is that of a total recorded 
nuEiber of 79 incidents of aggression, intervention and 
meddling by the United States in 23atin America from World 
War Bvo until mid-1969 n e a rly  75 percent were concerned 
with the Caribbean area, /
It is this readiness, willingness and ability of the 
United States to intervene which, in some measure, can 
be need to outline a "Caribbean Policy" within the wider 
Latin American policy, Consequently further study of 
the United States policy in the Caribbean area will 
frequently follow upon the lines of understanding the 
motives behind such interventions, It is also obvious
that the possibility of intervention will be very 
important in establishing within the minds of the dedsion 
makers of the various Caribbean states the limits to 
which their foreign policy may be allowed to operate*
ii'ie Smallness of States and the Capability Similarities
 Oaglteaan. A^eaj.,.. Sma_Jm
sise of a state has proved to be an important factor 
in international relations* Although sise remains an 
ambiguous and relative concept it is obvious that, however 
sise is defined, the majority of the Caribbean states would 
be regarded as small*  ^ Similarly obvious is that 
however/
62* (from overleaf) Antonio Ricoardi "Breve cronologia 
do los agresiones, intervencioiies e intromisiones 
del impérialisme yanqui on la America Latina" Pglitioa 
Internaoiona 1 (23a Habanas Cuba) Ano 5, Ho* 10, 1965*
%he wide range of events recorded e,g* from violation 
of air space to armed intervention, does to some extent 
distort the balance of the count by accenting the 
level of intervention and Interference by the United 
States* Yet even if this is taken into account the 
trend is clear*
63* Siî3e is, of course, multi-dimensional, Nevertheless 
it has generally referred to material sise from which 
certain capabilities are derived and possibilities of 
actions are inferred*
44.
however capability l8 defined there is a near equality 
of capabilitieB of a majority of states in the Oaribbean 
area#^^’ Bmallnesa and ©quality of capabilities, when 
combined, have one eignifleant implication for the inter­
national relations of the ai'oa# the inability of any 
single state to alter or control the immediate environment 
in which it operates,
) Smallness of States
hi1st the consequences of being small has received little 
attention within international relations the elements of a
gE
theory of behaviour of small states exists,
theoretically smallness,in respect of the society and 
policy, means self perpetuating elites, a stress on 
'particularism* rather than 'universalism* and the concomi­
tant factionalism and personalism; and the pervasiveness
f those observations are
67
66and ubiquity of politics. All o
to be found to a marked degree within the Oaribbean states,
Smallness in respect of économies, means great reliance on 
foreign trade; concentration of exports in a limited number 
of markets; and a small diversification of commodities 
produced/
65. Principally in 2 books - Burton Benedict (ed) Problems 
.aC=âpÂJS3LJlej3dâfiæâSâ ( I ’onaons She Athlone Preoo 
X96?r -and David Vital,
(Oxford# Olarendon Press 19677.
66. Bee B.P.J, Wood "Ihe Smaller Territories: Some 
Political Considerations" and Burton Benedict 
"Sociological Aspects of Smallness" in Benedict (ed)
67# S$e my section 'Internal Politicss Some major 
charao t er1sties',
64# Two different approaches to estimating capability and 
their application to the Caribbean area are discussed 
later in this section.
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6Rproduced for export. The pattern of trade and the 
general economic relationship estahlished "by the Caribbean 
8bates with the United States bears this out.^^
With reference to foreign policy formulation and execution
the Caribbean states clearly follow the predicted theoreti-
70cal behaviour pattern of small states.
Small states do not have the ability to staff and are 
unable to afford a large and universal diplomatic service. 
Diplomatic representation is therefore restricted to where 
a small state believes its major external interests lie. 
Generally those will be with its immediate geographical
71surroundings and with several or more of the major powers.
The pattern of diplomatic relations established by the 
Caribbean states substantiate the theory. All have much 
less than universal diplomatic relations - Mexico,
Yenesuela, Colombia and Cuba have the greatest number which 
Haiti, Honduras and Panama have the least. Diplomatic 
relations/
68* Bee A.D. Knox "Some Economic Problems of Small 
Countries" in Benedict (ed) Problems of ^Smaller 
v ita l, Ih^J^ix^oueJA^^
Chapter 3t and S. Kusnets "Economic Grovrch of 
Small Nations" in 15.A.Cl. Robinson (ed) Economip
.a£Jalifiaa» (i-onaon;
M aom lllan, 1963).
69. Bee 'The EconoBilc Interest* in my section "The 
Preponderance of the United States"#
70. Following tlieaialysis of Vital,
71. IMa. pp. 15-24.
relations are concentrated within the Western Hemisphere, 
and in particular within the immediate geographic location 
of the Oaribbean as the table below Indioates.
ÏABI.E ÏHIE'i'lM /
72# The total amount of diplomatic representation 
is as follows# gplombM - 32 embassies, 6 
legations; Oosta Hioa - 20 diplomatic
missions; Qutmi - 50 embassies* 25 legations;
- IG emhaGSleG, 15 legations;
*" IB embassies, 11 legations; 
(matèmâlà - 22 embassies* 2 legations; Haiti - 19 
embassies, 4 legations; Honduras - 18 embassies,j*v m J * M. . _  ^ «TM<4'M4* I»■ KrMiwN4#  ^ ^
2 legations; Mexico - 42 embassies, 2 legations;
- 2l“"embassie8, 4 legations; Panama - 
24 embassies, j legations; Venezuela - 24 
embassies, 2 legations#
Pigurea from Btatemanb Year Books for I960, 1961 
and 1965-1966,
TABLE THIRTEEN
To Show tlio Diplomatic Coverage by any Caribbean. State 
with other Oaribbean States, 1960*^1-
Ool* 0*R. Ob*
mW’VtarK.4rïH«f
.iOMsvaefxKVtr-
El.S* Gt* lit* Hd. Fix* Hie. Pan. Ten.
Ool* H E B L E Xj 33 B B B B
G.E. B E 0 E E B B B 3D B I,
Ob* E m L E B B B B 0A8 B B
D.B, 0A8 M E L E E 0 1 0 OAS E
El. 8. E M B L B 0 E B E B L
Crt. E M E 0 E D B B E E L
lit* Ij M B B L E 0 E 0 B E
Hd. B M E L E E 0 B E B Xj
Mx. B M E B 1 E E E B B E
Hie* B H E B E B 0 B B E E
Pan. E M B 23 33 E E B E B B
Ten. 1 M B E Ij B B E E E E
jjii*jsm*Trawrs?»viwi L«*B3jst«:sa*;-s LUKrc* ri2*»>ieWAh<iwrra*rrs«fl m iSnJSsnRUATTJWQEi»
* Head vertically for a single Caribbean State's diplomatic 
representation with other Caribbean States and horizontally 
for the type of diplomatic representation accredited to any 
Caribbean State by other Caribbean States.
£pj£* D - Embassy; D == Legation; M « Mission;
0 « Ho Diplomatie Relations; CAS - decision to 
sever relations taken in accordance with OAS 
recommandatlon.
Prom Statesman's Year-Book, I960, except for 
Colombia and Banama from Statesman's Year- 
Book 1961 and for Nicaragua from Statesman's 
Year-Book, 1965*1966*
All published by Macmillan and Co. Ltd* London.
Finally, all have diplomatic relations with a super-pov/er 
and/or one of the major powers
A small state's foreign policy is concerned with a narrow 
rang(
73* All maintain, for example, diplomatic relations 
with Great Britain*
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range of problems, ami wider problems are often viewed In 
regional terme* Lack of institutionalisation allows for 
a high degree of personal initiative and intuitive tMnking 
in policy making* Often the result of this is doubt or 
inhibition in foreign policy making which
"Only very exceptional men with great
Intuitive gifts and a marked capacity
and readiness for the taking of risks
and for facing powerful opposition are
„ 74likely to overcome * * * *
The Caribbean states exhibit a high degree of concern with 
internal affairs in neighbouring states* This is frequently 
attributed to the domination of policy making by personalities 
Finally, Castro, with the now foreign policy orientation he 
has given Cuba, provides a good example of what Vital calls 
"the exceptional man"*
Within the international system small states have only a 
small margin of safety and security; so much so that for 
all practical purposes nuclear warfare and large soale conven­
tional warfare may well amount to the same tiling in terms of 
ability to withstand attack and to recover from such an 
attack*
74. TIW., pp.24-32, 37-38.
75# Ibid, pp,58-61* Castro provides a. very good example 
GO substantiate this* In an interview with Lee 
Loc3iwooci in 1965 the following conversation took 
places
Lockwoods "You felt it made little difference whether 
Cuba was involved in a conventional war or in a 
th ormomiQ 1 e ar war ?
Castrog Conventional weapons with the employment of 
masses of airplanes are equivalent to the use of 
atomic weapons* We are certain that ouch an aggression 
by the United States against our country would cost us 
millions of lives..**" in Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba. 
Cuba's Fidel, (How York: Vintage Books.^MeaTHon
l9g9TTpp::^4-225.
4P
Confronted with tills problem small states generally have 
two options; either to maintain a modem defence force, 
or to maintain a limited defence force based on a profes­
sional or citizen based standing army#' The first option 
Implies considerable économie sacrifices from the population 
given the very costs of modern weapons# Also high
costs means an inability to develop such weapons autonomously 
and hence the need to buy them f3?om abroad which in itself 
means less political independence and freedom of manoeuvre# 
The other option also means economic sacrifices and the 
existence of the military as an element in the social and
77
political life of the state*
The Oaribbean states have adopted both options# Cuba, 
under Castro, has closely followed the first option yet 
maintains a large citizen baaed army and a militia force*
The Dominican Republic, under Trujillo* closely followed 
the second optlom#^^ But for the majority of the 
Caribbean states it has been a mixture of both options* 
i*e# essentially a third option, so that the problems of 
military /
76# Two other options exist and have boon actively
followed in the Caribbean area# One of those
options is a mix of both Vital*s options and 
the other is a negative option, i#e# no armed 
forces at all*
77. Vital, pp.81-68, 82-86.
73# Trujillo tried to get away from dependence upon
one country for arms procurements by establishing 
his own limited arms factory, producing rifles, 
and by buying from sources in the VJest other than 
from the United States# Mexico has also tried to 
reduce dependence by a limited national arms 
programme.
av
military dependenoe in terras of weapons procurements and
training from the United States co-exist with the problem
of military intervention from a small semi-professionalised 
7Qasniiy# Nicaragua* Honduras* Guatemala and El Salvador 
most closely follow this pattern* Costa Bioa and Fanama 
have been developing towards a different option, i,e* the 
fourth option, that of no national defence at all. 
Maintaining para-military forces, mainly for Internal 
security reasons, they both base their continued viability 
as nation states upon the capacity of the United States and 
the 0,A,S* to intervene on their behalf#
Translating these factors Into policy options gives a small
state, in principle, a choice of three strategies:
1* a passive strategy - the state renounces freedom 
of choice in the external world*
2* an active strategy - the state attempts to alter 
the external environment to its own advantage, and
3* a defensive strategy - the state attempts to
80preserve the status quo using its own resources#
For the Oaribbean states, all of which are underdeveloped, 
the choice is between the first two strategies# The 
smaller Caribbean states in particular the Central 
American states - have all followed the first strategy.
The United States is the cornerstone of their foreign 
policy/
79# See my section 'The Military I^nterest* in 'The 
Preponderance of the United States' and my 
section "Militarism* in 'Internal Politios#*#.*
8 0 . Vital / p p . 121- 122.
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policy and they rely upon it to maintain their politioal
mIdentity ao actors in the international system.  ^ This 
strategy, by freeing them from the major problems of the 
international oyotem, enables these states to maintain the 
high level of interest in regional politics which all show. 
To a large extent the Oaribbean area represents the next 
most important area for policy decisions after those
involving the United States* An active strategy has been
.95!
83
B2followed enthusiastically by Cuba after 1 9*' Mexico
has combined elements of both strategies*
Summary
It is clear that for the majority of the Caribbean area 
states the consequences of smallness cannot be overlooked. 
Physical size, the factor least open to change in the 
international system, plays an important part in determining 
the limits of a state's capacity to influence the functioning 
of the system. Effective international action is frequently 
confined to a small geographical area but for the Caribbean 
states even this limited influence is circumscribed by the 
presence of the United States as the hegemon!al power in the 
area. The consequence has been, for all intents and 
purposes, a voluntary surrendering of sovereignty by the 
majority/
81. D im  pp. 183-184.
82. See Pedro Meluza Lopez "Oon Voz y Li ne a Preopias o 
InclGpendientGB" Poiltio.a. Ia-fce?;naoAo»al (I/a Hatiaiias 
Ouba) Primer Semestre, l9o9*
83. See the section on 'The Foreign Policy of Mexico* 
in Carlos A. Astia (ed) feJfcLJmeA
Politics.
niajorlty of the Caribbean area otatee to the United States 
in roepeot of the pursuit of an independent foreign policy.
In return for this the elites in the area are able to gain 
support from the United States for overcoming some of the 
considerable internal difficulties created by smallness, 
e.g. access to a bigger market for trade and capital than 
otherwise possible; as well as guaranteeing by United 
States military and political support its omi base of power. 
Such dependence, of course, brings the United States many 
benefits, the greatest of which is the opportunity to indicate 
an ’expected* behaviour pattern for these states. The 
alternative to individual weakness is collective strength but 
there have been few sucoeseful moves in this direction other 
than these Involving the five Central American states*
Such unity they have achieved has so far been very limited 
and fragile and appears not to have significantly altered 
their relationships to the United States although it has 
affected relationships among themselves and in the Caribbean 
area as a whole* ' Foreign policy, for the majority of the 
Caribbean area states, thus remains determined to a signifi­
cant degree by their individual smallness.
Stephen B* Jones/
84* See my ease study ’The Central American Common 
Market as a sub-regional actor* in Part Three.
"Capabi3_ities influence international relations in 
two ways. They can either be perceived, reacted 
to and taken, into account by the decision-makers and 
therefore be seen as influencing policies; or they 
can limit performance or outcome of policies irres­
pective of whether or not these limitations were 
perceived/
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Stephen B* Jones suggests that the basic capability of a
state can be measured in terms of "area resources", "human
86resources" and "equipment resources".
By "area resources" he means the size and shape of the
country, Xandforias, soils, climate, mineral and biological
sources# The smallness of many of the states has already
been referred to and some are very close in size as Column
One of Table Fourteen shows* The type of underdevelopment
of the area further suggests similarities of exploitation of
87basic resources# *
By "human resources" he refers to size and structure of 
population; the social, political, economic and military 
systems of a country and the stock of skills, leadership and 
patriotism# The size of the population in many of the
states is very similar as Column Two of Table Fourteen shows
and/
85# (continued) perceived by the decision-makers"#
Harold and Margaret Sprout, m$J3ooloal^
_gn {Mevi J  ersey 3 Princeton
university Press, 19657? p«lX. The emphaâs zn 
this section is on the second approach.
86* Stephen B. Jones "The Power Inventory and National 
Strategy" in James H. Hosenau (ed) International
York» m è  W o e
Press of Glencoe, 1961).
87* That is, in spite of a wide diversity of natural
resources there is a. certain uniformity in terms 
of resources selected, and methods used, for 
exploitation# For a geography of the area see 
R# West and J#F# Augelli,
Banda and PcoD3.es, (Bnglewood 011 ffs, nVJi 
Prentice Hall, 1966).
54
TABLE FOURTEEN
Population and Area Statistics 
of the Oaribbean Area
OolomMa 1,138,338 14,443,000
Oos-fca Rioa 50,700 1,225,000
Ouba 114,524 6,933,000
Dominican Republic 48,734 3,098,000
El Salvador 21,393 2,501,000
Guatemala 108,889 3,886,000
Haiti 27,750 4,249,000
Honduras 112,088 1,863,362
Mexico 1,972,546 36,091,000
Iliearagua 148,000 1,526,000
Panama 74,478 1,109,000
Venezuela 912,050 7,523,000
Source; Juan Hociriguez Oruzp "11 Caribe en Gif ras" 
from P.M. Audio and T.S. Mathews (eels)
(institute of 
Caribbean Studies, university of Puerto 
Rico, Bio Pedras, P.E. 1965), Zable 2, 
p.334.
B8and its structure is also very much the same* The 
sections on 'Iconomic Underdevelopment’9 'Internal Politics * 
and 'The Preponderance of the United States' suggest further 
similarities be'Ween a majority of the states in the area*
By "equipment resources" he refers to economic capital 
goods* military equipment * the material apparatus of govern­
ment and its stockpiles of goods and financial credit. 
Various tables in the section "The Preponderance of the 
United States* point to similarities here also.
88. For Central America see T. Lynn Smi'bh* "The 
Population of Central American Coimtries" 
in Wilgus (ed) $M..£arJIjiteâ31L^^ 
Ajicvicm^xea, (GalueavillQ: Unxverex'cy^ 
Florida* Î96Ï)-
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Another method of measuring oapablllty is the funotional 
approaoh of the Sprouts* They suggest that capabilities 
oan bo estimated by reference to the following five 
functional categoriess decision-making functions; means- 
producing functions; information-providing functions; 
means-utilizing functions; resistance functions.
By "information-providing functions" they mean ability to 
collect* analyze* store, recall and utilize strategies for 
action*"’ The'underdevelopment' and 'smallness of states* 
indicators strongly influence this function as they do the 
"means-providing function" which is the ability to provide 
the instrumentalities required in order to implement the 
Btrategies adop ted *
The 'internal politics' indicator strongly influences the 
"decision-making function" and the "means-utilizing function", 
By the former they mean the ability to define feasible 
objectives* and to combine instruments and techniques of 
statecraft into effective strategies for attaining objectives 
The latter is the ability to employ effectively the instru­
mentalities that oan be produced and in combinations and 
pa 11eras ad op ted.
/
an Nostrand
90. Astig notes that Latin American diplomatic services 
have particularly poor information gathering and 
interpretation facilities, and that consequently 
personal impressions, often based on guesswork, are 
used to make policies# See his "Latin American 
Countries in the International System", pp. 7-10.
By the "resistance function" they mean ability to parry 
demancls, resist pressures, defend against attacks, and 
carry on under conditions of stress and catastrophe*
This is influenced by all 'indicators' but particularly 
by 'the preponderance of the Unites States' indicator.
Both methods of estimating capability point to a near 
equality of capabl3il;ies for a majority of the states in 
the area Insofar as differences between them, in all indi­
cators * are not very great# The states specifically 
excluded from this conclusion are Mexico and Colombia, 
with Venezuela and Cuba at the margin.
The most significant implication of this equality of 
capabilities is that a state cannot, by its o\m efforts, 
guarantee its security in the area. ' It is therefore 
confronted, by necessity, with defining a relationship to 
the environment which will guarantee it security. This 
means, in practice, a choice between five different 
strategies, although no one strategy necessarily excludes 
the adoption of various other strategies at the same time.
1* Through an alliance with a world power which has a 
major interest in the area. All the states have sought
91. If the Oaribbean area is considered as excluding 
the United States then undoubtedly Cuba could do 
this at present but the political cireumstanoeB 
are ouch that it is unlikely to be forced to do 
so. Before the Revolution its position was much 
the oarae as that of the other Caribbean area 
states.
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92thlB approach or have had ;lt pressed upon them
2* 'Through political unification to create a viable state 
in "both the regional and international Systems# Only the 
five Central American states have pursued this approach 
with any enthusiasm.
3. Through developing and operating a balance of power 
system. Examples of such an approach are much more common 
in the nineteenth century than in modern times.
4# Through the subversion of hostile governments in the 
hope of establishing a more friendly government. All the 
states have used this approach but some more frequently 
than o thers.^  ^
5# Through a policy of non-intervention in, isolation 
from, or strict neutrality toward* regional politics*
It has been most persistently followed by Panama and indiff* 
orcntly by Haiti.
92. The major reason for this is sbressed in the 
'Conclusions* to this section.
93* Various facets of Central American union are
considered in several case studies in Part Three.
94* Occasionally there have been times in which a
'balance of power* system seemed to be in operation# 
For example, at the end of 1940 ideological distinc­
tions between Oaribbean states were reflected in the 
limited co-operation between Ouba, Oorrba llica and 
Guatemala oounterposed against the limited co­
operation between Nicaragua, Honduras and the 
3)ominican Republic# However, such co-operation,
although resembling alliances was more a brief 
coincidence of interests than a consciously,, willed 
outcome of foreign policy on the part of any of the 
states involved.
93* See my case study 'Subversive Intervention* in 
Part Three*
96. The lovj level of participation in Caribbean regional 
interaction of both Haiti and Panama is recorded 
throughout Part Two.
SB
At the beginning of this section it was pointed out that 
the combination of *siaa.llneBS* and 'equality of capability* 
led to the inability of any single state to alter or 
control the immediate environment in which it operates. 
Another major implication stemming from the combination of 
'smallness* and * equality of capability* is now clear and 
arises from the correspondence of two of the strategies 
open to the Caribbean area states as possible approaches 
to the international system, That Is, insofar as the 
passive strategy (smallness of stated and the alliance 
strategy (capability similarities between states) are 
virtually synonymous, pressures on Oaribbean decision­
makers to adopt a renunciatory foreign policy will be very 
strong.
îiââ2?LiHÙLlsâjiiffiâ«
Althougli Latin America is characterised by states in 
markedly varying degrees and kinds of underdevelopment a 
majority of the states in the Caribbean area correspond 
to a particular type of underdevelopment in that the 
degree and kind of their underdevelopment is very similar.
Various models of underdevelopment show the similarity in 
degree, Using a linear model most Caribbean states are 
eouped /&
grouped at the 'imdeveloped' and 'backward' end of the 
Boale#^ '^  In terms of a growth model they are nearly all 
at the pre-take off s t a g e , P l a c e d  in categories based 
on per-oaplta income, growth, resource availability and 
nee, they fit into several categories at the most.^^ An 
important general effect of tlrls degree of underdevelop­
ment has been to exaggerate further the smallness of the 
states by virtue of the fact that all the pressures and
disabilities from which a small state suffers are in some
100measure enhanced if it is underdeveloped. In the 
Caribbean area, extreme smallness and a hi {pi degree of 
underdevelopment are thus mutually reinforcing factors.
The similarity in kind of ruiderdevelopraent stems from the 
historical/
97. Galbraith views économie development in tliis way 
by seeing "the countries of the world not as 
divided between the developed and the underdeveloped 
but as spread along a line representing various 
stages of development", See his ^on^omio Develjiu-
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 19G3), p,19.
UnzverBity Press, 1962). Mexico is at vhe vake-oxf 
stage and Colombia, Ouba, and Venezuela are special 
oases by being somewhere between the pre-take-off 
and take-off stages.
99* Benjamin ^iggins develops a 4 category model based 
upon such factors in Ills
Cl/oadon: Cons-caTile
ana Co. I i ta .  f ^ T ,  Ohapter i  cmd, pp.21-23 in 
particular.
100. Ah estimation of économie development frequently 
seems essential in defining whether a state ie 
small or not, e.g. Vital*s classification of a 
small state as "(a) a population of 10-15 lïïillion 
in the case of economically advanced countries;
(b) a population of 20-30 million in the case of 
underdeveloped counto^ies". See his Inegimlljzv^  pf
historical dominance In the area of the 'plantation economy*
3 01from which has risen a particular type of society# " Now 
in a process of modification the economy of the area is 
still largely explicable by reference to it, that is to
"a simple two-sector model with a
segment ed, foreign directed, pi'imary
export sector setting the pace -
largely in the traditional way in
respect of marketing, investment
financing, demand format!on and
1 f)o
technical progress"#""
The other sector comprises small public works and services 
combined with subsistance agriculture* This sector, 
generally stagnant, has been increasingly influenced by the 
other more dynamic sector in which it has become more or 
less i n t e g r a t e d . Consequently the economic history of 
the /
The basis of this economy and society have been 
outlined in Charles Wagley, "Plantation Americas 
A culture Sphere" in fera Bubin (ed) Caribbean
/SâM;lSllL™JLS2aE2S2qP (Xnstiouue of Sooxal and 
Economic Research. University College of the 
West Indies I 1937)# Only the Eastern lowlands 
of Central America can strictly be said to belong 
to this "culture sphere" in Central America but 
the latifundia system, particularly in the Pacific 
Coast lowlands, shows a number of similarities#
For this reason the notion of a "Caribbean culture 
sphere" oan be applied to the situation in Odntral 
America, particularly as these areas have proved 
to be the dynamic sectors of the economies#
102. Lloyd Best "Current Development Strategy and
Economie Integration in the Caribbean" in Lewis and 
Mathews (od) P.65
103# In Guatemala, for e-icaraple, the Indians, generally 
considered in certain areas as outside the money 
economy by their primary reliance on siibeistanoe 
agriculture, are nevertheless vitally important as 
seasonal labourers on the coffee, cotton, and sugar 
plantations. See Eduardo Galeano, Gua.t^m^s
(Wew York: Hoaem Header I'aper™
Isaekss 1969) 5 p p .4 1 -4 2 .
U 4,
the area oan largely be written in terms of the dynamic 
G00tor and in particular of the rospoBoe of the export 
sector to external demand#
The general pattern of imderdevelopment created by the 
'plantation economy* ie evident in the similar recommen- 
dations for development and the similar problems facing 
their implamentation#
Recommendations for the economic development of the various 
countries point to the need for economic planning; a 
hotter transportation system; Improved standards in 
public health, education and administration; and a widening 
of the base of the eoonoB^ r by diversification in agriculture? 
by utilizing new resources and by the creation of impact 
substitution industries *
The recommendation for widening the base of the economy is
104# Such a history is Ramiro Guerra y Banchez, Sugar
MalSSY„SC4atel.iXS?/K*/W^ (Hew Havens Yale
university Dress 1964) which stresses rhe gradual
integration of the other sectors of the economy 
with the plantation sector and the dominance of 
this, from the early 20th Oentury onwards by the 
Uni ted B tat as*
105* See, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Associatos,
Development (The 20th Century Fund? Mew York, 
George" Allen and Unwin Ltd* 19*32) Chapter 12; 
International Bank for Reconstruction and
One; Vincent Ohecohi and Associates, |londyu^s|^A 
î m à M m  20th century
funds Hew ïork 1939)g Chapter xO*
the most Imp03:tant yet the most difficult to implement, due
to its political implications, To diversify agriculture a
programme of land reform is necessary; yet this threatene
the native political ^11te as well as majoi? business interests
in the United States, For the former, ownership of land has
historically been the necessary base for entrance into
politics which also guarantees ? because of the very unequal
distribution of land, its exclusiveness,^^^ For the latter
large landholdings have been claimed ae initially necessary
107for efficient export production# Business interests in
the United States have consequently viewed land reform with 
alarm and have applied pressure at the government level, both 
in the United States and the Oaribbean area, to ps?event it.^^^
The development of import substitution industries creates 
similar problems. For the native elite it will inevitably
106. There are, of course other bases of power than the 
possession of land but in the Caribbean area the 
historical importance of agriculture has given a 
special significance to the ownership of land as a 
means of acquiring wealth and power.
For example, in banana production U.F.C.O# claims 
four reasons for large landholdings - (a) the need 
fo37 self-contained units, (b) the amount of 
irrigation, (c) the system of 'flood fallowing' to 
control disease, (d) only about one-quarter of the 
land is suitable anyway. See Stacy Hay and Galo
, _ , OR
1938), .pp.82-87.
108, Detailed examples of such pressures in Guatemala are 
provided in Alfonso Bauer gaiz, Oamo^o&er&gl
D4exloo Bazuoria
Ibero Hexicana, igÿbT.
mean an end to th© traditional exclusiveness of politics
a8 middle class elements and later the labeur unions
pressure to be admitted to the political a r e n a , F o r
United States business interests it has both advantages
and disadvantages, The advantages centre on the creation
of new lucrative investment possibilities, particularly in 
n othe G,A,C,M, The disadvantages are in the possibility
of a diminishing market for United States exports in an area
n  1where it has been particularly easy to sell them.
Within Central America, concern oves? this is shown in the 
pressure that United States business interests have put on 
their government to oppose the Integrated Industries Scheme 
of the C.A.O.m P^^
Within the states in the Oaribbean area the political elites 
marked lack of concern over development is most clearly 
shown in the general absence of parties or personaliticB 
offering a policy and ideology of development, Where 
such/
109* The 'rules* for admitting new groups to the political 
arena as well as the possible effects of so doing are 
outlined in Ohnfles W, Anderson, "Toward a theory of 
Latin American Politics" in Peter G, Snow (ed)
(lew  York; l î o l t ,  Blneharlî and W inston, In c , IW fT T
110, So far the major beneficiaries of integration are 
United States firms which have been quick to exploit 
the incentives and concessions offered them,
111, See my earlier section "The Preponderance of the 
Uni ted S tat ee",
112, See J,I), Oooîi3?an0ÿ "United States Attitudes toward 
Central American Integration" in In ter-Amorican 
Economic Affairs, 7ol.18, ho,2,, IS M -, pp,83-84 in 
particular,
113* A basic ideological approach to development is out­
lined by Pablo Gonzalez Casanova in "Internal and 
External Politics^  of Developing Countries" in R,
Basry Farrell (ed)
on s Nor thvieetern
University Press, 1966).
such parties or personalities appear opposition is bitter, 
from both the traditional land-owning elite and the army.
The native élite often combines with foreign business
interests to frustrate development programmes * The recent
history of the Dominican Republic provides a good example,
A combination of United States business interests and a
major section of the Political elite successfully hampered
the formulation and administration of Bosch's development
policies and kept open the idea of the sale to private
interests of th© state-owned expropriated Trujillo holdings
114upon which any development programme largely rested, ^
The United States government also concerna itself ivith 
influencing the goals and direction of Latin American 
developmentg as the whole conception of the Alliance for 
Progress indicates, Vfithln the Oaribbean it has been 
particularly concerned with the possibilities of the 0#A,C*M, 
and the Dominican Republic* Qualified support for Central 
American integration has been given but at the cost of 
placating United States business interests, and determining 
the overall operation of the C,A*0*M.^^-^ A similar picture
n  6emerges with respect to the Dominican Republic*
114* These holdings amounted to 65f^  of Dominican indus try ; 
35/^  of arable land and 30f^  of animal husbandry. See 
Fred Goff and Michael Locker "The Violence of 
Dominations tJ*S, Power and the Dominican Republic" 
in Irving louis Horowitz aï-âl (oü) Ha.tln Amog.lc.an 
Radicalism*
115. So© J.S. Dye Jnr* "0entrai American Regional 
Integration" .IntejpatlQml C m a m a t i m .  March, 1967, 
pp.52-57.
116. See John Bartlow Martin,
Civil War , (UevrYork: Doubleday a nd Oo,Xnc, 19ob) *
Any development programme hao therefore to take into accoimt
a multitude of national and foreign interests* Hence
widening the base of the economy will have international ae
well a8 national repercussions and will require approval
from abroad as well as at homo. Attempting development
without such approval may result in intervention. Interference
by the United States in the internal affairs of Guatemala in
1954 and later in the early developments of the Ouban
13 7Revolution are the clearest example of thle,'
Another major effect of the 'plantation economy* on inter­
national relations in the Caribbean area has been to reduce 
to a minimum the number of contacts between states. Producing 
similar products for sale outside the area economic contacts 
within the area have been few and unimportant, The develop­
ment of services, minimal and primarily associated with the 
export sector, has reflected this faot.^^^ Although the 
pattern is redressed somewhat in Central America by historical 
factors and that of geographic proximity greater trade and 
communication within the area is a very recent development.
â œ a :
Economic underdevelopment in the Oaribbean has then three 
major dimensions; /
117. Bee, in Part Three? the case studies of 'The 
Guatemalan Affair' and 'United Btates-Ouban 
Relations 1.959-1961'.
118. Telephone calls to neighbouring states, e.g.
Honduras and El Salvador, were routed through. Miami 
as late as 3,964. Railways in Honduras were 
developed only for the transport of bananas to the 
coast, hence the capital, Tegucigalpa, does not have 
a railway. Ae of 1966, between the capital of 
Haiti and that of the Dominican Republic there was 
no all-weather road or regular road transport 
services and telophbne calls wore routed via Miami.
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1# $he prevalence of a relatively Iiigh degree of 
underdevelopment3
2, file dominance of a single productive sector# 
the agricultural sector# in the economyg
3* fhe integration of this sector ?;ith an external 
developed state# the United States*
iB'or the majority of the Caribbean area states# under­
development removes the possibility of any action to 
influence the functioning of the international system.
At best all these states can hope for is to gain a measure 
of prestige in the system by the co-ordination of their 
international conduct to the value orientation of the 
international system*
Within the region effective action is circumscribed by 
the particular economic relationship established by these 
states with the United States. With the economy tied so 
closely to the United States pressure can easily be brought 
to bear by United States government and business interests 
to ensure compliance with United States demands* By 
accommodating themselves to these demands the Caribbean area 
states create a situation where United States interests and 
their/
119• I’liis is a general statement applying to all under 
developed countries* See Gustavo Bagos#
Carolina Brest3 1963) # Chapter 1 and pp.20-81 in 
particular* Caribbean area states try to
gain such prestige by verbally supporting the 
anti-colonial policies and the humanitarian 
declarations of the U.B.
their own appear to be icientioal# This identity of
interests reducee somewhat the aotion of the Oaribbean
area states in the O.A#8.# aa they are seen by a niMber
of South American atatos as mere ’client states’ of the
United States* Consequently, the initiatives taken by
the Caribbean states to activate the 0*A*S* have some-
IPTtimes been ignored,' Similarly# the prevalence of
non-ciemooratic forms of government and refusals to fully
implement various inter-American declarations have
resulted in the very low prestige of those states within 
3 2PLatin America* "
The particular type of underdevelopment in the Caribbean 
serves/
120, In Nicaragua under Anastasio Somoga* Mart# reports 
that ‘’Anbassador Guillermo Sevilla in Washington 
called home for instructions more than !)0 times in 
recent years preceding International conferences. 
His instructions always read the same8 "co-operate 
fully with the delegation of the United States" 
Central Americas 
p.199.
121. Ydigoras# as President of Guatemala, tried often 
and unsuccessfully to get the 0*A,S* to adopt 
stronger measures against Cuba from I960 onwards, 
these moves being seen by the larger states,
Brazil and Mexico in particular, as emanating from 
the United States. Juan Jose Arevalo, a former 
President of Guatemala, wryly notes that in the 
Û.A.S, "The United States delegates slip so many 
"suggestions" along the desks of the pre-committed 
that the proposals of interest to the powerful 
nation corae as though they originated from those 
who speak Spanish". See his %e,, 8^1iark,jnad.__%0 
Sardines (lew York; Lyle Gtuart, 1961), p.118.
122. On a subjective ranking by Latin Americans of the 
statue of the Latin American states only Cuba and 
Costa Rica received high scores. The former for 
its defiance of the United States and the latter 
for its ’fairer’ system of government. See 
•Johan Galtung et al "El Sistêma Latinoamerioa de 
lacioness un Analaeis Estruotural", pp.66-68*
serves then to fooua the International relations of these 
states on the relationship with the United States and to 
restrict# because of weakness, effective international 
action to the strictly local geographic area where other 
states in similar situations may be influenced*
Bor all of the twelve Caribbean area states it would be 
very difficult to generalise meaningfully about their 
internal politics; Mexico, for example, is clearly very 
different from the rest* However, for the majority of 
them# and in particular the smaller states, some generali­
sations are possible* Their political systems can be 
categorised as ’traditional’ or ’transitional’; and as 
remaining largely unintegrated and undifferentiated* The 
pattern of politics has basically been particularistic, 
aBcriptive, affective and diffuse; and has been marked 
by instability, militarism and personalism. finally, for 
one set or another of power contenders, the government has 
always been illegitimate and hence open to replacement by 
any means.
Personalismj, militarism and political instability have 
been recurrent throughout the history of the Caribbean area 
and remains of considerable significance at present. Their 
effect on the politics of the area is discussed below.
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III contrast to the decline of personallst politics in 
South America has been the persistence and perversIteness 
of pereonalist poltios in the Oarihhean area# Every facet 
of politics is affected by personalism#
Political issues and conflicts are frequently seen as 
arising 'because of the actions of one man rather than 
directly from the environment#^^^ Political parties, 
whether traditional# modern, or Ideological, tend to he 
organised around the political theory and personality of 
one Meanwhile nearly every major election, for
only the brief period of the election, sees the revival of 
•established* personalist parties and the formation of new
“I O/^
personalist parties# Finally# administration, whether
at/
Here, personalism is defined as adherence to or 
opposition to a political leader on personality 
rather than ideological grounds# Personal, 
individual and family motivations are to the fore 
rather than support for impersonal political ideas 
or pr ogr arame s «
124* Hence the use of assassination as a method of
political change. There have been four success­
ful assassinations of presidents - Roman of Panama 
in 1955, A# Soiiosa of Nicaragua in 1956, Castillo 
Armas of Guatemala in 1957 and Trujillo of the 
Dominican Republic In 1961 - and many other attempts . 
successful and unsuccessful, on other political 
figures.
i25- Traditional Parties, e#g. in Nicaragua the P.C.N, of 
Chamorro and the P,B#N. of the Somosas * Modern 
Parties, e#g# in the Dominican Republic the P.R.D. of 
Bosch# in Costa Rica the P.L,N. of Figtieres, in 
Venezuela the A.D# of .Betancourt and in Guatemala the 
P. H # of the Mont enegr os *,
126# A good example of an * established* personallst
party has been the P*H# of Calderon Guardia in Costa 
Rica#
(KJ
127at a national or at a local level, io personalis t based*
Personalism adds to, and la in part responsible for, an 
intensely partisan politics in which "winner takes all" 
prevails. For a perseonted opposition the options are 
feeble gestures, exile or violent opposition, For the 
government there are the considerable privileges and 
financial rewards of office, The sise of these gains and 
the difficulty of winning office in opposition tempt many 
governments to resort to ’oontimiismo’; either direct or 
inaireot.^^®
‘Personalism has also had a major effect on foreign policy 
formation* Personality has proved to be an important 
determinant in foreign policy decision making, and one of
the few checks available on a'berrant personalities is that
"a person is a3.ways a member of a group
and that there is a group or organisational
reality that stabilises the reality of 
each of its members and acts to prevent 
radical./
127* Stokes oays of Honduras that "personalismo might 
well be defined as £i principle in the Honduran 
administrative process"* See William S, Stokes,
SsBâiSEag.t, A
(Madisons University of Wisconsin Dress, 1950/, 
p.191.
128, "Oontinuismo" in the sense of legal change to
ensure that a president stays in office beyond the 
intention of the constitution under which he was 
elected has a long history in the area* Bee
loa
1940* A recent example of direct "oonrimiismo" is 
Duvalier is Haiti in 1964* Indirect "eontinuismo" 
can take two forms - "Impoeieiori" e^g* GW.lves in 
Honduras in 1949, or "candidate) unioo" e*g* Lemus 
in 231 Salvador in
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radical shifts or
The structure of government and personalism both tend to 
reduce such checks to a minimum# With the idea of 
executive control of policy, and in particular foreign 
policy, firmly established in Latin American politics, 
there are few institutional checks on presidential authority. 
Such checks as exist, legislative and/or administrative, are 
weakened by personalism* Foreign ministries are staffed 
almost wholly by followerb or friends of the President,
These officials rely upon presidential patronage and given 
this, plus the effects of personalism and. their prevailing 
values# are unlikely to be highly critical of presidential 
p o l i c y T h e  president sits in the middle of a communi­
cations network and decisions are frequently passed to him 
for resolution# He gives advice, when asked for, from a. 
largely uncritical group, A consequence is that the 
personality of the president becomes a major determinant 
of foreign policy decision-making, The philosophy behind 
personalism is also likely to act as an additional pressure 
upon a president to pursue, as far as possible, an individual 
style/
129. Joseph H, de Rivera, The Psvoholog:!oal h.imenslon
Ohapter 5,
130* Astis pointe out that in the Latin Ameri can diplomatic 
service "it is proper to assume that*,«positions often 
exist (or are created) to provide attractive rewards 
for the faithful of limited means" in his "The Latin 
American Countries in the Interna11ona1 System"^ p*4, 
Mexico# with a, small professional staff in its 
foreign ministry, is here an exception,
131, See John f, G-illin, "The Middle Segments and Their 
Values" in E.D. ïor/iaskek (ad)
Anchor
Booksj  1966).
le of foreign policy* Under these cireurastances it 
is clear that foreign policy will largely be personal; 
and it helps explain, why a great number of the presidents 
of Caribbean states have viewed Intra-area politics as 
based, often to a fairly large extent, on personality likes 
and dislikes $
,1Militarism^ ^
The military continue to be an Important group in the Latin 
American political process but as Xieuwen points out
"it is dangerous to generalise about the 
area as a whole, or any regional part of 
it, for the role of the military is not 
identical in any two countries. At one 
extreme is Costa Rica which abolished its 
army; at the other is the Dominican 
Republic with its absolutist military 
dictatorsMp* In between there are 
eighteen gradations•"
Nevertheless, it is possible to see that in a great number 
of/
132, Bo soil provides a clear example of this. He says 
"As soon as I was elected Président of the 
Dominican Republic Duvalier resolved to kill me - 
why I have no Idea, Perhaps he had a dream 
about me and interpreted it as an order to do away 
with me. Perhaps in a voodoo trance, one of his 
guardian spirits told him I would become his 
enemy." See Juan Boeoh
(Iiondon: Pall
Mall Breee 196é), g.184.
133# Militarism is here defined as "the domination of the 
military man over the civilian , the undue emphasis 
upon military demands, or any transcendence by the 
armed forces of "true military purposes" , from 
«^ ohn J, Jolmson "The Latin American military as a 
politically competing group in transitional society" 
lix John J. JotoBon (od)
CSew Jersey: Brinoeton
Ünlveroi'^ Press, 1 9 6 ^  p.91.
134. Bieuvjen America. p. 157
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of states of the Caribbean area the military are a 
decisive force in politics# And that vdth the exception
of Mexico and Costa Rica all the Caribbean states have 
political military forces#*
Since 1945, and with Mexico as the exception, the military
have intervened at least once in every state in the Caribbean 
137area# Many different reasons have been advanced for
these interventions but nearly a 11 agree that the basis for 
the frequency of military intervention in. the Caribbean area 
is the predominance of "traditional" end "transitional" 
social structures# * These structures giving the military 
in/
135# The very similar typologies of Lieuwen and Wyckoff 
between them place the Dominican Republic, B1 
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama in a category in which the armed forces 
dominate politics and are prone to intervene*
Bieuwen, A a i & ^ a â J l p l . l : y - m » p p . 150- 
163 and Theodore Wyckoff "The Eole of the Military 
in Latin American Politics" in John D. Marts (ed)
(Englewood Cliffs, lew Jersey; Prentice-Ha11 Inc.
1965), pp,263-268#
136, By "political military forces" is meant a military
which considers itself responsible for the definition 
and delegation of political authority" from Irving 
■ Louis Horowitz "The Military Elites" in Seymour 
Martin Lips et and Aldo Solar i (eds) Elites., in La:bin, 
America (New York; Oxford University Press, 196777
137# Although both Nicaragua and Costa Rica have been
considered as free of coup d’etats since 1945, the 
military have intervened in both# In Nioragua in 
favour of A.* Somosa against the incumbent president, 
Arguello, in May 1947# In Costa Elea in favour of 
the incumbent president, Picado, against the victory 
of anq>ponent, Ulate, in the presidential elections 
of February, 1948.
138* See, in particular, Gino German! and Kalman Silvert, 
"PolitioB, Social Btructuro and Military Intervention 
in Batin America" in Snow (ed) Politio.a
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In the area greater influence and greater opportunity to 
intervone*^^^
The motives for intervention, have been mixed 'but are related 
mainly to internal politico rather than external politics; 
and more to the preservation of the status quo than to its 
overthrow* The military are consequently regarded as 
guardians of the traditional order and not, as has happened 
elsewhere in Latin America, as possible protagonists of 
change #
Once in power the military are able to govern more adequately 
in the Caribbean area states than they have been able to do 
in Latin America as a whole* The smallness of many of the 
states ensures that the military are quickly able to consoli­
date power and guarantee future compliance* Two of the
greatest weaknesses of the military - inability to administer
111and lack of legitimacy - are reduced to a minimuia.
Militar
159. John j. Johnson in
Amer^qa (Californias Stanford University frees 1964; 
notes that "Historically they (armed forces) have 
attained the greatest influence when the masses have 
been apathetic, the trade unions feeble and few, and 
the officers themselves free to perform the relatively 
simple function of providing the balance of power 
between groups competing for political power but in 
essential agreement on social-economic objectives", 
p*257* This was clearly the position of many of the 
Caribbean states during the period under discussion*
140* ThG military in 11 Salvador and Venezuela have been 
reform minded however* Those in Guatemala, the 
Dominican Republic and Honduras have not* See 
Edv/in Bleuwen, (Boudons
Pall Mall P r e s s C h a p t e r s  3 and 5*
141. See S.S. Elner
military in politics. (Londons fall mil BroBS, 19^) 
Chapter 3T
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Military men have frequently had administrative experience
in civilian government and bo are familiar with civic problems
1/1'^
and procedures# folitical illegitimacy rather than
legitimacy is the normative pattern for much of the area,^^^ 
The military are, consequently, as acceptable as any other 
elite group in power and often make a case for greater 
acceptability by claiming to govern in the national Interest 
rather than for particular interests#
Toward foreign policy formation the military are generally 
very conservative* They change very little other than the 
emphasis put on certain relations# In the Caribbean area 
this generally has meant a greater support for United States 
policies, particularly in the 0#A#S,
Confusion often surrounds the definition of political 
stability or instability but however these terms are defined 
there is general agreement that political instability is a 
feature of Latin American . p o l i t i c s T h i s  permanent 
instability being expressed mainly in "purposive political 
violence"* Politics in the Caribbean area states can be 
described as very unstable and dominated by violence#
142# In Guatemala, under Arbens in 1954, all the 22
Departmental Governorb were army officers# During 
the presidency of Mendes Montenegro all the Governors 
of the Departments were colonels#
143# See Irving Louis Horowits, "The norm of illegitimacy; 
The political sociology of Latin America" in Irving 
Bouls Horowx-fcss et al (eds)
144# For a recent attempt to define political stability and 
instability in a general sense and then apply this to 
Latin America see Martin 0# Needier, Political
Evolu11 oiiarv (Jhan^ ce # (New tork: Random Hoube 1968;, 
Chapters 1,2.
Of the many explanations advanced for the causes of 
political instability in Latin America those of ICling appear 
to be the most relevant to the majority of states In the 
Caribbean area* Summarised as general propositions, he 
says that
"A decisive correlation exists between the 
control of the economic bases of power 
and the real exercise of political power in 
Latin America* Control of the conventional 
économie bases of power remains relatively 
static*
Because of the colonial nature of the Latin 
American economies an exceptional economic 
premium attaches to the control of the 
apparatus of government as a dynamic base 
for .power# Whereas the conventional bases 
of power effectively restrict mobility in 
economic status, control of government 
provides an unusually dynamic route to 
wealth and power* Thus the contrast between 
the stable character of the conventional 
economic bases of power and the shifting, 
unconventional position of government provokes 
intense and violent competition for control of 
government as a means of acquiring and 
expanding a base of wealth and power* In the 
vocabulary of mathematics .çiLSgMdo
âM,J^»j>o34âls,9l.Æ ÊQUiiaasîgïd5â.MJ^
(Emphaais in. the original).
145# Merle Eling "Toward a theory of power and political 
instability in Latin America" in Mart^ (ed)
p.138*
f f
In the Caribbean area this "intense and violent competition" 
for politloal power ia reflected by the frequency with which 
violence haa been the major factor in the change of presi­
dent a or juntas* From 1946 to 1963 there were twenty-seven 
Buoh changes and only Mexico was free from executive change 
by vlolence*^^^
TABLE FIFTZmSN
To show the successful use of violence in the 
Caribbean area to effect changes of
i|^ ï5*frTAi.a'iL»«ti.<Wrîe«TiWiin*5*W/Vjril<‘<A*r.y»i7.t»Æl/.ivzaNiFS7irvft*,CïJ#W#V!b/W%mAi^^
Presidents or Juntas -
Colombia 
Costa Hiea 
Cuba
Dominican Republic
El .Salvador 
Guatemala
Lti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Venezuela
June 1953, May 1957.
Mar oh-May, 1948.
March 1952, January, 1959 
(protracted)
May 1961-January 1962,
Sep tomber, 196 3,
Apr11-May 1965.
December 1948, October, I960 
January, 1961,
June 1954, July, 1957, 
October, 1957, March, 1963.
January, 1946, May 1950, 
December 1956-Ootober 1957*
October 1956, October, 1963.
May 1947, September, 1956*
November 1949, May 1951, 
January, 1955*
November, 1948, January 1958
146* Violence is here taken to mean all changes of
presidents or juntas occasioned directly by the 
threat of violence or the use of violence*
to
For the twenty-seven Buocessfxal attempts there were many 
more unBuooessful attempts but aoourate figures for these
'Î / Y
are difficult to come by*" ' An approximation of the total
general amount of political violence can be gained however
by using the figures collected by Eckstein on. Internal wars*
Using the Hew York Times Index for the period 1946-1959# he
records for the area* a total of 3S6 cases of equivocal and
unequivocal political violence*
TA3I33 SIYTEM
To show the total extent of political violence 
in the Caribbean area* 1946'
Equivocal and 
H B a g u l - g a o a l  . f f i m a u l m o a l - . . .
Colombia 42 47
Costa Rica 16 19
Cuba 80 100
Domini can Hepubli c 2 6
El Salvador 4 9
Guatemala 32 45
Haiti 32 40
Honduras 10 1%
Mexico 27 28
Nicaragua 13 16
Panama 23 29
Venezuela 26 36
tc.vi,yvyu*Cts»<-6-.y^ji i :*
îüaaââ" Hasïy Eokstein
MJlBjfeAfiÆaajakSa. c-^ -tea m  Merle laxng "1/iolenee
and Politics in Latin America"* p*196,
147* 4revaXo, as President of Guatemala from 1946-1951 
admits to 17 uprisings - others say there were 
many more* The Incidence of isolated acts of 
political violence directed m ainly towards the 
government was certainly high*
146* By ’unequivocal violence* Eckstein means warfare, 
turmoilg rioting* terrorism* mutiny and coups ; 
by ’equivocal violence’ plots* administrative 
action*
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These figures clearly show that thorough out the Caribbean 
area political violence is frequent* especially in the bigger 
states* But paradoxically political violence* less frequent 
in the smaller states* is more likely to end in a successful 
change of leadership as a comparison with Table Fifteen 
establishes. Here the use of violence io effective; it is 
also regarded as legitimate* The best indication of this is 
in its institutionalisation. Stokes* for example, disting­
uishes between seven types of political violence* all of which 
can be located in the politics of the smaller Caribbean area 
states sinee World War To this can be added the
rights of asylum and tradition of exile for participants in 
unsuccessful insurrections which are a marked feature of 
Central American politics in particular# Guerilla warfare * 
although non-institutionaliseds can also be added to the list* 
since it is based on advocacy of violence as the necessary 
condition for politiocal change* This * structured’ violence 
is further reinforced by a culture of political violence* 
formed elsewhere in Latin America* but very noticeable in the 
Caribbean area.^^^
Rooenau has drawn attention to the inadequacy of viewing the 
internal politics and external politics of a state as separate 
from each other and instead has stressed their inte.r- 
relatedness#^^^ /
149# The seven types are oaudillismo* golpe de estado* 
ouartelaso* revolution* imposicion* continuismo* 
candidate unioo# William S# Stokes "Violence as 
a power factor in Latin America" in Marts (ed)
150* SeG Merle ICling "Violence and Politics in Latin
America " in Irving Louis Horowits et al (eds) Latin
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1relatednees# From this it follows that the major
characteristics of internal politics become very important 
determinants of a state’s external policy* Rosenau further 
suggests that the external behaviour of states is generally 
explicable by reference to five variables which he calls
IE '
the idiosyncratic* role* government* societal and systemic#
Adopting HoBenau’e argument and his classification* the 
purpose of this section has been to stress the Importance of 
the idiosyncratic* societal and governmental variables as 
against the role variable for understanding politics in the 
Oaribbean area* ' Of particular importance * as outlined 
by the paragraphs on personalism is the idiosyncratic 
variable* As Eosenau points out this variable can be of 
considerable slgnifloanoe when the holder of high office is 
frequently important in both the national and international 
system and is largely responsible for delineating the 
boundaries between them* In these circumstances the natinze 
of the recruitment and socialisation of such officials becomes 
an important determinant of policy*^^^ In the Oaribbean 
area heads of state are Important in both the national and 
int orna11onal /
151* James N* Eosenau "Ere-theories and Theories of
Foreign Policy"in E* Barry Farrell (ed) Anprcac^s
153* The societal variable is stressed furthey, in the 
section "Economic Underdevelopments Its Nature 
and some Major Implications" and the systemic variable 
in the sections "The Preponderance of the United 
States" and "The 6malluess of States and the Capabil­
ity Similarities between States in the Oaribbean Areas 
Some Implications".
154* James N* Bosenaii "Introductions Political Science 
in a ShrinJ-Cing World" in James M* Eosenau (ed)
Linkage goXltips (Hew York: ïhe Free Press, 1969),
P* 13 *
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International system and the nature of the recruitment and 
socialisation Is powerfully affected hylhe mix of govern­
mental and societal variables as reflected in personalism 
as an ideology, militarism, political instability and 
political violence which all tend to reinforce and to 
emphasise the idiosyncratic variable* A reflection of this 
fact is seen in the explanation of much of Caribbean area 
politics solely by reference to this v a r i a b l e , T h i s  
ignores howover the other important variables , particularly 
the systemic* which must be taken into account for any 
meaningful explanation of the politics of the area,^ *^ ^
Using only material contained in the previous section ’The 
Particular Indicators of the Oaribbean Region’ it is now 
possible to identify a region and within this a core group 
of states*
The theory behind the identification of the region is that 
the material contained in the previous section points to 
a n ’ideal typo ’in every’particular indicator’, and from the 
sum of those ’ideal types’ it is possible to envisage a 
’typical’ Oaribbean state* The relationship of every state 
in /
155* Popular books on the area are particularly prone to 
do this, G*g* Oolin Rickards Oaribbean Powpi; (Londons 
Dobson Books Ltd,1963); a similar approach has also 
been suggested for serious research, e*g* Frederick 
E. Kidder "Hemispheric Role of the Oaribbean Political 
Leadersâ A Bibliography of Gurrent Biography^ in 
Wllgus (od) 2àâ,jOT;U5beajàt™„Xt0_^ ^^
156* On the point of the systemic variable see the section 
"Some Explanations of the Interaction Patterns in the 
Region 1948-1964" in Part Two*
in the Oaribbean area to this * typical’ state can therefore 
be assessed by reference to its relationship to every 
particular indicator# Those states approximating most 
closely to the ’typical’ state are considered as the core 
group of the region# Those approximating closely to the 
•typical’ state as being in the region# Those approximating 
only partially or not at all are excluded#
To identify both the region and the core group I  have drawn 
up a chart which Indicates every state’s relation to a 
•particular indicator’ as either positive or negative - 
shown by a tick and cross respectively# Where a state’s 
relation to the indicator may be qualified I have added a 
question mark# For a state to belong to the region it must 
register as positive on every one of the four ’particular 
indicators’# Conversely if it registers as negative in any 
one of these ’particular indicators’ I exclude it from the 
region# However, a state registering as negative in any one 
of the divisions into which the ’particular indicators’ are 
divided is not necessarily excluded from the region but it 
is excluded from the core group# Also excluded from the 
core group, but not from the region, is any state registering 
a qualified positive in any of the ’particular indicators’ 
or one of their divisions# X have made no attempt to rank 
or assign weights to any ’particular indicator’ or to its 
divisions#
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By registering a positive in every ’particular indicator’ 
or division of an indicator the following seven states 
constitute the core group of the region - the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua and Panama,
Ooeta Rica and Ouba qualify for inclusion in the region 
by registering as positive, albeit qualified, in every 
’particular indicator* *
Excluded from the region are Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela 
although Venezuela can, in many respects, be said to be a 
Caribbean state#
A brief look at Venezuela’s, Colombia’s and Mexico’s 
historical attitudes towards the Caribbean area as visible 
by their respective foreign policies also point to their 
exclusion from the region*
Venezuela’s foreign policy most closely approximates to 
that of a ’Caribbean state’ in respect of frequent involve­
ment in intra-area politics combined with a firm alliance 
with the United States* Involvement in the Caribbean area 
was particularly high under the regime of Betancourt when
Venezuela had a number of foreign relations problems with
1^7both the Domincan Republic and Cuba. At the same time
it/
157* a short summary of both disputes is in Robert 
.1. Alexander
i EE0ÊUÇL_2£JâlS_ïêSâffip-.^IXSS^^
(hew Brunswick, h*J. Burgers university Press,
1964), pp.143-146.
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it was particularly concerned with the ending of colonialism 
in the C a r i b b e a n . However, unlike many of the other 
Btat08 in the area, its Caribbean policy has not always 
been in accord with the United States and differences have 
a r i s e n # Also, unlike many of the states in the area, 
it has wider contacts in the intesmational system.
This relative independence from the United States has been 
reflected in the international system by the invitations 
sent to Venezuela to participate in the two 1961 conferences 
of the Hmcommitted* states. Its dependence on the United 
States and ite support of the United States is reflected in 
Venezuela’s final decision, reached only after much 
controversy, not to attend. Consequently Venezuela’s 
position in respect of its foreign policy is difficult to 
define* Whilst peripheral to the region it is also involved 
in a wide sense, with the region. But because it is only 
peripheral to the region I have decided to exclude it from 
c onsiderati on.
The anomalous position of Venezuela to the Caribbean region 
is not shared by either Colombia or Mexico* Their respec­
tive /
158. Representatives from the colonial West Indies were 
invited to the second conference of the inter- 
American Association for Democracy and Freedom in 
I960, for which the Venezuelan Government was both 
host and prime mover*
159. Such differences have been evident in the O.A.S* 
where Venezuela has been critical of United States 
policies, particularly in respect of United States 
attitudes at the Sixth and Tenth Meetings of the 
Foreign. Minis ter s.
160. Venezuelan initiative and contact with Arab countries 
was behind the formation of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries in i960. The 
functioning of this organization has also led it into 
formal contact with the Soviet Union.
fciD
respective foreign policies clearly show very little 
attention to the area#
For Colombia involvement in the Caribbean area has centred 
around the question of Panama# With the creation of 
independent Panama in 1903 a source of direct involvement 
ceased# ' Instead* involvement In the area now stemmed 
from its relationship with the United States and revolved 
around how the United States viewed the question of the 
defence of the Panama Canal# Due to this very indirect 
involvement in the Caribbean area Colombia has shown little 
interest in the affairs of the independent Caribbean area 
states* Such interest as is shown is particularly insig­
nificant when compared to the interest in her immediate 
neighbours - Venezuela* Peru and Ecuador#
For Mexico the Caribbean area has also been of little 
significance# It has never threatened here security and any 
desire of Mexico to establish hegemony over the area has 
been limited by powerful external states - principally Great 
Britain and the United States# Consequently Mexico has 
tiu^ ned her bade on the Caribbean*
"Her Oentral-Amerioan policy of strict 
non-intervention is coupled with one 
of strictly ignoring this region# The /
f 3î*ÉCÎï=JKsMÉ6asW3 .^riH£?».'*l«H»B»Ji»wyirî ra«rja#*»-n»S3«
161. By this is meant direct political involvement 
arising from geography* i#e* border disputes.
The fact that seven of Colombia’s nineteen 
departments border the Caribbean and that in 
these departments are several major Caribbean 
citiesp e.g. Barranquilla - population 499,000, 
Santa Marta - population 105,000 does not seem 
to have resulted in Colombia showing particular 
conoorn with developments in the Caribbean.
162. Since World War Two* this interest has taken the 
form of promoting ’Granoolombianismo* which is 
the promotion of cultural and commercial inter­
change * and of diplomatic co-operation* with /
u/
The great problems which have developed 
on her own doorstep have not elicited 
any positive aotion on her part* She
has done little to put an end to 
colonialism aside ihrom declarations, which 
are more theoretical than real, usually
"16*^5put forward àt inter-American meetings. “
Having idontided the existence of a region in the Garihbean 
it is now possible to shift the focus of the study on to the 
question of systems* That is, whether the nine states 
comprising the region form a system, or systems, in their 
own right, or if the region is only part of a much larger 
system. To begin to answer this question the next major 
section focuses on the pattern of interaction among these 
nine states*
1620 (continued) with neighbouring countries.
See W.O. Galbraith Oolom[bjag__
(London; Oxford University fress, 2nd edition 
1966), Chapter 15*
163* Francisco Cuevas Ganoino, "The Foreign Policy 
of Mexico" in J.B* Black and K.W. Thompson ^
( eda ) te,.giimXoUMas™3|^ "\,
(Hew York: Harper and How, 1963; p.658, \
P A R T  T W O
SHE BASSBRH 01’ IHSBRAGSIGH I# SHE 
CAEIBBEAH RESIOH! A QHAMSISASITE APPHOAOH
o y
SHE PAÏSE1ÎÎT OF IMBEAOSlOH IH 
SHE OAHIBBBAH HBGIOIs A
QUAHail'A'JlVE APPEOACH,
The purpose of Part Two is to establish the overall pattern 
of interaction in the region by the use of c[uantitative 
data over time* Essentially a brief commentary on the 
region* it provides information on the general level and 
nature of interaction in the region and whether this changes 
over time; and on the contribution to the general level and 
nature of interaction of groups of states and whether this 
changes over time* An explanation of some of the patterns 
of interaction is then given by testing some hypotheses from 
’small group theory’ which may also hold for the ’abstract’ 
international systern*
ïlio sourece of the data is the from
1
October 1948 to September 1964 inclusive, I feel justified 
in using this as the source for the following reasons:
1, Its coverage of politics and economics in the nine
states of the Oaribbean region is the best available 
source of information on the region next to the 
daily newspapers of each individual state,
2, Its basis as a scholarly report ensures that its
reporting of politics is not confined just to the
sensational but also includes the misensatiomX,
It thus provides a greater reflection of reality 
tlian any other interested outside source, for 
example, the New York Times,
i iity|e£3fssiM,to »?ts^%toqsjE«*jw;(*a‘K**TS#P*.’wrTWa
1, Published in 17 volumes by the Institute of 
Hispanic American and Luso Brazilian Studies 
at Stanford University, California, 1948-1964#
3, Its ooverage of polltics and economics month by 
month for each state of the Caribbean region 
allows for the recording of most of the major 
interactions between states. It is particularly 
useful in locating fairly accurately any signifi­
cant change in intensity, direction or type of 
interaction,
The method adopted to collect the data was based on an 
evaluation of the monthly report on each of the nine states 
If the report indicated any aotion from one state directed 
specifically towards any other states in the region this 
was noted and placed into the category of either friendly
2actions - co-operation* or hostile actions - conflict.
2. For example, for August 1951, in the Oaribbean region 
the contains the following
reports related to interaction in the region.
(1) That after 3 years of negotiations the 
Nicaraguan government returns to Costa Rica the 
3 planes flown to Nicaragua during the 1948 
civil war in Costa Rica,
(2) That Haiti denounces the privileged role of 
Cuba in the United States sugar market.
(3) That the Dominican Republic denounces the 
privileged role of Cuba in the United States sugar
market and warns the Cuban government of the
dangers of continuing to aid anti-Trujillo exiles*
These 3 reports were coded as follows;
Co-operation — Nicaragua — —  >■ Costa Rica
Conflict - Haiti ------------- > Cuba
- Dominican Republic— Cuba
Although collection of the data included two-way 
coding, i.e. a state was coded as to whether it was 
a recipient or transmitter of interaction, the 
analysis throughout Part Two does not utilise this 
information but concentrates on the fact that inter­
action has occurred. The tables containing the 
data on the number of interactions between states are 
in the Appendix*
The majority of actions so categorised were governmental 
in origin rather than non«govemmental* This emphasis
upon governmental actions is ‘based on tivo considerations*
One is the relatively greater importance in international 
relations of governments compared to any other organisation 
or individual* The other vias the difficulty of locating 
any non-governmental action as specifically hostile or 
friendly* The data represent primarily then, vjith one 
exception, a record of the quantity and nature of actions 
that various governments in the region directed towards 
other governments in the region from October 1948 to 
September 1964 inclusive*
The one exception made is on the recording of governmental
actions related to the programme of unity in Central America.
There are, I believe, two reasons for excluding such inter­
actions* Firstly, the particular nature and functioning 
of the Central American unity programme since World War Two 
allows it to he treated as largely distinct from the general 
pattern of politics in the region* Secondly, that 
frequently these governmental actions have been at an 
indirect rather than at a direct level and hence difficult tc
assess* Consequently it should bo remembered that levels
of interaction between Central American states are higher
%
than the data indicates.'
3* For an Indication of the level of interaction among 
Central American states in respect of the •union* p ro -
Ul
Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement”
v o i . 2 2 . ,  N0 . 4 . ,  1 9 6 8 ,
p p .873-874 .
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The level and Mature of Interaction in the 
Caribbean Region 1943-1964
Over the whole time period of fifteen years a total of 
one thousand and forty-six interactions have been reoorded#
The amomit and type of this interaction in any one year is 
shown by Diagram One*
What is immediately apparent from this diagram is the 
dramatic increase in interactions from 1959 through to 1964. 
One reason for this increase is in the nature of the material 
itself. The quality of the Hla2â^.JaMÂSSaJieB0Sji 
improved in 1959 and subsequently so the greater number of 
interactions recorded is partly a reflection of a more com­
prehensive coverage* However, this by itself is insufficient 
to explain all of such an increase which is explicable only 
in terms of the real increase in intra-Caribbean interaction 
from 1959 onwards*
This increase in interactions suggests that an approach to 
analysis of the data would be to treat it in two sections - 
pro 1959 and post 1959 particularly since a division of 
the data at this point would result in two sets of almost 
equal numbers of interactions - five hundred and twenty- 
four interactions pro 1959 and five hundred and twenty-two 
interactions post 1959* Such a division would also appear 
warranted in terme of a. number of historically observable 
changes in the pattern of politics in the region from 1959 
onwards*^ /
4. Particularly significant historically observable 
changes in this period have been the formulation 
by the United States of a now latin American policy 
and the beginning of the Cuban Revolution, both of 
which took effect in 1959*
o<r o00
Ow- o
onwards* Consequently, for some purposes I have chosen to 
divide the data into two time periods* Period One extends 
from October 1948 to December 1958 and Period Two from Januar
1959 to September 1964*
On the basis of this division into periods the data reveal 
a change of emphasis in interaction from a position where 
conflict interactions were only marginally predominant in 
Period One - 234 co-operation interactions to 290 conflict 
interactions - to where it is clearly predominant in Period 
Two -» 184 co-operation interactions to 334 conflict inter­
actions* Hence, over time, the trend within the region has
been away from co-operation and towards conflict* This is
particularly noticeable from 1959 onwards when it can be 
shown that previous to this year co-operation Interactions 
had exceeded conflict interactions in four separate years but 
that after 1959 conflict interactions always predominate.
The position of any state in the level of interaction remains 
fairly constant over time# This can be demonstrated by 
ranking the nine states in accordance with their total indi­
vidual interaction in the two time periods. Only in the 
cases of Cuba - a change from sixth in Feriod One to first 
in period Two, and the Dominican Republic - from second in 
Period One to sixth in Period Two, - is there any significant 
change* /
5* See Diagram One*
6. The effect of this switch by Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic on regional interaction is taken up later.
change#
Ranks of the Regional States hy Interaction
in the Two Time Periods
PERIOD CHE PERIOD ÏWO
No.
Inter™
actions State Rank Rankumax^ \'VenLamS[xi^i » State
No*
Inter­
actions
98 Nicaragua 1 1 Cuba 125
93 Dorn# Republic 2 2 Nicaragua 70
73 Guatemala 3 3 Guatemala 62
70 Costa Rica 4 4 Honduras 61
54 Honduras 5 5 Costa Rica 55
50 Cuba 6 6 Dorn. Republic 53
48 Tiîl Salvador 7 7 B1 Salvador 42
26 Haiti 8 8 Panama 31
12 Panama 9 9 Haiti 23
This consistent level of interaction 'by most states can he 
considered as indicating the existence of a hierarchy of 
states within the region* The adoption of such a hierarchy 
as valid is very useful in examj.nlng any particular state 
interaction within the region as it then hecomes possible to 
make generalisations about their behaviour over the whole 
time period* Consequently I have placed all the nine states 
into three groups dependent upon interaction levels* In 
Group One - high level interaction - are Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Group Two - middle 
level interaction - are Costa Rica, Honduras and B1 
Salvador /
El Salvador* In Group Three - low level interaction - are
7Haiti and Panama*
Further examination of interaction within the region proceeds 
on the basis of these three groups with the patterns presented 
as a set of findings so that comparison between them is 
easier*
fogQ’blierc the four states of Group One accoimt for 60^ of the
total interactions over the whole time period* Of this 
amount 68^ were conflict interactions and 32^ were co­
operation interactions* In both time periods the amount of 
interaction remains constant at 60^ in Period One and 59^ in 
Period Two* Of these amounts 63*/^ were conflict interactions 
in Period One and 73^ were conflict interactions in Period 
Two# Alongside this increase in conflict was a decrease in 
the number of co-operation interactions from 115 in Period 
One to 84 in Period Two*
I4!Èi^.îa'ËgjacJionJ^tenLXlJ& 55?* of the inter-
actions of Group One within the region are with itself. 
Interactions/
7* In choosing three groups with unequal numbers of 
participants an element of bias can be introduced 
in the sense that a group of four has more chance 
of external and internal interactions than a group 
of three, and a group of three has more than a 
group of two# However, an e3J.minatlon of this 
bias by expressing the proportion of actual inter­
actions during the time periods covered as ratio 
to the proportion of potential interactions during 
the time periods covered does not appear to 
significantly invalidante trends based on a straight 
comparison of absolute figures. Given this plus 
the suggestive rather tlian exhaustive nature of the 
exercise the mathematics of this section are there­
fore based on absolute figures shown directly from 
tables in the Appendix.
Interactions within the group are conflict dominant with 260 
conflict interactions clearly predominating over the 80 co­
operation interactions* The division of the interactions 
into two time periods reveals no increase or decrease of inter­
action within the group over time, there being 170 interactions 
in Period One and 1?0 interactions in Period Two, Although 
there is no increase or decrease in interaction there is incr­
eased conflict within the group# In Period One there were 
120 conflict interactions to 50 co-operation interactions and 
in Period 'Two 140 conflict interactions to 30 co-operation 
interactions*
= 3 #  of the inter-
actions of Group One within the region are with Group Two# 
Interactions with Group Two, show a slight preponderance of 
conflict, at 116 conflict interactions to 101 co-operation 
interactions# The division of interactions into the two time 
periods reveals there is a small decrease in interaction from 
Period One at 116 interactions to Period Two at 101 interactions, 
This decrease in total interactions is marked by a small 
increase of co-operation interactions from 49 in Period One to 
52 in Period Two, and a greater increase of conflict inter™ 
actions from 52 in Period One to 64 in Period Two#
H?'» of the inter-
actions of Group One within the region are with Group Tliree. 
Interactions with Group Three are conflict dominant, at 49 
conflict interactions to 18 co-operation interactions# The 
division of interactions into the two time periods reveals 
there is a fairly substantial increase in interactions from 
Period One at 28 interactions to Period Two at 39 interactions# 
This increase in total interactions is marked by a similar /
similar substantial increase in conflict interactions from 
15 in Period One to 34 in Period Tvfo with a correspondingly 
large drop in co-operation interactions from 13 in Period 
One to 5 in Period Two*
Summarvs The four states of Group One dominate interaction 
within the region hut are as likely to be Interacting with 
themselves as to be interacting with the other two groups. 
Conflict interactions are dominant with a high probability 
of these occurring within the Group and with Group Three, 
particularly in Period Two, Interaction with Group Two is 
more balanced but here also conflict in-.er act ions are 
increasing at the expense of decreasing total interaction* 
Overall then, the states of Group One contribute considerably 
to the high level of conflict within the region and are 
particularly responsible for the increase in conflict from 
Period One to Period Two.
The Interaction Pattern of Group Two
Together the three states of Group Two account for 31/^  of 
the total interactions over the whole time period. Of this 
amount 55/ were co-operation interactions and 45/ were conflici 
interactions. When the level and type of interactions of 
Period One are compared to Period Two only a slight decrease 
in interaction is evident - from 33/ in Period One to 30/ in 
Period Two* Whilst this is reflected in a similar slight 
percentage decrease in the amount of co-operation interactions 
from 56/ in Period One to 54/ in Period 0?wo the number of 
conflict interactions did not increase - from 76 in Period 
One to 73 in Period Two*
SSf. of the
interactions of Group Two within the region are with itself* 
Interactions within the group are co-operation dominant with 
64 co-operation interactions clearly predominating over the 
28 conflict interactions* The division of interactions 
into the two time période reveals that there is a email 
decrease in interaction from Period One at 50 interactions to 
Period Two at 42 interactions* This small decrease in 
total interactions is marked by a small increase in conflict 
interactions from 12 in Period One to 16 in Period Two, and 
a correspondingly greater decrease in co-operation interactions 
from 38 in Period One to 20 in Period Two,
665« of the inter-
actions of Group Two within the region are with Group One,
(For details of the level and type of interaction refer to the 
set of findings on the interaction pattern of Group One with 
Group Two),
The Interaction Pattern with Grouo tBirees 6/ of the inter- 
actions of Group Two within the region are with Group Three* 
Interactions with Group Three are co-operation dominant* at 
16 co-operation interactions to 5 conflict interactions* The 
divisj.on of interactions into the 'two time periods reveals 
there is a fairly substantial increase in interaction from /
8, As the 3 states of Group Two are all involved in the 
programme of unity in Central America interaction 
figures are higher, particularly in feriod Two when 
the programme really got going, than the above figures 
indicate. Overall then interaction, in reality, 
would be higher in Period Two than in Period One and 
also more likely to be co-operative than conflictive* 
For a confirmation of this see 1,8, Nye ”Comparative 
Regional Integrations Concept and Measurement”, 
pp.873-874.
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from Period One at 6 toteractions to Period Two at 15 Inter­
actions# This increase in interaction is marked by an 
increase in both co-operation interactions, froRi 6 in Period 
One to 10 in Period Two, and by the appearance of conflict 
interactions from nil in Period One to 5 In Pe3:iotl Tvjo.
The three states of Group Two are twice as likely 
to be interacting with Group One than with themselves and 
Group Tliree# Oo-operatioii interactions are dominant within 
the Group, less so with Group Three and more or less 
balanced with conflict interactions with Group One# Whilst 
there has been an increase in interaction with Group Three 
from Period One to Period Two the small percentage of total 
interaction with Group Three has been insufficient to offset 
the drop in interaction with Group One and within the Group 
itself which occurs in the same time period# Although 
there are indications of Group Two following the trend toward 
conflict they are very weak and the probability is as much a 
reduction of interaction by Group Two as a drastic change of 
type of interaction,^ Overall then, the states of Group 
Two a3ze mainly responsible for the promotion of co-operation 
within the region but a small declining total interaction 
prevents them from offsetting the increase in conflict from 
Period One to Period Two#
Kogetheï/
9, This trend is made even weaker by the absence of 
consideration of the co-operation dominant 
Central American *union’ programme.
Together the two states of Group Three aocoimt for 9/ of 
the total interaction over the whole time period. Of 
this amount 59/ were conflict interactions and 41/ co­
operation interactions. There is an increase of interaction 
from Period One to Period Two and the general trend of an 
increase in conflict interaction is followed with 15 conflict 
interactions In Period One rising to 39 conflict interactions 
in Period Two*
= 4?^  of the inter-
actions of Group Three within the region are with itself, and 
those are all co-operation interactions confined to Period 
One.
» 73# of the inter-
actions of Group Three within the region are with Group One. 
(For details of the level and type of interaction refer to 
the set of findings on the interaction pattern of Group One 
with Group Three),
lîlsnsLmao^SZLlâSlaaLlÜ^^ 23/. of the Inter-
actions of Group Three within the region are with Group Two* 
(for details of the level and type of interaction 3:^ efor to 
the set of findings on the interaction pattern of Group Two 
w1th Group Thr oe *)
.Sumaryj The two states of Group Three are only weakly 
involved with other states in the region and when they do 
interact with them this is more likely to he with Group One 
than with Group Two or themselves. The strong links with 
Group /
Group One when Interaction occurs would seem to be a partial 
answer to the increase in interaction in Period Two resulting 
in a change of type of interaction from co-operation dominant 
in Period One to conflict dominant in Period Two, Overall 
then, the states of Group Three are of little significance 
to t ho region and certainly have no possibility of influencing 
the pattern of interaction in the region,
Conclusions
Both the level and the nature of interaction have c3ianged 
over time but this has not resulted in a marked change of 
interaction patterns in the region. In the three 'groups•
I have identified, the patterns have been relatively stable 
with only slight modifications resulting from the increased 
interaction in Period Two being noticeable, Thus, 
essentially, Group One has remained dominant in the region and 
has been the major source of conflict and Group Two has 
remained subordinate but has been the most Important source 
of co-operation. Only in the case of Group Three, marginal 
to the region at any rate, lias a pattern changed over time 
through increased interaction.
These findings appear to indicate that although the inter­
national politics of the region are regarded by most political 
commentators as 'unstable* there are patterns of interaction 
which, by being relatively persistent through time, serve to 
promote a certain stability in the area* Further, such 
regular interaction in both intensity, direction and style 
indicates the possibility of the existence of 'systemic 
relations' in the region*
J.U2
Taking note of these conclusions, the next section gives 
some explanations of tlie interaction patterns outlined 
above.
Some Explanations of the Interaction Patterns
rna#iWMyi>Wrgaffai»i 1 i*W# "»
In a paper presented to a conference on international 
relations in 1966 Johan Galtung puts forward the idea that 
the sociology of small groups is useful for the study of
7 0
International relations," In particular Galtung drains 
attention to the idea that not only "concrete* international 
interaction (the interaction between pen;sons actively con­
ducting international .relations) but also the "abstract* 
international system can be understood in terms of the
7 7
sociology of small gp:'oupB,' ' To underline this point he
then gives examples of a number of hypotheses from small
group theory which could also hold for international 
12relations*"
This approach to international relations seems to me both 
useful and challenging* Useful in that, if valid, it 
could possibly offer some partial explanations for the 
patterns of Interaction I have outlined in the previous 
section/
10, Johan Galtimg, ’'Small Group Theory and t 
Theory of International Relations2 A St
rt T t'.ï runrii^rilh T  rj Î1 r\’r r A  . Yf n A 7 A M  I ]
IS ! S  udy
, pp.270-278
11. a m ,  pp.277-278
12. m m ,  pp.279-293
J.,
section and challenging in that the Caribbean region as I 
have defined it in Part One Is practically identical to a 
"small group".of nations as Galtung defines it so inviting 
the testing of his hypotheses, Consequently, I accept 
his basic idea that the sociology of small groups can be 
used as a model for undeiebanding international relations 
and proceed along the lines of testing some of his hypotheses 
against the data I have collected. Out of the many hypo­
theses he advances I have chosen three in particular - the 
hypotheses relating to rank and interaction, to« conflict and 
polo3?isation, and to consonance# But before gèing on to 
examine these tliree hypotheses I first briefly outline 
Galtung's reasons for using the sociology of small groups 
to study the international "abstract* system and his concep­
tion of the "ideal" small group of nations,
The Sociology of Small Grouos as a Model
Galtmg puts forward four main arguments to substantiate 
the use of small group theory in international relations;
”1* Small groups and International systems 
can be regarded as isomorphic with the 
s imp le c or r e s p end enc e s * • • # ( iiidi v idua Is 
to nations and interaction to interaction)
# * #.because usually relatively few nations 
interact together, which justifies the 
use of the word ‘’small”. Moreover, the 
international system has a relatively 
low level of organisation which justifies 
the use of the word “group”,
2. /
”2, Small group theory gives a theory of 
interaction in its most naked form, 
stripped of all extra connotations.
3. Small group theory is empirically rather 
well established since it can draiv on 
common sense insights, laboratory 
0zpe.riments, surveys, etc. as data....
4* Small group theory has not only well 
established propositions hut also a 
relatively high lcve3- of theoretical 
Integration of them at least as compared 
to other branches of sociology* This 
means that isomorphisms, once imputed 
and established, will be relatively 
rich in the sense of involving many 
relations between the elements”.
After pointing out that the method of isomorphism is mean­
ingful only if a smll group is conceived of as a model 
of a similarly organised subsystem Galtimg defines a small 
group of nations as
“Anything from two to the maximum number 
of nations that oaa he ke.Rt cognitively 
.present at the same time (ta'jenty is much 
too high, perhaps not more than ten, or 
seven)? all nations
(but not necessarily 
equally much wlth all other nations); 
thei'o is
Mi-JâlS-ÆlliSîaJ-Æ»âStenâS
There is no aas’amption to the effect that 
relations are positive or friendly, The 
interaction patterns may take on all values/
13. I M d ,  pp.277- 2 7 8 ,
JLVO
vaJaies from extremely positive through 
Indifference to extremely negative, but 
the net balance will usually have to be 
positive unless the group Is forced to stay 
together, as In the oaee when nations 
crystallise into geographically contiguous 
and immobile states. Thus, a small group 
of nations is neither the same as an alliance 
(which is a military organisation of 
nations with a specific aim) nor the same as 
a trade area (which is an economic organiza­
tion) nor the same as a federation (which Is a 
political organization of nations) - it is a 
much more primitive unit with much less
"1 A
structure”. ' (emphasis in the original)
It should be apparent that the Caribbean region as defined 
earlier approximates very closely to Galtung's small group 
of nations. The similarity is especially marked in respect 
of sise, nature, and level of interaction, and here the 
dominance of negative interaction can be attributed to the 
geographical factor. Only in the case of "consensus both 
witMn and outside the group" is there a possible area of 
disagreement# Overall, however, the Caribbean region can 
clearly be regarded as a small group of nations.
In small group theory there is a relationship between rank 
and interaction which should also hold at the international 
level /
14. rbld, pp.279-280.
The main findings of this relationship are;
"1, The higher the rank, the more inter­
action received and emitted.
2. The more equal the rank between two, 
the higher the interaction.
3* There is more interaction from high 
to low than from low to high.
4# These rankings are highly correlated 
with -
(a) the number of acts received 
by the units,
(b) the number of acts received 
by the units from a given unit,
(c) the number of acts sent by the 
units ÿ
(d) the number of acts sent by the 
unite to a given unit”. 16
Although data on direction of interaction has been collected 
only the first two findings have been considered. Omission 
of tests of the last two findings have been for two reasons. 
Firstly, much of the clta on interaction was ambiguous in 
that although transmitted by one state it was often reacted 
to by several states. The decision as to which state was 
the/
15* Galtvrng mentions that one reason why this may not 
hold is due to what he terms ”the formal norm of 
reciprocity”. Shis nom rests on the formal 
equality in international law of sovereign states. 
Hence a state establishing diplomatic relations 
with another state may expect this to be reciprocated 
Consequently there will be interaction across ranks 
based on considerations other than the rank of the 
state itself. However, often the lower rank states 
will not reciprocate diplomatic relations, as has 
already been noted, for reasons of economy. This 
leaves then the original hypothesis as largely 
vindicated, i.e. there will be more interaction 
between high ranking states than between low ranking 
states, .Ibid? pp.289-290.
16. IWA, p.288
the original target or was the major receiver of such Inter­
action was thus frequently dependent on intuitive c3?iteria. 
With several states transmitting actions and several reacting 
to ouch actions Intuitive criteria entered the assessment even 
further* Obviously then, any conclusions based on such coding 
would be distorted, at least partially, by the highly subjec­
tive evaluation of interaction* Secondly, to anticipate the 
conclusions, the test of the first two findings of the hypothe­
sis were bo unsatisfactory as not to invite any further con­
sideration of the last two findings*
Before testing the first two findings however, a ranking of
the states in the Caribbean has to be undertaken* In
deciding the ranlts of states Galtung talks of both 'ascribed'
3 7and 'achieved' properties of states as determinants.
Fortunately elsewhere Galtung has undertaken a rank ordering 
of all the twenty states of Batin America along these lines 
and has assigned to the nine Oaribbean states the following 
ranks - 20 counts as high:-
Cuba 18; Costa Rica 11; Panama 9; The Dominican Republic 5; 
B1 Salvador 4» Guatemala and Nicaragua 2 each; Haiti and 
Honduras 1 each;^^ Adopting this rank ordering and assigning 
my own ranks for the Caribbean only? i.e. 1 to 9 with 1 as 
high, the following rank ordering is produced;
Cuba 1; Costa Rica 2; Panama 3t The Dominican Republic 4;
331 Salvador 5? Guatemala 6.5? Nicaragua 6.5; Honduras 0.5; 
Haiti 8.5.
17# An 'ascribed' property is one handed from one
generation to the next unchanged, i.e. size and 
location. An 'achieved* property is the" achieve* 
ment of the present generation e.g. present 
history, JMâ» gp.285-286.
18. Johan Galtung et al* “El Sietema Datinoamerica 
de Haciones : Un Analasis Estruetural” pp.64-68. 
For my comments on this ranking see Footnote 28.
ore Cuba is the "leader* state, Costa, Rica and Panama are 
"oentrai* and the rest are "underdog* states#
Ssa;Lo;fniffl2o.S2JiM.l*
This hypothesis postulates that the higher the rank of a 
state the greater is its interaction# For the Caribbean 
over the whole time period this hypothesis holds only very 
weakly as Table Nineteen indicates*
TABIE NmETBEN
1
State
2
Galtung * B 
Ranks 
(.t'loaifiod)
5
Total
Interactions
Recorded
4
Banks by 
Interaction
Cuba 1 175 1
Costa Hioa 2 125 5
Panama 5 45 9
Dominican Republic 4 146 5
El Salvador 5 90 7
Guatemala 6*5 155 4
Nicaragua 6.5 168 2
Honduras 8.5 115 6
Haiti 8.5
Jfag.Tfc“i
49 8
A rank correlation co-efficient of iO.31 between Galtung*s 
rallies (modified) in Column 2 (the hypothesised position of 
each state by its contribution to the total interaction level) 
and the ranks in Column 4 (actual position of each state by 
its contribution to the total interaction, level) confirms 
this/
this weak relationship* Division into the two time periods 
further shows that the hypothesis does not hold at all in 
Period One - a rank correlation oo-effioient of «0*06, and
holds scarcely at all in Period Two « a rank correlation
IQ 1oo«efficient of f0*21* Clearly then there is, at 'first
sight, little connootion between rank and interaction in the
Caribbean.
To some extent this weak 3ze3.at ion ship between rank and inter* 
action in the region can be explained as a matter of method­
ology. Whereas my interactions are mainly governmental *■ 
foreign policy — Galtung has indicated that the type of 
interaction he woiOxl measure is the amount of oommunloation? 
commerce etc. « international relations « the use of which 
appears to estab.ll8h a much s tronger relationship between
OQ
rank and interaction#^ Consequently the hypothesis cannot 
be entirely disproved or indicated in this particular case. 
Nevertheless, certain comments can be made which serve to 
point out a limitation of the hypothesis*
This limitation stems from Galtung*s understanding and use 
of rank* The criteria he uses to assess the rank of a 
state and the use he makes of rank to postulate amounts of 
interaction, leads easily into an inference of the foreign 
policy of a state of the types A interacts mare-with B than 
with/
19. The difference between these 2 rank correlation 
co-efficients is not significant as most of it 
can be explained away by the shift in rank, 
determined by level of interaction, of Cuba and 
the Dominican Republic, from ranks at odds with 
those of Galtung*8 in Period One to ranks 
approaching more closely to Galtung*s in Period 
Two.
20, See Johan Galtung et al “El Sietema Latinoamerica 
de Nacioness Un Analaeis ^structural”.
with C and hence the foreign policy of A will he more
PIconcerned with B than with 0«" To infer this, hovjever, is to
he in error as the Sprouts, in their writings on capability 
analysis have pointed out:
“It is utterly meaningless to speak of 
capabilities in the abstract*
Capability is always capability to do 
something, to bring about or perpetuate 
some state of affairs# Policy 
assumptions may be left implicit* But,
unless some set of ends and means is
envisaged, no calculation is possible, no 
inventory of environmental factors has any 
significance*”
This means that, by itself, the establishment of a relation­
ship between rank and Interaction for any particular state 
or group of states can say nothing about the actual policies
of these states unless some attempt at defining ends and
means is undertaken#
This limitation has its use, however, in this particular case, 
in pointing out and emphasising a general aspect of inter­
national politics in the region. Namely that the difference 
between/
21. As stated earlier rank is assessed on both "ascribed* 
and "achieved* properties. In practice Galtung has 
chosen the following ten variables as indications of 
ranlct
1. Size « comprising the 3 variables of size of area, 
of population, of G.N#?.
2. Distribution of wealth comprising the 3 
variables of G.M.P. per capita, rate of illiteracy, 
daily newspapers per person*
3. Social structure - comprising the 3 variables
of percentage of population in middle and upper class, 
percentage urbanised, percentage active in agriculture.
4* Hace « percentage of population in the white race. 
I&id, PP#G4:68.
22. /
'between the weak relationship between rank and interaction 
(my data) compared to that between rank and interaction 
(Galtung"e data) indicates the importance of non-tangeable 
factors in relations between states* Relations between 
governments in the region are not just purely a reflection 
of commerce and other such allied interests but are also a 
reflection of other factors such as personality likes and 
dislikes and ideological differences* These factors in 
themselves may act to limit or increase interaction as the 
case may be*
This hypothesis postulates that the more equal the rank 
between two states, the higher the interaction* For the 
Caribbean over the whole time period this hypothesis does 
not hold as Table Twenty and Table Twentyone demonstrate.
In Table Twenty the hypothesised interaction pattern of 
each state is set out and compared with the actual inter­
action pattern of each state* For example, Cuba is 
hypothesised as having the most interaction with Costa Rica 
and Panama and the least interaction with Honduras and Haiti? 
columns 2 and 4 respectively* In reality it has the highest 
interaction with the Dominican Republic and Guatemala and 
the lowest interaction with Haiti and El Salvador, Oolumns 3 
and 5 respectively*
/
22. Harold and Margaret Sprout "Envlronmenta1 Factors in 
the Study of International Politics” in James N.* 
Rosenau (ed)
Rolioy - p.117.
TABLE TV;eïïTY
1 2 3 4 5
H yp 0 the t i c a 1 Actual Hypothetical Actual
state Highest Highest* Lowest Lowe Fit**
Ouba C.H# D.R. Hd. El S.
Pan. Gt# Ht. Ht.
Costa Rica Cuba B'ic, Hd. Ht.
Pan# GuhapPan. Ht# El S.
Panama G.E. Ouba Hd* Hd.
H.R. G.H. Ht. D.R.jHdpHt
Dominican Pan# Cuba Hd. El 8, Pan.
Republic El 8. Ht. Ht. Hd.
Guatemala Nio. Ouba C.R. Ht.
El 8, Hd,nt, El 8. Cuba Pan#
Nicaragua Gt# O.E# Cuba Ht* Pan.
El 8, Hd,Ht, Ild. G.E. D.R#
Honduras Gt# Mio* %o# Ouba Pan.
Ht# El S. C.R. Ht.
Haiti Gt# Hie. B.H. Ouba Gt,
Hd. Cuba G.E. lid. ? El. 8
" The state with the actual highest interaction is listed first 
The state with the actual lowest interaction is lieted first
In Table lS;entyone the number of times the hypothesised 
interaction level of a state corresponds with the actual 
interaction level is recorded in Sections A and B. And 
in Sections 0 and D is recorded the number of times the 
actual interaction level of a state is totally at variance 
with its hypothesised interaction level# The case of El 
Salvador provides an example# Using Table Twenty it can 
be seen that only in the case of Guatemalâ and Haiti does 
the hypothesised interaction level correspond to the actual 
interaction/
actual interaction level, These facts are recorded in the 
Table under El Salvador in Sections A and B respectively.
At the same time Table Twenty s hows that the Dominican 
Republic which is hypothetically supposed to have a high level 
of interaction with B1 Salvador in reality has a very low 
level of interaction with it, This fact is recorded in the 
Table under El Salvador in Section 0*
S T A T B B
Sections
ClJWnfUpTJ'rjKiOf
Ob*
TjaïamnP'âf^
OR* Pan DR,
vm'Aoir.rjMY^
*3».mcar«T*K%w
El S
tilUî^tiFWilVsWt
Ht. Hic Hd. Ht.
A No* times ffiXi corres­ponds with AMI and AM2
Gb.
Pan
OR,
vi»i L-pfARMV
Gt.
■aie5ïWïiîi'fr«(i>'^-‘9'i*
BIS Hd Mic
#kRM»M#a4,HKnwjiwiBiwr*
B Ho* times HLL corres­ponds with All and AB2
Ht. Ht* im.
Ht.
Hd, Ht.
0 Ho, times HMD corres­ponds with All and AL8
DR*
.iï^i*sri>ar=îï«n
Baai 
El S
DR* Ht,
wyswiWPCa»!
Ht, Hd.
Gt *
t^u^Kxdmmmrn
D Mo* times HX3j corres­ponds with AMI and AH2
lÆsas&ïJt-umwi.IMîjyfSijMtKl-if'tJiÜP'fl4«îrt>*SjA;#i|7iK
Ht*
< M
Ob.
e« wis..*c5 w ixma
OR,
«rtïw:a:j*a/;s*:.
Ob.
^ ctes Hm* stands for
HLL Btande for
AMI stands for
AM2 stands for
ALI 0tande for
AL2 stands for
othetioal most likely interaction*
Comparison of Sections A and B with Sections 0 and D clearly 
allows that the number of times the actual situation is at 
total variance with the hypothesised situation (3 and 4 
below) is nearly equivalent to the number of times the actual 
situation is the hypothesised situation (l and 2 below).
1, /
1. Nmiber of times HOT coincides with AMI and AM2 =3 7
2. ” ” " HOT ” " ALl and AL2 = 6
3. " ” ” IML ” " ALl and ALS = 8
4. ” ” » HOT ” “ AMI and AM2 = 4
This amounts to a refutation of the hypothesis for the 
Caribbean region? as a state in the region is as likely to 
interact with a state of very unequal rank as it is with 
one of near equal rank. Division into the t%vo time periods 
shows the same conclusion holds for both Period One and 
Period Two,23
One possible explanation why rank is here such a poor 
indicator of interaction in the Caribbean has to do v; ith 
the significant influence geography can have in international 
relations# This point has been recognised by Craltimg in his 
rahk-interaotion analysis of Latin America when he comments 
that? for the smaller states of Latin America in particular?
PA
the influence of geography is “constant and significant”,
It seems appropriate then to determine exactly what influence 
geography has on interaction In the Garibbean,
23* Period One
1. Number of times HMD coincides with AMI and AM2 == 5
2. ” “ ” HOT “ ” A ll  and AL2 =3 8
3# ” ” " HOT ” ” A M  and AL2 = 10
4. ” ” ” HOT “ ” AMI and AMS = 4
1, Number of times HOT coincides with Aî'!l and AM2 es 6
2, ” ” ” HOT ” " ALl and AL2 = 5
” ” HOT ” " All and AI,2 =3 ?ft
4. " ” " HOT “ ” AMI and AI^ 2 = 5
24# Johan Galtung et^al “El Sisterna Latinoamerica de 
Hacioîiess Un Analasis Estruottnral”. ? p*78.
J-J-O
111 this particular oaee it oeems to me that the heet way to 
assGBS auch an influence la to hypothealae a relationship 
between geography and interaction and then to see whether 
it holds for the region* Such a hypothesis^ if proved true, 
would help account for the failure of Hypothe sis 2 to explain 
adequately interaction in the region as it would offer an 
alternative, and possibly conflicting, guide to interaction*
She hypothesis is that the level of Interaction varies with 
geographic distance being highest with neighbouring states
pK
and lowest with distant states* fhe test of this hypothesis 
for the Caribbean region over the whole time period is set out 
in Table Twenty*«TvJOÿ which compares the hypothesised interaction 
pattern of each state with its actual interaction pattern.
In Table Twenty**two the region is divided into two major 
geographic sones the Greater Antilles (Cuba, Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic) and Central America (including 
Panama)* Por Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic the 
Greater Antilles is the immediate %one and for the six main­
land states Central America is the immediate aone* Within 
each gone some states are immediate neighbours, i.e. they share/
25* In formulating this hypothesis I am aware of certain 
limiting factors, for example, that in most under­
developed countries the elite are quite clearly in 
control of foreign policy and that,’ for them, distance 
is often a minimal barrier* Although this undoubtedly 
does hold for the Caribbean region the uncontrolled 
migration of peasants has, in itself, been a major 
SOU]?ce of international politics, aggravating, in 
particular relations between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic and B1 Salvador and Honduras. Dor Haiti-
la&noiago ae omies hartorxai Del racrxrco, 
pp*372^381 andjTor Hi Salvador-Honduras see 
Marco Yirgilio Carias "Analasis sobre el oonflicto 
entre Honduras y HI Salvador" pp*î577-379 and Obdulio 
Hunfio "Radiografia de la guerra del futbol 0 de las
oxen horo/j” pp.664-668, both in
). On this evidencÊASÀPifüaïA) Vol. 32, Ho.3.» 1970 e 
geoSaphy"appears, at least intuitively as a variable
oUaro common borders. The hypothesised interaction pattern 
is that a state will interact most frequently with its 
immediate neighbour (represented by Pigure 1 in Ooltuim 2), 
next most frequently with its immediate soxie (represented 
by figure 2 in Column 4) and least frequently with the other 
zone (represented by Higure 3 in column 6)* The actual 
interaction pattern is also represented by 1, 2 and 3$ with 1 
being the highest level of interaction, 2 the next highest
level of interaction, and 3 the lowest level of interaction. 26
TADia: TWENTY-TWO
Cuba,
Haiti 
Bom, Hep. 
Guatemala 
El Sal. 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Costa Hiea 
Panama
Immediate
Neighbours
Hypo­
thetical
MW**£tU»r7jeC)!K-’a *  ;i»WJW'.’-,3.5*»S»6rt»sr=ac=I?*sr
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Actual
1
2&
1
1
1
1
1
Immediate 
25 one
4
Hypo­
thetical
1 
2 
2 
2 
2
2 
2 
a
Actual
«■MTM*.fs»sc3p»'*«ss3*B:xair
1
2
2
2
2
2
9
Other 
2 one
6
Hypo­
thetical
2
3
3
3
3
Ac'tuml
1 
3 
2&
3
3
26. Eor 1 to be in Column 3 it had to fulfil two
conditions: (a) accomit for 30^  ^plus of the
interaction in the immediate Kone, but only
if (b) the immediate gone itself accounted for
at least 30^ plus of the interaction in the
region as a whole. For 1 to be in Column 3?
it had to account for at least 30^ plus of the
interaction as a whole (included in this figure
is the interaction of immediate neighbours).
for 1 to be in Column 7 it had to account for
50fo/of interaction in the region as a whole, 
plus
Tile table shows the considerable influence of geography
on interaction in the region* Only in. the case of Cuba
and the Dominican Republio is the hypothesised interaction
at variance with the actual interaction* However, a
division into the two time periods shows its influence is
27aotua.lly in decline.
Geography, by itself, is a fairly reliable guide to inter­
action in the Caribbean* It is also a very significant
force exerting a considerable influence on the direction
and level of interaction in the region* This is particu­
larly so prior to 1939. After this date its influence 
weakens suggesting that the continued distortion of ranlc- 
interaction patterns may well bo clue to new factoids or to a
shift of emphasis in the old, or both. Again, the influence
of non-environmental factors are probably crucial in 
accounting for this.
Rrom my data it is clear that ranlc is not a very reliable 
guide to interaction in the Caribbean. Whilst some of 
this unreliability can be attributed to differences in the
type of interaction measured, much more can, I think, be 
attril 
rank/
28ibuted to rank. The criteria Galtung adopts to assess
27, In Period One the only deviant state is the Dominican 
Republic. In Period Two there are four deviant 
states - Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala 
and Panama.
28. Intuitively, Galtung's rank ordering of states 
appears to me to reflect reality except that he has 
assessed Panama too high and Guatemala too low. In 
this respect Galtunghs subjective test of his own 
objectively defined rank order is suspe^et. Based 
solely on students assessing the importance of Latin/
rank are objective criteria, providing a measuro of the 
ability of a state to act. Interaction patterns based 
on these criteria are strongly influenced by geography 
which can, and does, in the Caribbean, dietoart them con­
siderably. Indeed, geography, by itself, is a botter 
guide to interaction in the region than is rank. However, 
GaXtung*s criteria, even accounting for the influence of 
geography, are not enough to explain or predict interaction 
in the Caribbean, The failure of rank and geography to 
explain interaction in Period Two is an example of this. 
Other criteria are needed, essentially subjective, which 
will explain a state’s willingness to act as well as its 
ability to act. Only by reference to such criteria « 
for the Caribbean ideology and personality differences - as 
well as to objective criteria, can behaviour such as the 
Dominican Republic’e, in both time periods, or Cuba’s in 
Period Two, be explained or predicted.
Galtimg adopts ae relevant to small group theory the finding 
from general conflict theory which postulates that conflicts 
polarise interaction, i.e. create positive interaction 
within/
28* (continued) Latin American states to other Latin 
American states this test reflects, I thinlc, the 
bias of students as éi group. If conducted in 
late 1963, as it may well have been, it would 
reflect student approval of Panama’s militant 
anti-United States stand over the Oanal in 1964 
(hence a high assessment of Panama) and student 
disapproval of the military coup and subsequent 
repressive right-wing military government in 
Guatemala from 1963 (hence a low assessment of 
Guatemala). Taking these considerations into 
account perhaps the subjective test was more 
subjective than it should have been.
OQ
within the bloc and negative interaction between blocs.
The increase in conflict from marginal pradominance over 
co-operation in Period One to clear predominance over co­
operation in Period Two provides an opportunity to test this 
finding by seeing whether this increase in conflict results 
in polarisation along the lines suggested by Galtimg.
The test is based on the widely held belief that the Cuban 
Revolution was solely responsible for much of the conflict 
in the Caribbean from 1939 onwards. If this is true then, 
according to the finding, the following should be the 
situation in Period Twos
(a) Cuba isolated and interacting negatively with the 
other states in the region, and
(b) the other eight Caribbean states interacting 
negatively with Cuba and positively among themselves.
This situation, as the ideal situation, is compared to the 
actual situation to see whether it holds true.
It is clear that the distinction made between interaction 
in Period One and interaction in Period Two is crucial to 
the testing of this finding as it necessarily involves 
comparing the situation prior to 1939 with that after it.
To compare the two periods,four correlations, which set out 
the/
29* Johan Galtung "Small Group Theory and the Theory 
of International Relations: A Study in
Isomorphism" pp,274-275? 280, The assumption is 
made throughout that Galtung’a positive and 
negative interactions are equivalent to my co­
operation and conflict interactions.
the changing nature of interaction within and between each 
period, are uaed. The belief that Cuba acted as the 
agent of change, i.e. is responsible for any differences in 
interaction patterns, is then tested.
1. A correlation coefficient of ^^ 0,6? between co-operation 
and conflict in Period One indicates a strong relationship 
between the two types of interaction for this period. It 
points to the special feature of interaction in this period 
which is the dominance of mixed balanced interaction between 
states* Mixed in that states are likely to be both in 
conflict and in co-operation with one another5 balanced 
because this pattern creates almost equal amounts of co­
operation and conflict interactions. The interaction 
pattern between Honduras and Nicaragua is a good example of 
thls.^
2, A correlation co-effioient of tO,19 between co-operation 
and conflict in Period Two indicates a weak relationship 
between/
30. Bach correlation co-efficient is based upon the 
absolute figures for co-operation and conflict 
in each time period, for each state, expressed as 
a percentage. Bor example, the interaction 
pattern of Costa Hica in Period One
Ob. ;d.r . B1 8.Gt. HtoHd. Hie. Pan.
Absolute Oo-opern* 0 2 8 3 0 3 15 5
C0-opern. 0 5.5 22.2 8.3 0 8.3 41.6 13.8
Absolute Conflict 1 7 1 2 0 0 23 0
Conflict 2.9 20.5 2.9 5.8 0 0 67.0 0
Bach correlation is therefore based on 72 pairs of 
numbers.
31. See Appendix Table Two.
between the two types of interaction for this period.
It points to the special feature of interaction in this 
period which is the dorainanoe of single imbalanceed inter­
action between states. Single in that states are likely 
to be either in co-operation or in conflict with one 
another* Unbalanced because such a pattern allows for 
one type of interaction to predominate, in this case, 
conflict* The interaction pattern between Ho,iti and the 
rest of the region is a particularly good example of this*
3* A correlation coefficient of ^0*57 between co-operation 
in Period One and co-operation in Period Two indicates the 
fairly strong relationship between the co-operation patterns 
In both periods* In particular, it points to the persis­
tence over time, of many of the co-operation patterns between 
states# Thus a state co-operation with another state In 
Period One is quite likely to be co-operating with the same 
state in Period Two* The interaction pattern between 
Guatemala and El Salvador is a good examplo of thlB,*^ *^
4* A correlation co-efficient of f0*27 between co3iflict in 
Period One and conflict in .Period Two indicates the weak 
relationship between the conflict patterns of both periods*
It points to the development, over time, of many new conflict 
patterns between states* Thus, a state in conflict with 
another state in Period One is not very likelv to be in 
conflict with the same state, to the same degree, in Period 
Two* /
32* See Appendix, Table Pour.
33* See Appendix, Tables Two and Pour
Two# The interaction patterns between the Dominican 
Hepublic and GuateEiala, and between Panama and Cuba, are 
particularly good examples of this,^
The most important finding to emerge from the above set 
of correlations ie that the interaction pattern does change 
significantly from Period One to Period Two, Mixed inter­
action gives way to single interaction and balanced inter- 
action to unbalanced interaction. However, this change 
is not as thorough as it first seems, and affects only the 
conflict pattern between states to any marked degree. The 
co-operation pattern between states remains, to some extent 
at least, unchanged.
Bearing these findings in mind it is now possible to see 
whether they are in any wa,y dependent on the interaction of 
Ouba in the region.
The test of this involves reconsidering interaction in the 
region but this time without Ouba, In this case recon­
sidering interaction means calculating Correlations 3 and 4
above without Cuba, and comparing the new correlation co-
36efficients to the previous correlation coefficients. If 
the/
34# Bee Appendix, Tables % o  and Pour
35, I do not intend to discuss, at this point, the causes 
of ’mixed balanced’ and ’single^balanced’ interaction. 
The possible causes of both patterns is discussed in 
Part Three,
36, Each new correlation coefficient is therefore based 
on 36 pairs of numbers and not 72 pairs as before.
the correlation coefficients are markedly different the 
interaction patterns will have altered significantly - hence 
Cxiha is of considerable importance in bringing about change*
But if the correlation coefficients are nearly the same the 
interaction patterns will remain largely unaltered - hence 
Cuba is of no great importance in their formation* The new 
correlation coefficients are set out as A and B immediately 
belows
A. A corre3,ation coefficient of f0.62 between co-operation 
in Period One and co-operation in Period Two is nearly the 
same as the correlation coefficient of -:'0,57 in Gorrâ.ation 3 
above* Pointing to no great change in interaction patterns 
between the states the new correlation coefficient shows that 
the contention that Ouba has forced positive co-operation 
between states is false* Instead, indications are that with 
the co-operation pattern among states remaining the same 
through time, co-operation probably depends on factors which 
are independent of parts of the political process*
B* A correlation coefficient of ^0*61 between conflict in 
Period One and conflict in Period Two is markedly different 
from the correlation coefficient of -J-0,27 in Correlation 4 
above* The interaction of Cuba in the region has acted to 
change considerably the pattern of negative interaction between 
states* The contention? that Ouba is isolated, acting 
negatively with the other states in the region, and in some 
measure is responsible for much of the conflict in the region, 
is /
3 7xs thus supported* ’ However, at the same time, the cor­
relation coefficient of 4-0*61 indicates that, apart from 
interaction with Cuba, the patterns of conflict between 
states remain persistent over time*
Whilst Ouba has had some impact on the patterns of inter­
action between states in Period Two it is easy to overestimate 
its extent* Cuba has not, for example, forced new patterns 
of co-operation between states* Neither, if its own inter­
action is set aside, has it radically changed patterns of 
conflict between states* All this seems to suggest that to 
hold Ouba responsible for all that has happened in the region 
from 1959 om;ard8 is nonsense. The Impact of the Cuban 
Revolution on international politics in the region has not 
been minimal, but neither has it been paramount*
The increase in conflict from marginal predominance over co­
operation in Period One to clear predominance over co­
operation in Period Two should have led, if Galtung’s suppo­
sition is correct, to polarisation in the region* Yet, 
evidence of polarisation is very weak* 3?or example, whilst
there is polarisation in the sense that interaction between 
Ouba and the rest of the region is both predominantly negative 
and/
37. I use the words "and in some measure is responsible 
for" as my data do not allow me to give direction 
of interaction with any degree of certainty* This 
prevents me from saying that Ouba is ’responsible’ 
for much of the conflict in the region if^y 
’responsible’ I mean it is the transmitter of such 
interaction. Frequently Ouba. was the recipient 
of such interaction* (The overwhelming prepon­
derance of my data on direction points to Cuba æ a 
receiver rather than a transmitter of interaction.)
and very high it has not resulted in the expeotcd re­
organisation of interaction patterns between states*
Instead the co-operation patterns between states remain 
much the same as before. And even though changes in the 
overall conflict pattern can be traced to Cuba the pattern 
of conflict between other states remains relatively un­
changed.
To talk of polarisation developing from increased conflict 
in the Caribbean is, strictly speaking, not true. Increased 
conflict has led only to a qualitatively different type of 
interaction being the norm in Period Two as against Period 
One, i.e. the change from ’mixed balanced* to * single un­
balanced* interaction, and not to a correspondingly radical 
alteration of the existing Interaction patterns between 
states. This emphasises a previous point - that although 
the international politics of the region are considered by 
many observers to be unstable there is, in fact, a fair 
degree of stability* States have interests vis-a-vis other 
states which are not likely to be changed over-night* In 
other words * system type* variables are more likely to account 
for interaction in this case than are ’idiosyncratic type* 
variables «
The idea of consonance is derived from the adoption into
small group theory of the mathematical theory of balance*
As/
u !Cti5»3f7*TOt2^™ti«rn*i»4*cfcse»T*ct?rr=r«2erje'£yje3B*ai*aiw-t4.'r4v,rtit.-t*WiiW
38. This is following Eosenau* s classification in his 
"Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy"*
See my * Summary * to ’Internal Politics: Some Major
Charac teristic s * in * Par t One’*
Aa an approach to the studj of interaction between atatea 
It Ifj not new, having been prev? onaly applied by Harary in 
his B'tamctnral analysis of the situation In the Middle Bast. 
Essentially it involves representing all interaction between 
states as a number of structures which, because balanced 
structures have a greater stability than unbalanced structures, 
will tend toward balance over time, Galtung illustrates what 
is meant by a balanced structure by quoting a traditional Arab 
saying
‘^the friend of my friend is my friend, 
the friend of my enemy is my enemy, 
the enemy of my friend ie my enemy, 
and the enemy of my enemy is my friend"
If there are no balanced structures
"then forces towards this state will 
arise, Either the dynamic characters 
will change, or the relations will be 
changed through action or througli 
cognitive reorganisation. If a change 
is not possible the state of imbalance 
will produce tension,"
39* Eranlc Harary "Structural analysis of the situation 
in the Middle East in 1956" Journal of Ognfld^t
RasoMfclm, Vol. 5., No.2., iga.
40* Johan Galtung, "Small Group Theory and the Theory
of International Relations: A Study in Isomorphism",
p,282, The four situations within the saying can be 
represented diagramatieally as four balanced 
stuotures in the following manner, (The order of 
diagrams corresponds to the order of situations in 
the saying),
I- ( 0 ) (a)
41* Prank Harary "A structural analysis of the situation 
in the Middle East in 1956), p,168.
I propose to test the idea of consonance as it applies to 
the Caribbean region in tvjo ways, Firstly, to see whether 
following the increase in conflict from Period One to Period 
Two, with its hypothesised polarisation, there are a greater 
number of balanced structures than before, Secondly, to 
examine the part played by Cuba and the Dominican Republio, 
whose interaction changes radically from Period One to Period 
Tvjo, in the development of new structures in the region. 
Before attempting this however a small methodological problem 
has to be solved,
liarary makes the point that relations between states are not 
only negative or positive, they may also be indifferent,^^
A glance at the interaction tables in the Appendix-shows that 
a largo number of relations between states in the Caribbean 
are characterised by indifference. Also, as X have pointed 
out in the test of the hypothesis on ’conflict and polarisa^ 
tion’, relations between the states can be characterised as 
•mixed balanced’ i,e, there is an almost equal amount of 
conflict and co-operation interactions between states. If 
an adequate test of the theory of consonance as it applies to 
the Caribbean is to be attempted both ’indifferent’ and 
•mixed’ relations between states will have to be incorporated 
into the theory,
The incorporation of these relationships into the theory 
increases the range of possible structures. It has led to 
a small increase in the number of balanced structures and a 
larger increase in the number of unbalances structures. At 
the same time it has allowed for the development of a semi- 
balanced structure,
42. niMs pp. 167-168.
XnBtead of W o  balanced BtractiireB there are now four# 
(These are represented In the following diagramss
r; 0 / 1 \ 0
! '
I '(any
, tions^p)
!
Aa can be seen Structures 3 and 4 * incorporate I the 'indifferent*
% /  ^'
relationship between states. Both are considered b^lgmoed '
1 '' ^ ' \
because either there is no relationship at all, '.Btucture \
i "
or only a bilateral relationship* Striictua?e 4. Xherefore,
within the structure there is no great pressure for change#i;
! ^
(They are fairly stable#
The incorporation of * mixed * relationships bettveen states 
has caused the increase in unbalanced structures# 'llixeci* 
relationships are unstable as they can easily be converted 
into either predominantly co^-operation or conflict relations 
by only a small shift of emphasis in one or both of th^ 
relationships* Within the structure there is great pressure 
for change to reach stability# Consequently any structure, 
ivith one exception* which includes a * mixed * relationship is 
unbalanced# The exception is Structure 4 as here it is 
obvious that a shift of emphasis will not in itself unbalance 
the Btrue tur e•
There are two eemi-bala.noed structures. These are 
represented in the following diagrams*
Both/
Both are ooBsidered semi-halanoed as there appears to be no 
great pressure for change# 3Purther, action upon the 'indif­
ferent* relationship to change it is as likely to be positive 
as negative# In this ease the action will have the effect 
of balancing the structure* i#e. changing Structure 5 to Struo* 
ture 1 and Struoture 6 to Structure 2# But the important 
point to note is that there is no great need for such action 
in the first place#
This incorporation of the 'indifferent* and 'mixed* relation­
ships between states now makes it possible to represent all 
the Interaction data as a number of structures# To do this 
all int037001ion data for each time period is coded as 
'indifferent', positive* * negative* or 'mixed* according to 
the following systems
Oo-ojjemMQa. Interaction Mî£UsA-Ifflâ§£âCÊl2îl
humber of Humber of
iaMmaWais, IMesssiloas
Indifferent Hil or 1 Indifferent Hil or 1
BositiVG(low) 2 - 7  negative (low) 2 - 9
3?ositive(high) 8 and above Hogative(high) 10 and above
Mixed - IiO%v positive/low neg# Mixed - Bow neg/low positi'v 
- High positive/high neg# - High neg/high
All the relationships between the nine states of the region 
are then represented by 04 structures for each time period, 
each structure being a triad# Analysis of changes in the 
37eg!on is then based on the changing nature of the structures 
from Period One to Pe3:iod Two#
-I#
The increase in intensity of interaction from Period One to 
Period Uhvo, and the change of emphaois into conflict dominant 
interaction should he 37effected in the changing nature of the 
structures over time# Specifically* it should have led to an 
Increase in the number of balanced structures as the develop­
ment of polarisation in the region forces new patterns of 
relations on states* The extent to which this is borne out 
by the actual situation is set out belows 
Mature , ,of, , , Structures
Eâiisâ-Saaâi
Balanced - 30 Semi-balanced - 3 Unbalanced - 51
Period Two:
Balanced - 35 Semi-balanced - 14 Unbalanced - 33
Over time there has been a tendency towards balance but this 
is reflected mainly in the substantial increase in the number 
of semi-balanced structures rather than the small increase in 
balanced structures* This indicates that there have been only 
moderate changes in the nature of structures. Closer analysis 
shows that the changes have largely been confined to the break­
down of mixed relations into either co-operation or conflict
A %
relations* This has led to the partial balancing of 
structures which* because of the mixed relationship, were 
previously unbalanced. Ovej^ all then the effect of increased 
conflict in Period Two has not been to promote an extensive 
balancing/
4-3• This confirms the theory that in an unbalanced 
structure the weakest relationship, in this case 
the mixed relationship, will change in order to 
balance the structure, Ibid# p.l?8«
balancing of previously unbalanced structures but rather, 
through the slight modification of patterns of relations, 
to promote the partial balancing of previously unbalanced 
structur68*
Ouba
Ouba and the Dominican Depublic are unique in the region in 
experiencing radical changes in the level of interaction from 
Period One to Period Two* It therefore seems appropriate to 
examine the effect this has had on each state as reflected by 
the part it plays in promoting the overall tendency towards 
balance#
Each is involved in 28 structures* The changing nature of 
these structures is set out below:
oum
DOM. REP.
Period One 11
Period Two 6
Period One 8
Period Two 10
10
0
Unbalanced
16
12
20
13
In the case of Ouba the situation is confused and far-reaching. 
There has beeia change in the nature of three-quarters of the 
structures. This change has involved a reverse trend of the 
unbalancing and semi-balancing of previously balanced struc­
tures as well as the overall trend towards balancing and semi- 
balancing of previously balanced structures. Apart from the 
factthat nearly all changes can be attributecT to the develop­
ment of conflict relations between states there is no 
particular pattern to the changes*
In the ease of the Dominican Republic the situation is 
much ole337637, There has been a change in the nature of only 
half the struotwjes. This change has been along with the 
general tendency towards balance* and nearly all changes can 
be attributed to the breakdown of mixed relations between 
states into conflict relations*
Whereas the Dominican Republic conforms to the overall 
tendency towards balance* Ouba does not,^ '"^  ^ This fact can 
be accounted for by the differences in levels of interaction, 
In the case of Cuba the increase in interaction has had a 
disturbing effect on the region whilst in the case of the 
Dominican Republic the decrease in interaction has tended 
towards correcting a previously disturbing involvement. 
Consequently, whilst nature of interaction is important the 
level of interaction also has important consequences for the 
nature of structures*
The application of the theory of consonance to the specific
conditions of the Caribbean region has not been particularly
rewarding. To some extent the absence of strict polarisation
â q
in the region may account for this* It has allowed many 
diverse structures to develop in both time periods which have 
tended to reduce much of the predictive value of the theory* 
Hover thelees/
44# But the Dominican Republic goes against the theory 
by maintaining’ unchanged through time a large number 
of unbalanced structures.
45# Harary bases his analysis of the Middle East on the 
nature of polarity. Ibid. pp.166-167#
nevertheless* parts of the theory do apply In practice,
There is a tendency towards balance* even if only weakly so, 
and unbalanced structures are generally transformed into 
balanced structures by a change in the weakest relationship 
between states. Changes in the level of interaction of 
individual states has an effect on the structures of the 
region but not in any particular manner. The final con­
clusion is not to rojeot the hypothesis as such, but to 
question its usefulness as regards interpretation of the 
situation In the Caribbean#
oaastosassa
The tests of the three hypotheses point to two main con­
clusions* Firstly, that small group theory as a model for 
International relations is* in the case of the Caribbean, 
of limited value. Secondly, that although there is an un­
resolved question as regards system versus sub-system 
determination in the Caribbean there is more support for the 
former than the latter#
Small group theory as a predictive model for international 
relations in the Caribbean has failed* For all three 
hypotheses the real situation is at variance, to a marked 
degree, from the hypothesised situation. This reduces the 
value of small group theory, in the context of the Caribbean 
at any rate, to the status of a heuristic model. In this 
capacity it does have some value as a plausible reference 
point from which to begin analysis.
The/
The evidence for system determination derives from the 
stability of interaction patterns over time. At a super­
ficial level much changes* which conceals the fact that at 
a deeper level very little changes. Thus, changes in the 
nature and level of interaction have only a marginal effect. 
And trends, such as the one towards conflict and polarisa­
tion* or the one towards balance, are comparatively weak.
This suggests that among all the variables affecting external 
relations in the region, the systemic variable is the most 
powerful.'^ '^  Yetg as the test of Hypothesis One has 
established, there is a place for variables other than those 
that are environmentally imposed upon decision makers.
Because of this all that can be said is that, on. balance, 
there is an emphasis on system rather than sub-system 
d e t ermina11ons•
ghe Quantitative Apngoach.s Summary ana Comment
Tun adopting a quantitative approach to international politics
there is always the general danger of claiming too much for
the data, and the particular danger of discovering something
A *7that is not really tîiere. ' Very much aware of tMs I will 
reserve my conclusions until Hater and offer, at this stage, 
only a brief summary and a tentative comment*
46. i.e. as against idiosyncratic, I'ole, governmental
and societal variables. This follows, of course, 
the classification scheme of Eosenau in ''Pre-theories 
and The or 1 e s of F or 01 gn P 0 XI c y , pp .42 -4 3 *
47* The scope and the limitations of the approach are
discussed fully by Arthur Bee Burns in "Quantitative 
Approaches to International Politics" in Horton A. 
Kaplan (ed) latAœioacMâ„â9.JjQâamatL<BâOMa*l98â«
The major points emerging from thie approach are best
presented as a number of findings* These are given
immediately below in order of appearance in the text*
1* Over time there is an increase in interaction*
2* Over time there is an increase in conflict*
3* The combination of (l) and (2) points to a division 
of the region into two distinctive time periods, in 
each of which the interaction pattern is different* 
Period One is from October 194B to December 1958 
and Period Two from January 1959 to October, 1964»
4. Over time, with the exception of Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic, states in the region maintain consistent 
levels of interaction* This indicates the existence 
of a hierarchy of states in the region* Division of 
this hierarchy, on the basis of levels of interaction, 
into three groups of states enables generalisations 
about their behaviour, over time, to be made* Ch?oup 
One consists of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua* Group Two of Costa Rica, El Salvador 
and Honduras* Group Three of Haiti and Panama*
3* (a) Group One 'sets the style* of interaction in the
region* It dominates interaction, contributes con­
siderably to the high level of conflict, and is 
particularly responsible for the increase in conflict 
from Period One to Period Two*
(b) Group Two is mainly responsible for the promotion
of co-operation in the region but because of a declining 
total interaction^has been unable to offset the Increase 
in conflict by Group One*
(c) Group Three has little significance in the region 
and follows the 'style* set by Group One*
6* In all tliree Groups both the level and the nature of 
interaction have changed over time but the patterns of 
interaction have been only slightly modified.
7»/
7# A plausible ease can be made for using small group 
theory to explain international relations in the 
Caribbean*
8* That the hypothesis ' the hi^er the rank the greater 
the interaction' when the reank ordering of states is 
determined by criteria of an 'economic development 
type' is not a reliable guide to interaction in the 
region* Neither is geography a guido tp interaction 
though it is more reliable than rank* %his points 
to the need for a consideration of subje^^ive criteria 
in addition to objective criteria, when [predicting 
levels of interaction. , ■
I
9* Thera is little evidence of polarisation in the: region 
developing as a result of increased conflict. ; Whilst 
increased interaction has led to a qualitatively 
different type of interaction being the njorm in Ferlod 
Two as against Period One, i.e. the changje froia 
'mixed balanced' to 'single unbalanced' interaction, it 
has not led to a corresponding radical alteration of 
existing interaction patterns* 5
10* Changes in the interaction patterns from '{period One to 
Period Tv/o camot be attributed, either wjliolly or in 
large measure, to the interaction patterh! of Cuba.
11* The adoption of a structural analysis of jinteraction
* / '/
the region points to a tendency towards ; b|alance and ! • 
hence to increasing stability of interadg'ljlon patterns/ 
In Period Two the interaction pattern of jthe Dominiotn 
Republic supported this tendency whilst /that of Ouba / 
acted against it. ■ , y
12* The use of small group theory to explain e\nd predict
international relations in the Caribbean h^s proved 
less successful than anticipated. Its Vfji^ ue is 
strictly limited to that of an heu37istic model.
13* In the region system determination has thd edge over
sub-system determination# i
14. /
14# Although there are a great nuniher of irregularities 
in interaction there is, despite this, a persistence 
of interaction patterns through time* This makes 
for a greater stability in the region than is apparent 
to most observers.
Compared to other more orthodox approaches to international 
politics in the region, this approach has stressed the 
stability of interaction patterns and the complex mix of 
factors creating such patterns* It has thrown doubt on the 
type of analysis wîrloh regards co-operation and conflict in 
the region as dependent on personality and/or ideology, 
and has supported the type of analysis which recognises the 
importance of geography, economics, etc in addition to 
personality and Ideology*^^ It has stressed continuity as 
well as crisis in the region when all too often in the past
KQ
only the crisis has been recognised*Perhaps the greatest 
justification for this approach has been in the recognition 
of these particular points.
48* This type of analysis is the basis of J* Bloyd 
MeCham's chapter on the Caribbean in his The
  -.. „ - -  ^ , - - - _ cer
13.
49# For example, see J*S* Mye "Central American 
Regional'Integration"*
50, Throughout the writings on the region's international 
politics there are frequent references to it as "the 
storm centre of the Americas" and as "highly unstable"$ 
studies of the region have reflected this by being 
'conflict* oriented^
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Tile main purpose of Part Three is to provide a qualitative 
explanation of political interaction in the Caribbean.
That is, by description and analysis it seeks tq deepen the 
inquiry into political interaction in the Caribbean whilst 
at the same time attempting to avoid becoming primarily an 
historical accoimt of such interaction.
Consequently the method is to integrate the infori#tion in
f
Part One and to develop the information in Part Twjo in the 
foilowing manner:
1* By means of a framework in which political interaction 
is intelligible. The framework suggested is that of the ' 
Penetrated Subordinate State System,
2, By means of case studies which focus on specific points 
relating to the structure and functioning of such a system. 
These studies will highlight key aspects of political inter­
action rather than total political interaction and will be 
organised in two sections corresponding to the earlier 
division of political interaction into two time periods, 
Section B will, therefore, focus on international politics 
in the region.from 1946 to 1958 and Section 0 on international 
politics in the region from 1959 to 1966.
The major sources of the various case studies comprising 
Part Three are gathered in the Appendix under the headings 
of the various case studies and are numbered in accordance 
with their appearance in each study.
A. Hur-iEvroiocs n œ  caeibbeai region as a
PElffiSRAraîB SÜBOEDIMAÏE SÏASE SYSBEÎ-I
The Caribbean Eegion as a Subordinate 
State System
At the moment there is no consensus on what constitutes the 
characteristics of an international sub-system*" 3?or 
example, whilst Modelski has stressed the geographic concept
P
Haas stresses the societal concept# To some extent Hrecher
bridges both viewpoints by his observation that a subordinate
’5system is both a. political and a geographic concept#
Because of this, and because Brecher*s concept of the sub­
ordinate system Involves *the state* as the basic unit I 
have followed his definition rather than any other#
Brecher considers that the concept of the subordinate state 
system requires six conditions:
1./
1, See Chapter 1 of Bruce M* Eussett, Internatlonal
political ecology#
2. Modelski states that "the conditions governing the 
existence of a regional sub-system are only two: 
the presence of a cluster of small powers, and 
their geographical and physical propinquity". See 
his "International Relations and Area Studies:
The Case of South East Asia", p#151, Haas thinks 
that "An international system may be defined as an 
aggregation of politically autonomous and semi- 
autonomous societal systems; any subset of such 
entitles thus constitutes an international sub­
system"# See Michael Haas "International Subsystems: 
stability and Polarity", Aaeri.o.an PAlit.lml.JM m o a  
lüiisa» Vol.64, Ho.i., igfïïTpTïüo.
3# Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian 
Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern
Asia", p.220.
X* limited scope, primary stress on the geographic region, 
2# at least three actors*
3m together these are recognised as a distinct community,
4# members identify themselves as such,
5» units of ’power* are relatively inferior to those in
the dominant system* and
6, changes in the Dominant system have greater effect on
the Subordinate system than vice versa#^ '
All these conditions are met within the Caribbean region as
K
I have defined it in Part One# The first two conditions 
obviously so and the last two conditions clearly so if the 
Domihant system is taken to be the inter-American system.
The evidence for meeting condition 3 and 4* however, is less 
apparent and so I have set it out below. Per condition 3, 
it rests on the fact tlmt the Caribbean has been considered 
by the United States as a distinct region within the Latin 
American sub-system; and that within the Latin American 
sub-system states have several times designated the region 
as *a special area*. The policy of the United States 
towards the Caribbean* as compared to South America, has 
marked it as a region in which particular interests are 
involved which call for, in their twm, particular responses 
Consequently within United States policy-making circles the 
Caribbean/
4. Ibid.
5. See my section ’The Region Defined* in Part One.
6. See my section ’The Preponderance of the United 
States* in Part One.
Caribbean has been regarded and oontlimes to be regarded, 
as a specific ’issue area’# In the Latin American sub­
system South Amerioan governments have recommended action, 
and initiated action, which would deal specifically with the 
Caribbean region* A concrete example of this is the convo­
cation, on the recommendation of the governments of Brasil, 
Chile, Peru and the United States, of the Pifth Meeting of 
the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to consider 
"the grave situation which existed in the Caribbean region".
surface
For condition 4 there is very little/evidence; for example,
all institutional expressions of awareness are essentially
specific and have been greater or less than the region as I
Bhave defined it. Nevertheless a great number of states 
in the region liave, by their actions, expressed an awareness 
of the region. As the politics of'interventionism* demon­
strate they have specifically designed their foreign policies 
to have an impact upon the domestic policies of other states - 
in the region*^ And although it is true that some states in 
the region are less involved in this type of politics than 
are/
7# For example, throughout the 1950’s there were 
periodic meetings of the U.S. ambassadors to the 
region to discuss the problems of the region, 
and to adopt oommon policies as regards the region. 
And in 1967 it was revealed that President Johnson 
had called for a major study of the political and 
economic trends in the Caribbean basin.
B. At the level of less than the region, there are now 
a host of organisations which have been set up as a 
result of 'spill over* from the C.A.G.M. At the 
level of 'greater than the region* are a few economic 
organisations such as *Fedcame' which looks after the 
interests of the coffee growers in Central America, 
Mexico and the Caribbean.
9. See my study of 'Subversive Intervention*•
are others its effect has been universal. Thus no state
has escaped the problem of contending with organised groups
of exiles who, with the overt or covert support of one or
more states in the region, have frequently attempted to seise
power by insurrectionary or guerrilla warfare. The continual
existence of such serious challenges to governments has
served to focus the attention of individual state decision-
makers on other states in the region. Perhaps the clearest
evidence of this attention is in the pattern of diplomatic
relations in the region* Given that small states have
diplomatic representation only where they believe their major
external interests lie, the fact that for most Caribbean
states a considerable proportion of their total diplomatic
representation is restricted to the Caribbean region indicates
] 0
the importance of the region for the states within it.
2he.=Jâ£ikàSSrm RâSlffi^ 9_a^jSaâSm jiââ-Za2^
Professor Eosenau'e concept of a 'penetrated political 
system* is particularly relevant to Latin American countries. 
It can be used, for example, to explain both the politics of
11
underdevelopment and the persistence of Cold War politics in 
3 p
Latin America. ' For understanding politics in the Caribbean 
region/
10. See Table 13 in my section on *The Smallness of States 
and the Capability Similarities between States in the 
Caribbean Areas Some Implications*.
11. AstiB discusses the validity of the concept for Latin 
America in his "The Latin American Countries in the 
International System", pp.10-12,
12. As a contributing factor to the politics of under­
development in Douglas A, Chalmers, "Developing on 
the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American 
Politics" in Hosenau (ed) Linkage,Politics. As the 
main factor in the persistence ofÜ old War politics 
in Bspantaco, "The Latin American Crisis" and its 
External Framework" in Astis (ed) Latin. Amerlc.aiL.
pp. 10-36.
region it is crucial.
A penetrated political system is one where boundaries 
between systems are indistinct. As Eoeenau points out
"in certain respects national political
eyeterns now permeate, as well as depend
on each other and that their- functioning
now embraces actors who are not formally
members of the system* These non-
members not only exert influence upon
national systems but actually participate
in the processes through which such systems
allocate values, co-ordinate goal directed
efforts* and legitimately employ coercion.
They not only engage in bargaining with
the system but they actually bargain within
the system, taking positions on behalf of 
or
one/another of its components. Host 
important, the participation of non-members 
of the society in value allocative and goal- 
attainment processes is accepted both by 
its officialdom and its citlsenry, so that 
the decisions to which non-members contribute 
are no less authorfntive and legitimate than 
are those in which they do not participate*
Such external penetration may not always be 
gladly accepted by the officials and oitisons 
of a society, but what renders decisions 
legitimate and authoritative is that they are 
felt to be binding, irrespective of whether 
they are accepted regretfully or willingfully".
This description provides a. neat summary of the character 
of/
13. James H* Hosenau "Hre-theories and Theories of 
Foreign Policy", pp.63-64.
of United States-Oaribbean relatione* Examples of the
United States participation in the "value allocative and
goal attainment processes" of Caribbean states are numerous
and prove that penetration is at all levels and in virtually
3 àevery sphere of activity* *■
The general effect is that while penetration varies from 
state to state and over time the essential image of the region 
remains constant - that of a deep "deep South" of the United 
States*
The Caribbean Region as a Penetrated Subordinate State 
System
The Caribbean as a penetrated subordinate state system is 
a synthesis of the two previous concepts of the region. It 
does not alter the essence of these concepts but adds an 
extra dimension to them relating to the particular manner in 
which the system is subordinated. Subordinate to the inter- 
American system as a whole it is intimately related to the 
Latin American sub-system, and so in some ways, subordinate 
to this system* At the same time, and as a result of pene­
tration, it is subordinate to the United ^tates system* It 
is therefore not surprising that insofar as there are 
differences in the inter-American sub-system these are 
reflected in a particularly acute way within the Caribbean* 
But not all developments in the region can be related to 
this state of affairs* Indeed many of the issues in the 
region/
14* See, in particular, my case study of ’United States* 
Dominican Republic Relations 1959-1966*.
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region appear as specifically Caribbean! In studying 
the region as a subordinate system it is therefore very 
important to distinguish between situations of ’a 
regional type’ and these which are, essentially, external.
In this way questions relating to the degree of independence 
of a Caribbean subordinate system from the major divisions 
of the inter-American system can be answered,
15. With respect to the Caribbean a similar approach has 
already been suggested by V,A, Lewis and A,W. Bingham 
when they ask if the system is "maintained predominan­
tly by external pressure - that is, where the coherence 
of the elements of the sub-system is in the main the 
consequence of their separate integration with a unit 
external to their immediate environment" or if it is 
one "which, in spite of a certain sub-systemic 
dependency, sufficient crucial elements exist and are 
continually engaged in reciprocal interaGtion,~as to 
ensure a state of coherence or Integration that is 
’independent* of external pressures". See their 
"Integration, Domination and the Small State Systems 
the Caribbean" in S. Lewis and T,G, Matthews (eds) 
Oaribbean_Inta^atipn. p,
B. INÏEEMÎIOHAI, POIiIÎIOS IN THjG 
OAEIBBEAN 1946-1958
The pattern of International politics in the Caribbean 
from 1946to 1958 can be understood by reference fco four 
factors which in differing combinations underlay the 
majority of co-operation and conflict in the region.
These factors are ’Inclusiveness*; ’Subversive Inter­
vention’; ’National Interest’ and ’The Bole of the United
States’. Fully defined later each factor will, in this
section, be the subject of one or more case studios; the 
approach being to focus on specific situations in which 
one factor can be seen to be dominant. It is therefore 
important to recognise that each case study is only a 
partial study, i*e. is developed insofar as it illuminates 
one particular factor, and that in practice any political 
interaction would have developed from a combination of 
factors. Such an ’indivisibility’ of political interaction 
is especially relevant to a consideration of ’The Bole of 
the United States’ for, given United States preponderance, 
a United States presence was felt in practically every 
interaction. Olearly then# a full treatment of United 
States policy in the region can only be gauged by reference 
to comments on United States actions in the case studies 
which are not primarily concerned with United States policy 
as well as the study which is. For this reason considera­
tion of ’The Bole of the United States’ is left until last. 
The order of the appearance of the other factors has no 
sd. gnif ica.no e*
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inclus iTeneas
A special feature of international politics in the region 
in this period is its ’incluaiveness* * By this I mean, 
principally, two inter-related points. First3,y, that 
there is a wide range of effective participation? and 
secondly that there is a lack of houndaries. Individuals, 
organised groups, governments and inter-government organis­
ations all interact with one andther, and can, either 
singly or in combination, decisively influence the inter­
national politics of the region. Making for the develop­
ment of very complex and diverse Interaction patterns the 
following case studies show two such patterns* The first 
case studyj that of the formation of the O.A.O.M, shows 
Mnclusivenese’ leading to the development of a factor 
which later had a decisive impact on the international poli­
tics of the region* $he second case study, that of the 
conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, shows 
'inclUBivenesB* as a complex of widely differentiated 
actors determining international politics in a type of 
situation which was by no means uncommon at the time*
f or ma. t ion of the G *A*0*M*
The early development of the C.A.G.M. provides a good 
example of a unique pattern of ’inclusiveneBs’ involving 
essentially non-political external and internal actors.
The main actors were B.O.L.A.; Central American ’technicos*? 
and to a lesser extent Central American business and 
indus trial interes te *
The period from 1951 to 1958 is generally considered as the 
formative period of the O.A.O.M» Its greatest significance 
was in defining and implementing the functional approach to 
integration rather than any other. Above all it sought to 
separate economic integration from political integration. '
As the external actor in the integration programme the role 
of E.C.L.A. has been considerable. Laying down the basis 
of the programme in Resolution 9 of the 4th  Session of 
E.C.L.A. in June, 1951, it arranged meetings and provided 
both financial and technical assistance throughout the 
remainder of this period* Publishing a number of feasi­
bility studies it was particularly concerned in avoiding 
problems with political implications and was therefore
forced into promoting a very functional approach towards 
2integration* The culmination of its work was in the 
preparation of the two major treaties, adopted in June,
1958, initiating the beginning of ’real’ Central American 
integration*
1, The wisdom of such a policy was doubted in 1966
by the man raw t responsible for the integration
programme, the Secretary General of S.I.E.O.A., who felt 
that the ’beclmicos’ had come near to the end of the 
development of the economic integration programme unless 
they received active political support#
2. The lengths it sought to go to in avoiding politics
is illustrated by the fact that until 1959, and then
only after a request from El Salvador, there was no 
study analysing the benefits and adverse effects 
economic integration could expect to have on the economy 
of any individual coimtry. Considering the importance 
of developing policies ensuring a fairly balanced dis­
tribution of benefits and losses in all involved states, 
during the integration process, this is no less than 
astonishing.
3. ThesG two treaties were the Multilaterial Treaty of 
Free Trade and Central Amerioan Economic Integration 
and the Convention on Integrated Industries. The 
influence of E.C.L.A. Is particularly noticeable in 
the latter.
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Implementing the policies of E.O#L»Aa in Central America, 
were a small group of highly influential ’teehnicos*, 
mainly economists, upon whom the success of the integration 
programme largely rests. It was from this group that the 
original integration idea came, and it was this group that 
decided, at the 4th Session of E.C.L.A. to set up the 
Central American Oomiiittee on Economie Co-operation to 
promote integration#^ Successfully warding off attempts 
by the Central Amerioan foreign ministers to include them 
in O.D.E.O.A. then just being formed, the functional 
approach to integration was adopted as being prudent as well 
as practicable. Throughout the 1950*s the Central 
American OoniDiittee on Economic Co-operation sought to avoid 
politics by advancing non-controversial proposals such as 
the one for a school of public administration*^ Overall 
this non-political approach was quite successful. Figie?es 
has stated that
"the Central Amerioan and integration ideas 
were fashionable; we did not think it 
would amount to much; and it was important 
to/
4# It was the representatives of the 5 Central American 
states to the 3rd Session of E.C.L.A., 1950, who 
first advanced the integration idea*. In the 4th 
Session as representatives,were Jorge Sol of El 
Salvador, Enrique Delgado of Nicaragua, and Manuel 
Noriego Morales of Guatemala, all of whom considered 
themselves economists favourable to the integration 
idea as well as Ministers of Economy of their 
respective states.
5. In the years 1954-1955# which were marked by intense 
political activity and tension in Central America, 
the Committee continued meeting, but informally, so 
avoiding hostile political comment.
to keep the economists happy. If I
trusted the man I would sign his 
6declaration."
Economic Integration also proceeded via individual states 
as the ’teohnicos* implemented a whole series of bilateral 
treaties freeing trade between Central American states. 
Proceeding in these ways by 1958 the idea of integration 
had become acceptable and was beginning to receive support
A measure of lukewarm support came from business and 
industrial circles. Given the personal ties of many of 
the ’teohnicos* with this group, as well as the frequent 
multiple rôle playing of the 'teeîmicos*? business and 
industrial circles were certainly in a position to know 
about and take advantage of schemes for integration*^ For 
example, hesitation by the 'teclmicos* over the question 
of Panamanian participation in the integration scheme 
appears/
6. Hye "Central Amerioan Regional Integration", p.28. 
This free hand policy for the 'technicos* was also 
followed by Anostaso Somosa of Nicaragua and 
Villeda Morales of Honduras.
7. 1951 - El Salvador and Nicaragua, El Salvador and
Guatemala,
1955 - El Salvador and Costa Rica, Guatemala and
Costa Rica,
1956 - Honduras and Guatemala
1957 - El Salvador and Honduras. _
6. Significantly, it was in this year that the indiffer­
ence of the United States to the ’Common Market idea* 
changed into support following the visit to the area 
by Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower,. In a speech in El 
Salvador, Dr. Eisenhower spoke out strongly in favoux 
of developing a common market.
9. Due to the practice of changing the entire adminis­
tration every time a new government takes office, 
many ’teolmieos’ have been employed as both business­
men and as government officials severa]. times. A 
number of them have also sej^ ved in the various inter­
national organisations*
8
appears to have been reinforced by the objection of
3 0business interests#“ Finally, the declining prices of 
coffee, bananas and cotton from 1955 onwards muet have 
stimulated business interests to look for alternative 
sources of profit#
The conflicts between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 194S-1949 
and 1955 provide a good example of a repeated pattern of 
’inclusiveneSB'# In both conflicts the main actors were 
the same two presidents, as individuals and as heads of 
government; an organised group of exiles, and the O.A.S.
The same two presidents were Jose Figueres of Costa Rica 
and Anastasio Somosa of Nicaragua* The personal enmity 
and ideological difference of the two men is generally held 
to be the basic cause of the conflict* Whilst I would not 
disagree with this an important distinction should be made 
between personal enmity as Bomosa’s main motive for con­
flict and ideological difference as Figueres’# If a 
distinction between presidential authority as 'individual* 
and as 'darived from government* is adopted Somosa’s 
behaviour is understandable primarily in terms of the 
former and Figueres* as the latter#'"
10# Objections were focussed on Panama’s higher labour 
costs and lower tariff rates, and its special 
relationship with the United States#
11# By this I mean that Bomosa thought primarily in 
terms of power as 'personal* and not as a 
’system’, That is he had no quarrel with Costa 
Rica as a democracy, witness the friendly, if 
distant relations, between Bomosa and Ulate during 
the latter*8 administration of Costa Rica from 
1949-1953, but only with Figueree as President of/
As the precipitating factor of both conflicts was the 
invasion of Costa Rica from Nicaragua by an organised 
group of exiles, however, the involvement of this group, 
as a separate actor in the conflicts differed in 1955 
compared to 1948-1949* In effect, the 1940-1949 confhct 
was a continuation of the 1948 Civil War in Costa Rica. 
Failure of the Oalderonistas in Costa Rica to rise in 
support of the invading exile forces and the prompt inter­
vention of the O.A.S., rather than a withdrawal of what 
was only limited support from Somoaa, constituted the 
main .reasons for exile forces abandoning the struggle.
In the 1955 conflict, a more serious affair, the role of the 
invading exiles, was more closely tied to the strategy of 
the Bomo^a regime. Without the political ’capital* of a 
recent revolt and a deposed government to trade upon the 
exile forces were dependent upon Soniosa for political and 
military support."' Once in Costa Rica the necessity of 
Nicaragua as a base was vital* The decision of Somoza to
co-operate with the O.A.S. in finding a peaceful solution was
13therefore a betrayal. It was just as Important, in 
forcing/
11. (continued) of Gobta Rica. figueres, and his 
immediate supporters however, viewed politics as a 
system* That is they objected to personal pm er 
and nepotism wherever it existed, as under Trujillo 
in the Dominican Republic as much as undes? Somosa 
in Nicaragua, and sought to replace it with their 
version of democracy. Somova suffered the most from 
this policy by being the most geographically 
accessible*
12. With a widespread patronage system operating at all 
levels of the administration it is safe to assume that 
a number of supporters, hence beneficiaries, of the 
Picado Government - (the government immediately 
preceding the Civ£L War) would either be without jobs 
or be facing such prospects in the near future. The 
incentive for these forces to join the invading exiles, 
or to agitate on their behalf, must have been great.
15* This was, in all probability, the reason for the
renewal of hostility by a small group of exiles on/
forcing the exile forces to abandon the struggle as the 
prompt intervention of the O.A.S, - this time openly in 
support of the Figueres government, and the stiff resis­
tance from hastily mobilised Costa Rican 'volunteer* forces. 
Abandoning the struggle in 1948-1949 the exile leadership 
recognised the failure of a rebellion. In abandoning the 
struggle in 1955 they recognised the failm?c of an invasion.
In both conflicts the O.A.S., as a separate actor, was used 
for the same purposes and proceeded essentially in the same 
way.^ ^^  On both occasions it was able to secure a cessation 
of the hostilities by elimination of the actor immediately 
responsible for the conflict, which was also the weakest 
actor, by refusing to recognise the invading exile group as 
a power contender. Its main method of achieving this was 
to guarantee the viability of the Costa Hie an government and 
to open a line of 'mediated* comjEunication between the other 
two main actors, Somossa and the Figueree government, who 
were also, in large measure, responsible for the conflict.
13# (continued) on February 4th after they, along with 
the others, had effectively abandoned the fight on 
January 26th^
14. That xBf (l) It reacted quickly to the situation by
sending an * on-the-spot * investigation and conciliation 
team, (2) It acted to preserve the existence of the 
Costa Rican government, (3) It recommended settlement 
of the conflict within the existing framework of inter- 
American law. The rôle of the United States in 
promoting this action is often disguised by claims that 
the United States subordinated its policy to that of the 
O.A.S* What should be recognised instead is how 
closely the O.A.S. action corresponds to U.S. policy 
aims which were to keep both Figueres and Somoza in 
power. The determination of the United States to 
su%)port Figue3?es had always been consistent. In 1948 
it had refused to supply arms to the Fioado government, 
then facing; the threat of an internal revolt led by 
Figueres. In July 1954, when relations between Costa, 
Rica and Nicaragua were very strained, it had sent 
observers from its military mission in Managua to 
accompany/
Insofar as the O.A.S# was unable to alter the behaviour or 
attitude of these two actors it was unable to secure a firm 
guarantee of future peace#‘" Nevertheless the 1955 conflict 
dampened the enthusiasm of Figueres and his supporters 
regarding the desirability of creating a democracy in 
Nicaragua. Similarly, Somoza*s attitude became more 
flexible and with his assassination on the 21st September 
1956 future harmony between the tv;o states became more likely,
Both patterns illustrate the extent to which international 
politics in the region was often developed outside the 
official government foreign policy-making machinery. Although 
direct access to government decision-makers was generally 
available for those local elite and foreign Interests who 
wanted/
14* (continued) accompany the Nicaraguan forces as they 
moved towards the Costa Rican frontier, and next 
month, sent on a goodwill mission, six 0-4? planes 
to Ban Jose. Action by the United States in the
O.A.S* once conflict broke out, left the O.A.S. as in 
no doubt of the_ willingness of the United States to 
supply arms to Figueres if only the O.A.S. agreed.
When they did on the 16th January, four P-51*s were 
promptly despatched. On the other side the pro­
vision of high-powered medical attention by the United 
States government to Somoza, following his fatal 
wounding in 1956, and later remarks by President 
Eisenhower on the good character of Somoza, can be 
seen as a token of the support the United States 
government gave him despite widespread indignation of 
this in the rest of Latin America.
15. Peace, as established in the Pact of Amity, 21*2.1949, 
and in the Agreement Between the Governments of Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua in Compliance with Article 4 of the 
Pact of Amity 9.1*1956, aimed only at the prevention 
of further exile groups forming. It did nothing to 
solve basic differenoes between the men.
16. The Figueres government reduced the volume of hostile 
propaganda directed at Nicaragua and became less 
tolerant of anti-Sonioza exiles.
wanted to Influence the foreign policy of a national govern­
ment this was not the only option open, A course of action 
outside a national government could be as successful in 
achieving desired ends. It is therefore not surprising 
that much of the international politics of the region 
followed this course. But because such action was extra- 
governmental, confined to small groups of actors, and
involved a great deal of intrigue, it remains largely un- 
17documented*“ Furthermore such action was often limited in 
scope and aimed at fulfilling only limited ends. Creating 
confusion without often effecting any change it was persistent 
and widespread, and was a major factor in creating the image
18of unstable international politics as the norm of the region*
17* It is prima:eily through biographies or memoirs 
that such information comes to light* One 
particular example shows this well, Ydigoras 
Puentes, a former president of Guatemala, reveals 
in his memoirs that whilst in exile in 1954 "A 
former executive of the United Fruit Company, now 
retired, Mr, Walter Turnbull, came to see me with 
two gentlemen whom he introduced as agents of the 
0*1.A* They said that I was a popular figure in 
Guatemala and that they wanted to lend their 
assistance to overthrow Arbens# When I asked 
their conditions for the assistance x found them 
unacceptable* Among other things, I was to promise 
to favour the United Fruit Company and the Inter­
national Railways of Central America; to destroy 
the railroad workers’ labour union; to suspend 
claims against Great Britain for the EeXf^e 
territory; to establish a strong-arm government, 
on the style of Ublco". See his SL.,War.^mth 
Communism (Englewood Cliffs* N.Js Prentioe-Hallj 
Tnc."TT§^^), pp.49-50, Another colourful account of
plots in the Caribbean is to be found in Arturo R, 
Bspaillat SaayiJM* (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company 1965). As Secretary for State for 
Security in the last years of the Trujillo govern­
ment Bspaillat was involved in preparing much of the 
plotting and intrigue in the Caribbean during these 
years,
IB, In reality, as I have demonstrated in Part Two, /
Subversive Intervention
uic^ sMUfcMl
Intervention was the most persistent form of political
I Q
interaction between Caribbean States in this period, Of 
all types of intervention the most frequent and universal 
was subversive intervention, here defined as
"acts for which a government is responsible, 
intended or likely to ferment aggression 
against a state, or revolution within a 
state"
The case study, for example, focuses on subversive inter­
vention as the major cause and main manifestation of 
conflict between certain Caribbean states from 1947-1950? 
a 'state of affairs* which was to be repeated again at the 
end of the 1950’s and which directly led to the Fifth 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the 0,A*B, at Santiago, 
Chile, in 1959*
The universality of subversive intervention can largely 
be explained by reference to the specific characteristics 
of the region, viz preponderance of the United States, 
chara cteristic s/
18* (continued) Two, political interaction between states 
in the region is more stable than it first seems,
19, Intervention is cons id ered as "a:^ action beginning 
with deliberate or remediable interaction among 
nations, that significantly affects the public 
internal realm of another sovereign state and which 
stops short of aggressive crossing of international 
frontiers". Manfred Halpern, "The Morality and 
Politics of Intervention" in James I, Eosenau (ed),
P'rincetons
Princeton University Press, 1964/ p*25S, In rhxs 
period the most frecpient techniques of intervention 
between Caribbean states were diplomatic interference 
in internal affairs, clandestine political action, 
demonstrations of force and subversion,
20, Quincy Wright, "Subversive Intervention", American 
lËaœ pU oO aism aiyv^Jv..^ voi.54s H o ,3 .rV §^ ^  
p.531.
characteristics of internal polltiea, economic under-
PI
development, smallness and equality of capabilities.
The major aim of United States policy in the Caribbean is 
to maintain preponderance and for this political stability
09
is seen as essential, " A very necessary condition of
this political stability is the absence of inter-state
conflict. Given the readiness of the United States to
intervene in the region this condition effectively rules
out war, considered as polities by other means, as a policy
option open to any Oaribbean state decision-maker, The
'area of manœuvre’ for the external relations of Oaribbean
states is thus seriously reduced* A consequence of this
has been the development of subversive intervention as an
acceptable and analogous alternative to war* Acceptable
in that, by being covert and hence not easily regulated by
the United States, subversion allows some 'freedom of
23manoeuvre' to a Oaribbean state decision-maker, Analogous 
in that the principal objective of subversion in the 
Caribbean /
21, These specific characteristics were earlier advanced 
in fart One as the four particular indicators of the 
region* For a full discussion of these character­
istics see Fart One,
22, For a discussion of the major elements of United 
States policy in this period see "The Rôle of the 
United States 1946-1958"#
25, When it can, the United States operates within this 
'area of manœuvre' in order that subversion is not 
directly counter to its policy in the region, These 
operations generally take the form of controlling 
through bureaucratic methods, such as the granting of 
import/export licences and Customs seizure, the flow 
of arms from United States companies to various groups 
of political exiles and to states. See George Thayer, 
The War. Business (London: Paladin 1970) Chapters 2,
5p 4#
Caribbean lias been the replacement of one government for 
another by means of externally directed force,
Subversive intervention has thus acted as a partial 
substitute for war but this, in its turn, has been a 
contributing factor to :eecu3?rent crises in the international
pK
politics of the region*"
The major characteristics of internal politics - personalism 
militarism, the persistence of political instability and a 
tradition of political violence favour the use of sub­
version* Personalism, with its stress on an Individual as 
a source of politics, is particularly responsive to sub­
version which may, in this case, be either positive or 
negative* Positive subversion takes the form of support 
for a major opposition leader of another state with the 
intention of installing him at some future date as head of
O
government of that .state*^  Negative subversion is the 
assassination or deposition of the head of governraent, or 
leading/
24* War can be defined in a number of ways and fought 
for a number of reasons* Here it is simply 
considered as armed and organised conflict to 
achieve definable objectives and/or resolve 
conflicts*
25* Absence of war, and subversive intervention as a 
partial substitute for war means that in certain 
cases political differences remain unresolved or 
on3.y partially resolved* The effect of this is 
to leave a comparatively easily activated reservoir 
of possible future points of contention and conflict,
26* Characteristics of personalism such as authority, 
loyalty and patronage dovetail with some of the 
essential elements of subversion such as the 
Element of risk, the need for secrecy, and the 
involvement of only a fev/ persons in key decisions, 
to enhance greatly the chances of developing 
Buocessful subVersion*
leading political personalities, of another state with the
intention of creating a political crisis* Olearly positive
subversion, implying some form of control over the outcome
is better than negative subversion where the final outcome
27cannot be predicted* In recognition of this most person-
alist based subversion in the Caribbean has been positive 
28subversion* Militarism allows for subversion directed at 
the ’area of distrust* between civilian and military sectors 
of society* Such subversion generally takes the form of 
playing one sector off against another by the use of rumour 
and innuendo* Finally, political instability and the 
tradition of political violence legitimises subversion as a 
method of political change* Providing that some attention 
has been paid to nationalism the external origin of political
change is normally not regarded as a sufficient reason to 
disqualid 
method /
lify such c h a n g e S u b v e r s i o n  is a relatively cheap
27* This control, however, is very weak for once the 
subversive element is in poweiz external dependence 
ceases* Such control therefore takes the form of 
the expected enacting of promisee (which may be 
broken) and of influence %which may be rejected)* 
Consequently the only safe policy fo3? the state 
originally promoting subversion is to develop 
uncerctainty by beginning the process again* The 
adoption of this policy by Oaribbean states is 
another factor accounting for the recurrent crises 
of the region*
28* Resort to assassination as the only major technique of 
subversion has generally been *a final solution* used 
only after positive subversion has failed, e«g* the 
Dominican Republio-Yeneauela conflict 1959*1960. A 
similar practice has been followed by the United States 
in respect of the Dominican Republic 1960-1961, and more 
recently in Cuba*
29# The organisation of a subversive movement by a govern­
ment which aimed at placing its own nationals in key 
positions in a future government of another state 
would probably not be tolerated*
method of attaining foreign policy objectives* It is
therefore a particularly suitable policy for underdeveloped
states which cannot afford to maintain the necessary means
of attaining objectives in other ways, for example through
the use of military force derived from the possession of
large well equipped armed forces, or through 'leverage* as
a result of economic aid* In this period all the Caribbean
states were underdeveloped ând government revenue was 
30limited* The result was an emphasis on subversion as a 
practicable, and possibly effective, foreign policy means*
Smallness has also been a factor encouraging subversion.
The strategy of subversion aiming at key political figures 
is particularly appropriate to small states as the key 
individuals are relatively few in number* Another conse­
quence of smallness is the tendency for political power to 
be concentrated in one place, usually the capital city*
Hence subversion needs only be geographically limited in 
scope for it to succeed* In the Caribbean these two 
strategies were combined to develop a pattern of subversion 
based upon the key political figures in the capital city*"^ '
A further source of subversion is the relative equality of 
c ap ab illties/
50. On the formal traditional instruments of foreign
policy - the foreign service and the armed forces « 
all the Caribbean states except for Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic qent less than /lO million a year*
31, This pattern of subversion is very close to, in form,
the coup d'etat and, like the coup d'etat, is generally 
supportive of the status quo* Its antithesis is 
guerrilla warfare*
capabilities between the states of the Oaribbean* Two 
major methods of increasing capabilities, war and internal 
development, are ruled out* war, because of the equality 
of capabilities may not be successful and is, at any rate, 
restricted by the preponderance of the United States*
Internal development, because of the features which act to 
inhibit the processes of internal development - export 
dependence, political instability and smallness of size - 
cannot easily or quickly be remedied so making difficult any 
rapid increase in capability of a single Oaribbean state 
vis-a-vis any other Oaribbean state* In these circum­
stances positive subversion aimed at promoting friendly 
relations becomes a means of temporarily increasing capability,
From the multiplicity of factors generating subversive inter­
vention as a regional phenomena techniques of subversion have 
developed which are mutually reinforcing rather than mutually 
opposed* It is therefore not surprising to see subversive 
intervention frequently employed in Caribbean international 
politics* /
32. From this it follows that the only way for a 
Caribbean state to increase capability rapidly 
is tl'irough the external environment* The most 
favoured method of achieving this is by importing 
arms, generally from the United States, occasion­
ally from Western Europe, and in times of crisis 
from 'friendly' Oaribbean states* This means that 
the United States government in particular is 
especially able to influence the military capability 
of a Caribbean state* Both the Guatemalan Affair 
1954, and the Cuban Crisis^ 1962, show that the 
United States government attaches great importance 
to the maintenance of this influence.
33polities# To some extent this has led to its recognition
as a specifically Caribbean pattern of interaction, one that
is 'unique to the Caribbean by being different and distinct
from patterns of interaction among other states in the inter-
34.American system* The case study, which focuses on the 
years 1947-1950, Illustrates this Caribbean pattern of inter­
action in operation.
On January 6th, 1950, the 0*A*S* Council met to consider a 
request from Haiti that the Organ of Consultation be convoked 
in respect of "a series of flagrant acts of intervention" by 
the Dominican Republic which tiireatened "the territorial 
inviolability, the sovereignty, and the political indepen­
dence" of Haiti. At the same meeting the Dominican Republic 
rejected the Haitian charges and itself requested the convo­
cation of the Organ of Consultation in order that steps could 
be taken to remedy "the abnormal conditions prevailing in the 
Caribbean/
 .  1*1 i#L
33* To some extent the pattern of ’mixed balanced inter­
action* previously noted in Fart Two as character­
istic of this period is explained by subversive 
intervention. " (See Part Two - The Four Correlations). 
The pattern is established in the following ways 
State A is involved in subversion in State B and when 
B discovers this it complains to A - hence conflict*
The reaction of A is generally to deny, and then 
suppress, such subversion - hence co-operation* As 
a means of countering A however, B frequently begins 
subversion of A, so beginning the process again.
54. The only similar pattern of Interaction in South 
America is between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay 
where the Argentinian and Brazilian governments tolerate, 
largely through being unable to control, the 'invasions* 
from their frontier regions into Paraguay by various 
groups of Paraguayan exiles.
Oaribbean area". Agreeing to the requests of both Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic the O.A.S. Council established 
itself as a Provisional Organ of Consultation and appointed 
an Investigating Committee to examine the numerous and con­
tradictory 'facts’ presented by Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic to substantiate their claims of intervention.
On March 13th, 1950, the Report of the Investigating 
Committee was submitted to the Provisional Organ of Consul­
tation. Frori'i the Report, which covered in detail the 
conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic during 1949, 
and the situation in the Caribbean 1947-1949 one point in 
particular was very apparent* This was the complexity of 
subversive intervention in the region* Related to this, 
and as a further point, was the difficulty found by the 
Investigating Committee in recommending any real solution to 
the problem, of intervention in the region.
The complexity of subversive intervention was a reflection 
of two inter-related points? the diversity of techniques of 
intervention and the special relationship of Caribbean 
governments to subversive movements.
An idea of the diversity of techniques of intervention can 
be gained by drawing examples of intervention from the 
dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic during 1949. 
These are listed below together with a brief reference, in 
brackets, to the situation to which they refer.
/
1. - Permitting political exiles to use a government
associated radio station to incite revolt in another 
state* (Use of the Dominican radio station *Da Vos 
Dorainicana* hy Haitian exiles Boland and Tiau to incite 
revolt in Haiti in June and November, 1949)*
2* - Circulation of oxternallj printed propaganda within
a state, the purpose of which is to advocate unconsti­
tutional means of replacing the incumbent government of 
that state* (Leaflets inciting rebellion and signed by 
Boland which circulated in Haiti in November, 1949)*
3é ^ Frequent contact between exile groups in one state
with the opposition in another state the purpose of which 
is to promote subversion, such contact being assisted and 
encouraged by government officials of the exiles* host 
state* (Meetings during 1949, with the help of 
Dominican officials, between Dupuy, Haitian opposition 
and Boland, exiled in the Dominican Republic, at which 
plans for subversion in Haiti were formulated*)
4* - Use of the diplomatic corps to finance opposition
groups* (A sum of 02,000 given by Rafael Oscar de Maya, 
First Secretary of the Dominican Embassy in Haiti to 
Dupuy in November, 1949)*
9* •» Supply of arms and ammunition to opposition groups in
a state by an external state, or to exile groups by the 
host state, the purpose of which is to facilitate the 
overthrow/
overthrow of another government* (Delivery of weapons 
to Dupuy in the Dominican Republic in December, 1949).
6* - She promotion by one state of assassination and arson 
in another state the purpose of which is to precipitate 
a political crisis in that state* (Plot by Dupuy and 
others to assassinate high officials of the Haitian govern­
ment and start fires in Port-au-Prince in order to create 
panic in the city.)
7. - Permitting within one state the assembly and military 
training of an armed group of political exiles whose 
purpose is the invasion of another state* (Plan by 
Roland to cross into Haiti from the Dominican Republic at 
the end of December, 1949, at the head of an armed group 
of exiles with the intention of taking over the Haitian 
government * )
The special relationship of Caribbean governments to subversive
*35movements stems primarily from 'inclusiveness*• This fea­
ture introduces complexity into subversion by permitting groups 
of political exiles to establish a semi-autonomous relationship 
with the host government* Such a relationship is particularly 
obvious in the case of the two attempted invasions of the 
Dominican Republie*
The/
35. For a discussion of the concept of * inclusiveness* and 
how it operates in the case of exile groups see my 
section 'Inclusiveness - The conflicts between Costa 
Hioa and Nicaragua**
The first attempt, known as Gayo Confites, was much the more 
ambitious. In preparation throughout 194? the Invasion 
force, when assembled at Oajo Confikes, Cuba, in September, 
19479 numbered over one thousand armed men, twelve aircraft 
and three vessels. The equipping and training of this force 
was openly tolerated by the Cuban government, A Cuban 
government minister, Jose" Manuel Aleman, and a high govern­
ment official, Hanoio Castro, were intimately involved in 
preparing the invasion and to this end channelled funds into 
the invasion from the Cuban Department of Education, Juan 
Bosch, Juan Rodrigue# Garcia, and Miguel Angel Ramire#, all 
Dominican exiles in Cuba and the major organisers of the 
invasion, were friendly with key persons in the Cuban elite 
through whom they had direct access to high officials of the 
Cuban government. Such close identification of the Cuban 
government with the aims of the invasion brought proteste 
from the Dominican Republic on July 23rd 1947, but this, and 
subsequent protests, were ignored by the Cuban government,
Less easy to ignore was the mounting pressure from the United 
States government to break up the invasion and finally, albeit 
reluctantly, the Cuban government succumbed to this by moving 
against the invasion force on September 28th, 1947.
The second attempt, known as Duper^, was staged from 
Guatemala in June 1949, Persons prominent in Cayo Confites, 
such as Bosch and Angel Hamire# were again in leadership 
positions/^^
36, Trujillo finally protested about the expedition
through the 0.A.8, and although the United States State 
Department was anti-Trujillo at the time it responded in 
his favour, Truman ordered his chief of staff,
General Eisenhower, to summon his Cuban opposite number, 
General Pere# Damera, and to demand the expedition, be 
stopped.
37positions# The invasion plan was based on the use of six 
aircraft which the Guatemalan government were equipping at 
the military air base of San Jose de Guatemala, The 
Guatemalan government also provided the invasion forces with 
a limited amount of arms and was intimately involved in pre­
paration for the launching of the invasion. Once under way 
bad planning and lack of awareness of the true situation in 
the Dominican Republic, among other things, contributed to 
the dismal failure of the invasion.
These two invasion attempts were prepared with the collusion
of the Cuban and Guatemalan governments but because of this
they should not be seen as merely an expression of the foreign
policy of these governmentb. Rather, preparations for the
invasione were tolerated because they corresponded with the
foreign policies of the host governments, and were furthered
insofar as they were not directly inimical to the interests of
these governments. The exile groups thus often operated
with a degree of autonomy - a situation frequently underpinned
by the active participation of high officials of the host
government who could make available parts of the government,
39machinery without the consent of the government as a whole. 
Occasionally such exile groups were so small they could 
operate/
’CUt uicMzem u«tw3,!'-rï»:*=aaiE'«i
37, A prominent .organiser of Luperon was Eufemio Fernande#, 
a Cuban who until May 1949 was the Chief of the Cuban 
Secret Police - the ideal position from which to conduct 
a clandestine operation with or without the knowledge of 
the Cuban government,
38, When the activities of a group of exiles were inimical 
to a government they were suppressed, e,g, Gaya Confites, 
1947, the disbandment of the Caribbean Legion in Costa. 
Rica, 1949ÿ the suppression of the activities of Costa 
Rican exiles in Nicaragua, 1995•
39, On October 2nd, 1947, Jose Miguel Aleman was censured by 
the Ouban Senate for his part in Cayo Confites,
*  * W
operate without the knowledge of the host government and 
in invading another Caribbean state could seriously disturb 
relations between the host state and the invaded state,
In any situation groups of exiles could therefore bo either 
dependent, quasi-independent, or independent actors thus 
making it very difficult to associate with certainty any one 
govermaent with any particular group of exiles or act of a 
group of exiles,
This complexity of subversive Intervention was reflected in 
the five draft resolutions submitted by the Investigating 
Committee to the Provisional Organ of Consultation, For 
example, in the particular case of the conflicts between 
Haiti and 'the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, Guatemala and 
the Dominican Republic, the Investigating committee recog­
nised that satisfactory solutions could be found only if each 
case was treated individually and accordingly recommended 
that a Special Committee for the Caribbean be set up to 
promote the settlement of these conflicts on such a basis.
At the same time complexity was a factor in detcrming that 
the recommendations of the Investigating Committee on the 
general situation in the Caribbean were reduced to the lowest 
common denominator, in this case to stressing the importance 
of Caribbean states abiding by the norms of inter-American 
law,/
40, Such occurrences were frequent in Central America
where Honduras, because of its geographical position 
and the weakness of the government in the countryside, 
was used as the spring-board country more often than 
any other,
41* Modelling itself on the work of the Inter-American
Peace Committee the Special Committee considered that 
its prime function was to provide 'good offices' and 
to press for settlement. It was thus concerned, 
above all, to promote settlement on a bi-lateral basis 
taking into account the specific characteristics of 
each case.
4.2 —law, especially as it related to non-intervention. in
approving the draft resolutions of the Investigating Committee 
the O.A.S. was therefore able to secure a short term settle­
ment among certain states in the Caribbean but was unable to 
develop this or to suggest any means of ensuring a long-term 
settlement of the problem in the region as a whole.
Overall, the practice of subversive intervention generated 
tension and mistrust among Caribbean states as each state 
remained uncertain of any other state's real intentions.
Many observers have seen the basis of such subversion primarily 
in ideological terms, i.e. democracy v dictatorship, and legal 
terms, i.e. the non-adherence by Caribbean states to the norms 
of inter-American law.^ '^^  But this view, at best is only half 
the picture. Thus whilst it is true that ideology motivated 
some exile groups, many more were based on opportunism, 
organised on personalist lines, and operated for a variety of 
purposes depending on the particular reMionship with the host 
government* More Importantly the ideological view ignores 
the environmental factors that, by themselves, encouraged and 
sustained subversion as an effective politics within the 
Caribbean /
42. Of equal importance to 'complexity* in reaching this 
solution was the internal^politics of the O..A,$, 
Always fearful of United States power the Batin 
American states were not prepared in this particular 
case to sacrifice the cherished principle of non­
intervention for the ill-defined principle of repre­
sentative democracy.
43. Sea, for example, J. I.loyd Meoham, $MJ!alÈ.§â-âMigâ 
aaOÆteï.r4myjlÂMme£urlÈLjB^^ Chapter 13; 
Gordon Coimoli-Smith, IM.Ji«îeïri!aS£Jcan..àXal2Êl 
(London! Oxford University frees l9ëo), pp.223-2^9; 
Jerome Slater,
Z s U a ,  pp.77-83.
Caribbean as a whole. The legal view similarly neglects 
environmental factors by ignoring them; hence prescriptions 
for curing subversive intervention based on adherence to 
inter-American law were Bound to fail as long as environ­
mental conditions remained u n c h a n g e d . 44
Hatlpïial
Much of the international politics in the Caribbean during 
this period can be considered as 'spontaneous* and 
'reactive*.However, there are certain aspects of state 
behaviour which appear to be 'purposive' and to be rooted in 
some conception of what is generally termed 'national 
interest*. Despite its limitations it therefore seems use­
ful to adopt the concept of national interest which here is 
defined in two ways as 'what is best for a national sodety* 
and 'as the general and continuing ends for which a nation 
a c t s ' . B o t h  these defiitbions have suggested the case 
studies. The 'what la best* is reflected in the first study, 
that of the immediate causes of the Honduras-Hicaragua border 
dispute/
44# Of importance to note here is that this fact was recog- 
nis ed and articulated by Cuba alone among the American 
states when in 1959, at the 3?ifth Meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the O.A.S., the Ouban delegate, Haul Roa, 
pointed out that underdevelopment was the root cause of 
tension and instability in the Caribbean. See Quinta
Actog V DocumentOS. (0• E.A. Ser.F/ixi•5•Xespanol),
3rd Plenary Session, Doc. 39#
45. What I term 'spontaneous international politics is 
closely lin k e d  to my concept of 'inoluBiveness', i.e. 
is a consequence of 'inclusiveness* and is best illus­
trated by my section in Inclusiveness. What I term 
'reactive* international politics is closely linked to 
the Caribbean as a penetrated system with a common 
environment and is best illustrated by my section on 
The H#le of the United States 1946-1958. The inter­
play of both types of international politics is  a theme 
of my section on Subversive Intervention,
46. For these definitions and a discussion on national 
interest see Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: 
Macmillan, 1970), Chapter 1, passim.
«ï- I Jf
dispute of 1957? in which national interest is shown as the 
generator of conflict and crisis. The 'general and contin­
uing ends' is reflected in the second study? that of the 
different attitudes of Panama and El Salvador to unity in 
Central America? which is an evaluation of national interest 
as a determinant of long standing policies of involvement 
(El Salvador) and indifference (Panama) to Central America.
The Hondurae-Nicaragua Border Dispute 1957#
The Hondtiras-Hlcaragua border dispute had a long history as a
continuing point of contention between the t%vo countries.
Si#e was a factor inhibiting any easily negotiated settle­
ment, the disputed area being some seven thousand square miles 
whilst at the same time the limited strategic and economic 
value of the area? in 1955 an isolated population of about 
four thousand only marginally integrated in the money economy, 
ensured that the problem rarely became urgent. Supposedly 
definitively settled by a judgment in favour of Honduras in 
1906 the later Nicaraguan rejection of this judgment led to
a situation in which, for the first half of the 20th Century
Honduras accepted the fact of Nicaraguan involvement in part 
of the area provided it was not explicit whilst insisting on
its non-negotiable legal right to the whole of the disputed
47 / area. /
47. So that even though Nicaraguan administration and 
economic exploitation of lumber in the Coco River 
area extended some way into the territory claimed 
by Honduras most Honduran protests were confined 
to the status of the whole of the claimed area and 
were, for example, over incidents such as the publi­
cation of maps and calendars in Nicaragua shmlng 
the disputed area as belonging to Nicaragua.
The major sources from which this case study is 
derived are listed in the Appendix under 'Oase Studies - 
The Honduras-Hicaragua Border Dispute, 1957’.
4 .  t
area. The immediate cause of the conflict of 1957 was the 
recognition hy the governing military junta of Honduras that 
this situation could not he perpetuated except at the expense 
of Honduras.
The most important factor behind this re-appraisal was the 
possibility of a major change in the economic value of the 
area. Although no oil had yet been foun.d a geological 
survey by the Honduran Petrol Company in 1955 had been con­
sidered favourable enough for drilling to begin in the 
Oaratasca Lagoon area by 1956. The decision of the company 
to bring in heavier equipment to drill a second well in the
vicinity of the first in early 1956 sparked off a period of
4-8oil speculation, in Nicaragua as well as in Honduras.
For both Honduras and Nicaragua oil meant government revenue 
but more importantly, in the case of Honduras, it also 
promised economic development and less reliance on bananas 
and U.P.C.O.^^ These considerations became increasingly 
powerful during 1956 as first U.P.C.O* postponed further 
expansion in Honduras and then the discredited and conserva­
tive government of Logano was replaced by a mildly imiovating 
military /
48. A new mining law covering oil was drafted by Nicaragua
in 1956 and later in the year the Waterford Oil
Company of New Orleans, which had a large concession
from the Nicaraguan government for exploitation along 
the Atlantic sea-board, began geological surveys near 
and in the disputed area.
49. In the 1951-1955 period Ü.F.G.O. contributed an
average of 033 million a year to the Honduras economy.
See Stacy May and G-alo Plaaa, ghe„TM J M .i^mi:LÇj)mH3ÿ.
(national Planning Association 195877
P.158.
military junta# The beginning of the Sue# Canal crisiB in
October? 1956? with its subsequent emphasis on Western oil
30production operated as a further stimulus for action* In 
these circumstances it is not surprising that the new Honduras 
government decided that in the interest of Honduras some 
revision of the existing status quo as it applied to the 
disputed area was both urgent and necessary*
The first moves in this direction came on 21st February 1957
when? by Decree 52? the Honduran government created the new
department of Gracias a Dios which, for the first time,
administratively organised all the disputed area claimed by 
31Honduras# On February 26th, Nicaragua protested this move
as making the dispute more difficult to settle* In March,
amid increasing public support for its policy, the Honduran
government answered this by proceeding to appoint officials
to the political organisation of the new department. At
the end of April Honduras was claiming violation of its
territory by Nicaraguan armed forces and on May 1st open
32fighting broke out#"^  Following requests from both Honduras 
and Nicaragua the O.A.S• Oouncil met and on May 2nd resolved 
to turn itself into a Provisional Organ of Consultation and 
to /
50# As a direct result of the Sue# Canal crisis from 
October 1956 to March 1957 there was a 75 percent 
decline in oil shipments from the Middle East 
which was largely compensated for by increased 
p roduGtion in the Western Hemisphere*
51# Prior to this only in part of the claimed area., the 
Patuoa Valley? did Honduras wield de facto authority.
52# Although both Honduras and Nicaragua mobilised 
reserves the scale of fighting was very limited 
lasting only a few days and with just a few hundred 
troops and several aircraft involved#
to appoint an Investigating Committee* By May 5th? the 
Investigating Oomalttee had secured a cease-fire and by 
May 10th arranged for troop withdrawals along sones of 
contact in much of the disputed area# On May 17th the 
Investigating Committee was reconstituted as ah Ad Hoc 
Committee which, by July 21st, had effected a final agree­
ment by Honduras and Nicaragua to submit the dispute to the 
International Ooiu?t of Justice, the decision of this court 
to be binding and requiring immediate compliance#
The crisis with Nicaragua, and the subsequent intervention 
of the O.A.S. make sense if they are seen as deliberately 
planned by the Honduras government. The reasoning is as 
follows? The promise of oil made the problem of the disputed 
area one of urgency for the Honduras government, for if oil 
were discovered the economic value of the disputed area would 
increase and correspondingly the chances of a *no compromise 
on the 1906 award’ settlement with Nicaragua would diminish. 
3?erraanent military occupation of the disputed area by 
Honduras was ruled out through lack of capability and, in any 
oase, meant the risk of war with N i c a r a g u a , O n  the other 
hand Honduras had an asset in its excellent legal case for 
rightful/
53* From 1906 onwards Nicaragua had been willing to 
settle the dispute by compromise but this 
approach was always rejected by Honduras as 
calling into doubt the validity of the 1906 award,
54# In terms of immediate military superiority, i.e. 
troops available for immediate combat, Nicaragua 
had an estimated 2s1 advantage over Honduras. In 
a war lasting more than a few weeks Honduras was, 
therefore, increasingly at a disadvantage#
- L  { I
33rightful possession of the disputed area. For Honduras 
a sound strategy was therefore one which minimised its lack 
of capability but maximised its legal claim, and at the same 
time forced compulsory arbitration of the dispute on Nicaragua 
before oil was discovered« Unable to force arbitration on 
Nicaragua by its own efforts, Honduras enlisted the aid of 
the O.A.S. by first precipitating the conflict through pro­
vocative unilateral action and then inviting the O.A.S. to
36intervene and to find a settlement. In so doing it banlced 
heavily on a repetition of the previous practice of the O.A.S. 
when dealing with crises, which was to arrange an immediate 
cessation of open hostilities - for Honduras this would 
compensate for its military weakness vis-a-vis Nicaragua, and 
then to recommend settlement by law thus giving the advan­
tage to Honduras through its legal claim to the disputed area. 
Action by the O.A.S. confirmed Honduras’ expectations. On 
the above interpretation of the dispute It is quite obvious 
that a conception by the military junta of the national 
interest of Honduras was paramount both in precipitating the 
conflict and in contriving the resolution.
El Salvador, Panama and Oentral American Union"*' /
f^ * ‘Ttr-nriV i'tn-irTi,i r  irn  ' # 'rw i rn wrttBttiÉ
55. The history and basis of the Honduran claim as 
set out by the Honduras government is summarised 
in the paraphlet
(^elnelgalpa, Jwne 1957K
56. This explains why from 21st February 1957, Honduras 
deliberately escalated the dispute; why it quickly 
brought to the attention of the O.A.S. Council on 
April 50th, the relatively minor incursion by 
Nicaraguan troops into territory claimed by Honduras 
when previously such incursions had been ignored; 
and why, once the O.A.S. Council had involved itself 
as a Provisional Organ of Consultation Hondm^as 
officially announced on May 5rd that all fighting had 
stopped.
El Salvador? Panama and Central American Union’''*
During the 1950's El Salvador's vigorous championing of the 
union of Central America contrasted radically with the 
studied indifference of Panama, At the base of these 
differing attitudes? however? was a common concern with the 
probable effects of union on the development of the oountu^ y 
and a shared awareness of the influence of history. In 
other words national interest, as it was being interpreted 
in the present and had been interpreted in the past, was a 
major determinant of the attitude of bo’th states.
For the elite of El Salvador union in Central America was 
seen as part of the answer to the pressing problem of
37economic development without social or political change.
To develop union by working through its foreign ministry 
and through 0,U,E,G.A, therefore became a major priorl’îjy of the 
Salvadoran government and, over time, resulted in the close 
identification of El Salvador with the direction, maintenance 
and furthering of the union programme; so close, In fact, 
that Salvadoran foreign policy in Central America and the 
development of union became virtually synonymous. This led, 
in/
The major sources from which this case study is 
derived are listed in 'Llie Appendix under 'Case 
Studies - El Salvador, Panama and Central 
Arner1oan Union',
57, A programme of industrialisation was seen as
providing the rest of the answer. The comple­
mentary nature of union and industrialisation was 
a major theme of economic studies on El Salvador 
during this period.
in Itfj turn, to the manipulation of 0#D.E*G,A. by the
Salvadoran government in order that O.D.E.C.A*»s policies
should reflect Salvadoran interests* One particularly
obvious example of this was the question of the free
movement of Central American citizens between Central
American states, Vlith a high population density and a
rising rate of population growth yet with virtually no
cultivable land left uncultivated and only an embryonic
Industrial base the government of Ï51 Salvador was faced
with a large and growing population problem, A partial
solution to this was envisaged in the encouragement of
emigration from El Salvador to other less densely populated
parts of Central America but for this to be feasible a
policy on free movement of labour in Central America had to
be forthcoming,^^ To this end El Salvador worked in
O.D*E.C.A, for discussions and decisions on the free move- 
60ment question? and followed up one initiative with 
another /
58, The density of population per square mile in 1958 
was 298 persons overall? and 191 persons in rural 
areas. The population growth rate of 1.3 percent 
per annum? 1940-1950? had increased to 3,6 percent 
per annum, 1958-1961. In 1950 nearly 75 percent 
of the land was in farms, 60 percent of it under 
pasture or cultivation? and nearly 20 percent in 
mountains? forests and sub-marginal land. In 
1956 about 13 percent of the economically active 
population worked in manufacturing and construction.
59, Density of population elsewhere in Central America
was3 Guatemala - 84; Costa Rica - 55; Honduras - 42; 
Nicaragua -26, All figures per square mile and for 
mid 1958,
60, For example, the Ministers of the Interior of O.D.E.G.A. 
met, early in 1957, to discuss the free movement 
question and resolved, among other things, to recommend 
that the respective internal laws of each state be 
amended to allow Central Americans to take up residence 
in any state.
another despite the hostility of some Central American 
c 1
states, The use of San Salvador as the headquarters
of 0,I),B,G,A, and the principal meeting place for most
of the conferences? etc, on economic integration further
enabled the Salvadoran government to influence union?
particularly as it consistently supported the functionalist
62approach in both philosophy and action# By late 1959? 
as the behaviour of the Salvadoran government during the 
crisis over the election of a new Secretary General for
O.D+E.C.A. clearly showed, El Salvador had come to regard 
0*D.E,G.A. at least inasmuch as it was a tangible expression 
of the aspirations of union, as indispensable, ^
For the elite of Panama ? union with Central America was 
seen as an alternative, to the maintenance and expansion of 
its/
61, Much of the hostility between Ilondwzas and El 
Salvador revolved around the large sca3.e illegal 
immigration into Honduras by Salvadoreans, A 
similar? but less sizeable movement of Central 
Americans into Costa Rica following the abolition 
of visa regulations in 1957? led Costa Rica in 
May 1959# to unilaterally suspend the 1957 agree­
ment*
62, The functional approach %vas basic to the Salvadoran 
concept of union. Thus at the very beginning? 
i*e« at the founding of 0,D,E*C,A. in October? 1951#
El Salvador had argued for gradualism and against 
Nicaragua’s concept of immediate political, union.
At the same time? through initiatives such as the 
signing of the free trade treaties with other Central 
American states# it had encouraged the development 
of the necessary economic framework for closer union*
65. In support of O.D.E.G.A, the Salvadoran government was
active diplomatically to secure an acceptable new 
Secretary General and to devise an interim arrangement 
whereby O.B.E.O.A, would temporarily function without 
a Secretary General, At the same time it provided 
practical financial help to O.B.E.O.A, by being the 
on3.y state to pay its quota for 1959 in full# by 
paying the rent on the O.B.E.O.A. buildings in San 
Salvador# and the wages of the O.B.E.O.A. staff for 
December, 1959.
:lto special relationship with the United States,
Consequently some consideration was given to the question
of union with Central America but in this period every
Panamanian administration? on economic and political grounds?
ended up favouring closer ties with the United States rather
63than any other course of action# ' In the case of Central
America the economic grounds for ruling out full Panamanian
participation in the schemes for economic integration were
based? in large measure# on the fact that it would mean a
revision of the preferential trade agreements with the
United States# the end of the Colon Free Port? and the
levelling up of Panamanian tariffs to match the high Central
66American levels# By way of a contrast a decision to 
concentrate on a revision of the relationship with the 
United/
64# A third alternative existed in the form of union 
with Gran Colombia# The promise of an economic 
confederation of Gran Colombia involving Panama? 
Colombia? Venezuela and Ecuador had led Panama 
to join with these states in signing an agreement 
at Quito in July 194B in which all four states 
pledged themselves to achieve a measure of economic 
TLmion by eo»--*ordination* However# no further
progress was made and the agreement subsequently 
sunk into obscurity#
65* This held true even for the .demon administration 
which was? in many ways? different from other 
Panamanian administrations# Thus? the open verbal 
support given to Central American luiion by Remon 
during hie 1952 tour of Central America as president­
elect of Panama was quickly superseded and then paled 
to insignificance when compared to the time and energy 
spent on his negotiations with the United States for 
a new Canal contract#
66# A further factor was the fear by business interests 
of the effects of competition with Guatemala and El 
Salvador due to the high labour costs of .Panama and 
its peripheral geographic location to the centres of 
Central American economic activity. Paradoxically 
this fear was mirrored in reverse by Guatemala and 
El Salvador who felt that Panama would attract loan 
capital more easily because of its skilled labour 
force and its position on a major world trade route.
XU'd
United States? whilst difficult, meant only a simple
transfer of resources and/or revenues within the existing
67economic structure* In brief, whereas integration with 
Central America meant immediate adverse consequences offset 
by only a promise of future marginal benefits, an expansion 
of the relationship with the United States was certain to 
provide immediate benefits with a minimum disruption of the 
economy# Given the business ethics prevailing in Panama 
there was no question that continuing the links with the 
United States would be the preferred course of action* 
Politics reinforced this preference* With corruption and 
graft an integral part of the Panamanian political process 
any major economic decision had political Implications inso­
far as it reflected on the opportunities for such practices* 
And, on balance, it appeared that économie integration with 
Central America offered far less opportunity for graft and 
corruption tîian an expansion of the relationship with the 
United States*^^ Nevertheless, despite all these factors 
operating against Panamanian participation in Central 
American economic integration, the theme of imion persisted, 
with /
67* i*e* more money to Panama from the Canal Bone* 
Approximately one third of all Panamanian 
revenues derived from the gone*
68* In Panama, both the habits of commerce - this being 
the major form of local capitalist enterprise - and 
the Latin American entrepreneur’s emphasis on 
immediate self-interest combined to discourage 
development oriented economic thinking focusing on 
the long-term*
69* One of the most lucrative aspects of the relationship 
with the United States was the opportunities it 
presented for drug smuggling. Drugs for the'Far 
East and the Andean countries of South America were 
obtained from ships passing through the Panama Oanal 
and then were introduced into the United States via 
the substaitial flow of United States personnel, to/
V
with the result that Panama? on a number of different
occasions, sent observers to the various conferences dealing
with one or other aspect of Central American union.
Moreover, at some of these conferences the Panamanian
presence turned into Panamanian participation, a.lbeit at the
minimum level of membership of 'common service* type organ!- 
71satiens*'’ However, such participation by its very nature
and infrequency, only served to point out that for Panama it
was very much the United States first and the United States 
7Pforemost.
Supporting El Salvador's and Panama's differing evaluations 
of Central American union were strong historical tendencies. 
Thus ? El Salvador, involved in most of the previous attempts 
at union, could refer to this tradition to justify policy 
and mobilise support for its attempts at constructing a 
working union of Central American states. Similarly?Panama 
could/
69. (continued) to and from Panama. Thus the higher 
the flow of United ^tates personnel the greater the 
opportunities for smuggling* Such activities were 
not wholly confined to professional criminal groups 
but frequently represented an acceptable sideline 
for many of Panama’s elite*
70. For example? observers were sent to the Meetings of
the Foreign Ministers of O.B.E.O.A. the Meetings of 
the Central American Committee for Economic Co­
operation? and the Meetings of Central American 
Defence Ministers.
71. It helped form the Institute of Nutrition of Central 
America and Panama in 1951, the Committee of Education 
of Central America and Panama in 1955? and the Central 
American Association of Inter-Municipal Co-operation 
in 1958.
72. Determining to some degree, of course, the low level
of involvement of Panama in the Caribbean region as a
whole. See Table 1 in Part Two.
çould use its 3.ong association with the United States to' 
argue for a continuation and expansion of this relationship? 
and? at the same time, point out that the lessons on 
sovereignty drawn from this relationship justified caution 
in respect of participation in Central American union.
These two case studies have focussed on a rather narrow 
definition of the national interest by equating it to the 
economic interest of the respective elites of Honduras, El 
Salvador and Panama. In so doing it has illustrated that 
some foreign policy has been formulated with reference to 
a rational choice of alternatives in the light of received 
and projected goals which are, in a sense ? akin to a 
conception of national interest. That is? it has drawn 
attention to the fact that Caribbean governments may enter 
regional politics to attain recognisable objectives fiirough 
orthodox foreign policy procedures.
The Role of the ^nited States 1946-1958 
The distinction between the South American and the 
Caribbean policy of the United States government largely 
rests on the greater readiness? willingness and ability 
of the United States to intervene in the Caribbean than 
in/
73in South America* A study of a specific intervention in 
this period therefore provides an authentic example of the 
United t^extes Caribbean policy. The Guatemalan Affair, 
as the most dramatic and comprehensive intervention in this 
period; provides the most appropriate study.
The Guatemalan Affair*
In the Guatemalan Affair the year 1933 was critical. At 
the beginning of the year concern by the United States 
government over the way the Guatemalan Revolution was 
developing had# by the end of the year? crystallised into
7 A
a decision that the Arbenz government must go. An 
examination of the major developments involving Guatemala 
in 1933 therefore provides an indication of what were 
regarded by the United States decision-makers as 'unaccep­
table* developments in the Caribbean region*
73# Gee my sub-section "The Political Interest" in the 
section * The Preponderance of the United States’ in 
Part One, cited hereafter as ’The Political Interest’
74# It was at the end of 1953 that:
1. The G.I.A. began approaching anti-Arbenz 
political exiles in Central America offering 
them aid and the tacit support of the United 
States government, for any invasion or 
rebellion against Arbenz;
2. Speeches by leading United States officials 
began linking the Guatemalan Revolution with
’interna ti onal C ommuni sm * ;
3« The United States government moved to 
include on the agenda of the Tenth Inter- 
American Conference consideration of an inter­
ventionist oriented resolution on * The Inter­
vention of International Communism in the 
American Republics’.
* The major sources from which this case study is 
derived are listed in the Appendix under 'Case 
Studies - The Guatemalan Affair* *
At the centre of Guatemalan politics in 1953 was the
implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law of June 1952*
Proviously only peripheral to the Revolution agrarian
reform was chosen Toy Arbenz as the means to carry the
75Revolution into the economic sphere, In so doing a 
confrontation with powerful United States economic 
interests, primarily U.F.0*0, was inevitable.'^^ In 
February? 1953, such a confrontation took place when the 
Guatemalan government moved against U.F.O.O* by expro­
priating some 220,000 acres of its Uaclfio Coast lands 
in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law. In defence 
of its interests U.P.C.O* turned to the United States 
government where it had every expectation that its oase 
would be heard sympathetically and aid would be offered. 
Accepting U.P.G.O.’s arguments the United Spates govern­
ment began to act on its behalf? but at this stage not 
openly. Only when it became clear that the Guatemalan 
government was determined to press forward with implementing 
the Agrarian Reform Law did the United States government 
publicly begin to support U.F.C.O.^^ /
75. Under Arevalo the Revolution had been primarily 
’political* in that it had established and 
defended freedom of political thought and 
expression provided that it was of a 'democratic' 
persuasion, but had not sought to change the 
econoïïdc and social base of the country*
76. At the time U.P.C.O. owned some 461?000 acres in 
Guatemala of which over 80 percent was uncultivated. 
As the agrarian reform was? if proper3.y implemented, 
aimed at uncultivated lands and agricultural units 
above 667 acres, U.F.C.O* was bound to be affected.
77. John Poster Dulles? Secretary of State, was a stock­
holder and long-time corporation counsel for 
U.P.O.O.; Allan Dulles Director of the G.I.A. had 
been a President of U.P.O.O.g John Moore Cabot,
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, was a large stockholder.
r o  f
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In Deoember? 1952, the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo
(P.GUT*), in reality the communiât party in Guatemala? was
legalised. At the time very weak, it immediately set
about recruiting new members and extending its role and
influence in the governmentAdopting the programme
approved at the party's Second Congress in December 1952?
the P.G.T. began emphasising the agrarian reform question.
For example, many of its members became actively involved
in the National Agrarian Department# the main agency
80charged with implementing the Agrarian Reform Law. This
policy paid off in terms of membership and political
influence# In just over a year the P.G.T. recruited
several thousand new members* More importantly, its
81
political influence grew, particularly with Arbenz. 
Subject/
78. In August 1955 the start of proceedings for the 
expropriation of a further 174&060 acres of U.F.0.0's 
land here provided the confirmation that the United 
States government needed? and provided, the opening 
for a public campaign against the Guatemalan govern­
ment. Such a campaign began when John Moors Cabot 
in a speech on the 14th October, 1955? accused the 
Guatemalan government of "openly playing the
0ommunis t game ' •
79. In registering as a pol.itical party in December 1952 
the P.G.T. claimed to have only 532 members. An 
estimate based on the number of delegates to the 
Second Congress places the figure at between 700-900.
80. Around 55 percent of the full-time employees of the 
National Agrarian Department were P.G.T. members.
81, In particular? Fortuny? Secretary General of the 
P.G.T.? Gutierrez, Secretary General of the G.G.T.G. 
(a Communist controlled labour union of 100,000 
members); and Guerra Borges? Editor of the communist 
newspapers? Octubre and Tribuna Popular? had frequent 
direct access to Arbenz. He? in his turn? often 
acted upon their advice.
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Subject to pressures from many sides to slow down the pace 
of the Revolution? Arbenz began to view the P.G-.T. as indis­
pensable to M s  aim of preserving and furthering the 
Revolution. Consequently he became more and more willing 
to support and use the P.G.T* By the beginning of 1954 the 
P.G.T* were therefore clearly in a strong position but still 
only able to define the form of the Revolution partially, 
rather than to lead it.
On the 7til April, 1953, Guatemala formally withdrew from 
O.B.B.C.A* charging the neighbouring countries with openly 
supporting and aiding 'Guatemalan reactionaries' in con­
spiracies against the government, and engaging in a defamatory 
press campaign against Guatemala, by openly urging inter­
vention in Guatemalan affairs*. The other countries in 
O.D.E.O.A* viewed the withdrawal as ah attempt by the 
Guatemalan government to avoid discussion of the question of 
communist infiltration in Central America which was on the 
agenda for discussion at the proposed May meeting of
O.B.E.G.A.®^ These differences of viewpoint were reflections 
of the strained po3.itioal relations which had existed for 
some time between Guatemala and the other Central American 
states. During the remainder of 1953 these relations were 
to deteriorate even further as charges of subversion by 
Guatemala/
82* At the O.D.E.O.A. meeting of July 1953, to which 
Guatemala was invited to send an observer, the 
question of communism in Central America was 
discussed. V/hilst the door was left open for 
Guatemala to re-enter O.D.E.O.A. the adoption of 
a firm anti-communist attitude, as set out in tin 
Resolution of Managua, made this unlikely.
.LO^
Guatemala against the other Central American states and
vice versa became c o m m o n * B y  the end of 1953 the
Guatemalan government had considered the problem serious
enough to attempt to improve the national defences against
both internal and external attack* Considering a new
purchase of arms as basic to such an improvement, and faced
with difficulties in buying arms from ’traditional* sources,
i.e. the United States and Western Europe, the Guatemalan
government, in January 1954» sent Major Alfonso Martinez to
BAbuy arms from Eastern Europe* *
If these developments in Guatemala during 1955 are related 
to the concept of the Caribbean as a penetrated subordinate 
state system, it is quite apparent that in effect they 3?epre- 
seiited, even if unintentionally, ah attempt to redefine the 
basis/
85* Most of these oliarges were founded on a basis of 
fact* Guatemala was frequently accused of using 
its embassies to disseminate propaganda. In 
Panama its ambassador was declared persona non grata; 
in Costa Rica its ambassador was expelled; in 
Nicaragua its ambassador was accused of involvement 
in the plot to assassinate Anastasio Somoza; and a 
diplomat, Alfredo Chocano, was declared persona non 
grata by both Nicaragua, and Honduras* On the other 
hand, other Caribbean govex^nments were involved in 
actively aiding anti-Arbenz political exiles*
Castillo Armas relates that he had offers of arms, 
base and training facilities from the Nicaraguan 
government; arms and substaatial economic assistance 
from the government of the Dominican Republic; and 
from the government of Honduras the use of its 
common border with Guatemala to launch the attack 
into Guatemala,
34* The contention that the arms were intended primarily 
for uprisings in neighbouring countries is invalidated 
by the nature of the arms themselves, e*g* heavy cannon 
and anti-tank mines# These weapons were clearly meant 
to increase the capability of the Guatemalan army reather 
than to provide material for subversive movements 
throughout the Caribbean* Shortly after Armas took 
office all these weapons were sold as being virtually 
useless in Guatemala, See George Thayer, The War 
olneaa, pp.48-50.
basis of the systera*^  ^ For the A^^benz government, in 
endeavouring to minimise the amount of 'penetration* by the 
United States in both the economic and political spheres? 
was undermining a principal characteristic of the system 
and threatening to alter the structure of the system,^^ At 
one level? therefore? the United States government reacted 
to preserve the system by resorting to intervention aimed 
at ensuring continued 'penetration'*
At another level? however, intervention was seen as necessary
to maintain the United States inter-American policy* For all
these developments were also contrary to every dimension of 
87that policy* ' The Guatemalan government ? in pressing 
fonr^rd with an agrarian reform which involved conflict with 
United States economic intereete, and in allowing communist 
participation in government, was challenging the United States 
'right* to determine the internal political structures of 
Latin American governments* Also, by its continued existence 
the Guatemalan government threatened to create serious inter­
state conflict within the Caribbean region thus creating 
Instability where the United States was particularly anxious 
that stability should prevail* Finally, in seeking solutions 
to/
85* I say 'unintentionally* as all evidence points to 
the fact that the Arbenz government was concerned, 
above all, with domestic politics# Its foreign 
policy was thus primarily framed to support its 
domestic policy rather than to influence events in 
the Oaribbean*
86* This assumes that subordination to the United States 
was? in part? due to penetration*
87* This is adopting Slater's view of United States 
policy towards Latin America as laid out in my 
section 'The Political Interest'.
to its .problems by co-operation %lth the and contact
with Eastern Europe .the Guatemalan government challenged the 
Monroe Doctrine which Foster Dulless in July 19545 referred 
to as "the first and most fundamental of our foreign 
policies.
With the two basic reasons for strong positive action it is 
difficult to decide whether intervention in Guatemala was 
primarily to preserve the Caribbean as a penetrated subor­
dinate system or whether it was primarily to maintain the 
United States inter-American policy® For example, inter­
state conflict in the Caribbean, by itself, had not, in the 
previous few years, caused the United States government to 
seek solutions to such conflicts by the removal of an 
involved government.^^ Neither, as not too dissimilar 
events in Bolivia at nearly the same time show, did the 
United States government necessarily react to expropriation 
and communist infiltration in a Batin American state with 
an ^interventionist* policy designed to replace such a 
government.^^^ Consequently what appears decisive in deter­
mining /
88* Dulles - Radio and Television Address, June 30th 1954? 
in U.S. Department of State,
89* During the disputes between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
for example, the United states gove.rnment was anxious 
to maintain, both involved governments. See my foot­
note No*16 to the case study of 'The Conflicts between 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua’ in my section in 'Inclusive­
ness * *
90. United States intervention in Bolivia was to maintain 
the 'Revolutionary* government of Fas Estenscrro 
through extending economic aid* See Richard W. Batch. 
"Bolivia5 U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting" 
in Eloharü .U. Adams et al.,
Amerlea Today (New forks Vintage Books, I960) and 
ÏTaurence Whifehead,
(Haslemere Group Fublication, 1969).
determining United States attitudes was the fact that the 
Arbenîs government constituted a multiple threat and challenge 
to inter-American policy in a region of particular signifi­
cance for United. States decision-makers, A successful 
action by the United States government would therefore entail 
re-affirming and re-establishing 'penetration* in the 
Caribbean whilst emphasising that significant, i,e, multiple, 
challenges to its inter-American policy would not go unheeded, 
Especially when they occurred in a region defined as 'vital* 
to United States interests. In the case of Guatemala, then, 
a successful action clearly predicated the removal of the 
Arbena government and its replacement by one more amenable to 
United States influence, For the United States government 
'intervention* was perceived as the only 'real* response.
Intervention was by way of two independent, but linked, 
strategies* One strategy, involving the C.I * A., was essen­
tially covert and unilateral, The other strategy, involving 
the 0,A.8,g was essentially overt and multilateral. The 
former strategy was emphaeiBed, the latter was not.
In adopting and emphasising a covert unilateral strategy, 
the/
91, The notion of a 'real' response is here very important. 
The United States was, at this time, heavily involved 
in the politics of S.E, Asia for which it formulated, 
in early 1954, the 'domino theory* * Consequently, it 
is not too far fetched to suggest that elements of 
'domino* thinking were present in the United States 
government's appraisal of the Guatemalan situation. 
Moreover, the pressing questions of S*B. Asian politics 
demanded a quick solution to problems 'nearer to home*.
the United States government attempted to combine two
objectives# One was the greater certainty of success
accompanying a unilateral a c t i o n , T h e  other was the
minimisation of the effects that a unilateral action might
have on the United States position within the International 
93system,**^
Of these two objectives the achievement of a successful 
outcome was the more important* Two incidents in particular 
point to this fact* On June 18th, 1954? Castillo Armas and 
his small 'Army of liberation* invaded Guatemala with the 
fact of United States participation in the invasion fairly 
well concealed*However, when on June 22nd the invasion 
looked like being a failure the United States government was 
willing to reveal its close partisan involvement by indirectly 
supplying several aircraft to Armas as replacements for the 
two/
92* On the whole, unilateral action has historically 
been more successful thæi multilateral action.
The ability of one state to largely define the 
situation is, of course, a major factor in 
accounting for this,
93# This refers primarily to repercussions within
the inter-American system and the U,H* However, 
in early 1954? the United ta tee government was 
considering the possibility of setting up an 
alliance in Asia* In selling the idea to Asian 
states the fact of a, recent unilateral interven­
tion by the United ^tates government might well 
have acted against the chances of getting such an 
idea accepted*
94. The Arbens govojrnment, in its June 18th message 
to the President of the U,H, Security Council, 
could point to aggression by the governments of 
Honduras and Nicaragua but not by the government of 
the United States*
two aircraft Armas had lost early in the invasion.
Similarly, the flamboyant role of the United States 
Ambassador to Guatemala, John. B. Peurifoy, in negotiating 
several changes of government in Guatemala from June 27th 
to July 2nd was a semi-public indication of close United 
States involvement*^^ Thus whilst every effort was made 
by the United States government to conceal its involvement 
in the operation - for example, by working almost exclusi­
vely through the C.I.A. - it was, nevertheless, not prepared 
to compromise the outcome for the sake of appearances*
The multilateral strategy adopted by the United States govern­
ment had two main purposes* One was to provide a possible 
alternative/
95# After the 'Army of liberation’ crossed the border 
it penetrated only 20 miles before being contained 
by units of the Guatemalan army. Consequently, 
the only direct evidence for many 'politically 
active' Guatemalans that such an invasion was taking 
place were the raids by Armas’ aircraft on Guatemalan 
cities* The loss of two aircraft thus represented, 
for Armas, a very real loss of military effectiveness 
and of propaganda# This was understood by Eisenhower,
Allen Dulles and Foster Dulles who decided to replace 
the two aircraft in spite of the objections of Henry 
P* Holland, then Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, that such an action would be 
widely interpreted in Latin America ae intervention 
in Guatemala's internal affairs*
96* On June 27th, Guillermo Torlello (Guatemalan Foreign 
Minister) visited Peurifoy and suggested the situation 
could be solved if a military junta, which included 
Arbenz, were to be formed. Peurifoy rejected this and 
that evening, when it became clear he had lort the 
support of the army, Arbens resigned in favour of his 
Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Enrique Dias* However, 
lUag was unacceptable to Peurifoy, even though he was 
willing to out3.aw the P* G. T., ae he still wanted to 
prosecute the war against Armas* Consequently, on 
Jime 28 th, Diaeî was replaced by 0 clone 1 Elf ego Monson 
as head of a junta acceptable to Peiuifoy. Talks 
were then arranged in San Salvador between the junta 
and Armas, but Armas and Menson were unable to agree 
and/
alternative strategy in the event of the impossibility of 
developing any further an adequate unilateral strategy*
The other was to  ensure the success of the u n i la te r a l  
s tra te g y  by countering any d i f f ic u l t ie s  a r is in g  from the 
in te rn a t io n a l system as a re s u lt  o f unilateo^al a c tio n . In  
both oases, the key to success was the m anipulation  of the 
O.A.S.
The multilateral strategy as an alternative was pursued 
until the end of the Tenth Inter-American Conference in 
March, 1954* Prior to the Conference the United B%ates 
had engaged in a propaganda campaign against Guatemala 
with the aim of creating a climate of opinion in the hemi­
sphere favouring .positive action, via the O.A.S. against 
Guatemala* At the Oonference the legal basis for such 
action was to be provided by the adoption of the United 
States sponsored resolution 'Declaration on Solidarity for 
the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American 
States against International Oommmaist Intervention'. 
However, many difficulties surrounded the adoption of this 
resolution and the United States government had to agree to 
some/
96* (continued) and so Peurifoy flew to San Salvador 
to precipitate such an agreement. This was soon 
reached in the Pact of San Salvador on July 2nd 
which let Armas join the junta on the under­
standing that an election for chief of the junta 
would soon be held. Such an election was held 
on July 8th which Armas won and so became 
President.
some concessions.^'^ This iiad the effect of making it 
clear to the United States goveonment that there would 
he no significant support from within the inter-American 
system for more meaningful direct action against 
Guatomala*^^ Consequently the United States government 
stopped developing the multilateral strategy as an alter­
native and instead developed it as a supporting strategy 
for unilateral action# Thus from April 1954 the main aim 
of the multilateral strategy was to ensure the success of 
unilateral action* This involved disguising the fact that 
the United States government was seeking a unilateral 
solution to the Guatemalan problem by keeping the problem 
before the O.A.S. but without stressing the need for urgent
O.A.S*/
97* Among the most important concessions in respect 
of the possibility of Immediate action against 
Gua temala were s
1. The statement by the United States govern­
ment that the purpose of the resolution was 
merely 'preventive* as the United States govern­
ment did not, at the time, consider any existing 
Latin American government to be under Communist 
domination;
2. The amendment of a phrase in the original 
United States resolution. Originally, on the 
proof of the intervention of international 
communism in an American state, the United States 
had proposed "appropriate action in accordance 
with existing treaties". Under pressure from 
Latin American states this was amended to read 
"and would call for a Meeting of Consultation
to consider the adoption of appropriate action in 
accordance with existing treaties"* This meant 
that the chances of a mainly United States inter­
vention, but under the O.A.S. banner, were much 
reduced*
98. The resolution was passed by a 17-1-2 vote
(Guatemala against, Mexico and Argentina abstaining). 
But of the 17 only Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Feru and Venezuela welcomed it without 
any mlsgivings•
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O.A.S. a c t i o n ; a n d  once the invasion  was under way, 
using the O.A.S. to deny the Arhenz government any chance 
of s u rv iv a l tiirough the e f fe c t iv e  involvement of the Ï Ï . 1 I .  
or any o ther ac tors  in  the in te rn a tio n a l system ap art from
the O.A.S.^00
The strategies of intervention adopted by the United States 
government point to the desire to impose a solution in 
Guatemala, hence unilateral action, whilst at the same time, 
through the involvement of the O.A.S* to attempt to minimise 
the effects of such action on the inter-American system# Of 
these two objectives priority was given to the resolution of 
the situation in Guatemala* This establishes the Caribbean 
as the 'vital' area in the United States conception of Latin 
America, and one to which the inter-American system of 
collective/
99* On May 19th Nicaragua broke diplomatic relations with 
Guatemala and began to sound the O.A.S. on the 
Guatemalan situation* However, it was not joined by 
the United States until early June when the arrival 
in Guatemala of an arms shipment from Eastern Europe 
had led to a shift of opinion in some Latin American 
states towards favouring a review of the situation in 
Guatemala* It was generally assumed in the O.A.S. 
that the United States would propose such a review, in 
the form of a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign 
Ministers, at the regular meeting of the O.A.S. Council 
on June loth; this was not done. On Jtme 18th Armas 
invaded Guatemala* Had the United States proposed the 
meeting of Consultation, as was expected, the O.A.S. 
would have been in a far better position to take 
immediate action on June 19th than it proved to be.
100 The United States used the early request from the Arbenz 
government for action by the 1-A.B.C. to argue before 
the U.ÎI. Security Council, to which the Arbens govern­
ment had also appealed, that the invasion of Guatemala 
was already being investigated by the O.A.S# ‘which was, 
in such matters, the competent regional organisation to 
deal with the situation* Consequently, the U#N. had 
no heed to be involved. At the same time the United 
States government also delayed the calling of the O.A.S. 
Meeting of Consultation until July 7th although it was 
normal, in 'criE#' situation, for the Council of the 
O.A.S. to declare itself a Provisional Meeting of 
Consultation so that immediate action could be taken.
c o lle c t iv e  s e c u rity  I . e .  the O.A.S, did not g en era lly
apply; p a r t ic u la r ly  when, as in  the ease of Guatemala,
1 0*ïUnited States interests were at risk.'" '
From this case study a number of points emerge which did 
not derive solely from the situation in Guatemala.
Hotbeahle in other situations elsewhere in the region these 
points therefore form the basis of a few general observa­
tions about United States policy in the Caribbean during 
this period.
One of the most impo%'taut is that whilst the complex inter­
play of United States security, economic and political 
interests obviously varied with each situation, the United 
States responded primarily to the totality of this interplay 
as reflected in the politics of tb.e situation. In other 
words, the policy of the United States government had mainly
a political base which included both economic and security
102factors as integral, but nevertheless subordinate.
With politics largely determining policy, the image that 
United/
101# See Anthony Maingot, "National Sovereignty,
Collective Security and The Realities of rower 
in the Caribbean Area" in Hoy Freiswerk (ed)
(Trinidads Institute of International Eolations, 
University of the W^st Indies, 1969) particularly 
pp.232-234.
102. This is in contrast to earlier United States
policy in the region which can be seen as being 
in response to either economic or strategic 
factors. On the primacy of the economic see 
Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Doliar Pipiqmacy 
(Mew York: Modern Reader Paperback,“1969)4 On
the primacy of the strategic see J.F. Hippy, The
(New York: G.Î. Pwtnam's
Sons, 1940)1
United States decision-makers liad of the region assumes a
1 0  *'5spécial significance. The most important part of this
image was that which defined the Caribbean as 'vital* to
United States national security for this led to an emphasis
on coercive intervention as the most appropriate instrument
of United States policy* For example, whereas elsewhere
in Latin America an 'unacceptable* government attempting to
define an independent foreign policy (e.g* in Argentina the
Peron government’s * third position® until the early 1950*s),
or a government attempting to develop a social revolution (e.g.
the Faz Estenssoro government in Bolivia from 1952 onwards)
might cause concern in the United States it did not, as was
the'.case, in Guatemala, create alarm. Policy followed
accordingly, For both Argentina and Bolivia the United
States government projected a number of long-term policies,
But for Guatemala 'alarm* created a sense of 'urgency*, The
emphasis was therefore on a quick solution and for this
coercive intervention was perceived as the only 'real* response.
And it also meant that intervention was more likely to be
unilateral rather than multilateral.
103* The importance of images and the image of the
Caribbean in the United States have been outlined 
in 'The Political Interest', Two further pointh 
need to be made:
1, With the image governing United States 
foreign policy decision-making, rational 
decision-making is more difficult,
2, Variations of United States policy in the 
Caribbean can frequently be traced back to—  
changes of administration, i.e. evaluation of 
the situation in the region varies with 
differing groups of decision-makers.
104, For United States policy towards Argentina, see
specially Ohapt' 
policy towards Bolivia, see the sources cited in 
footnote number 90,
Another important point is the effect of penetration. 
Penetration provided the effective means by which* in the 
normal rim of events, subordination of a Caribbean state to 
the United ‘-Hates was maintained. Reliance on United States 
military aid and sales of surplus weapons, and the need to 
keep the region attractive for United States business by 
providing incentives, developed a 'state of mind* for \ 
decision-makers in the Caribbean states euoh that their 
controlled policy inputs into the Caribbean system tended 
to accord with United States interests.Reinforcing 
this was the practice of all United ta tes ambassadors in 
the region, some notoriously bo, of involving themselves in 
the various policy-making processes of the state to which 
they were accredited*^^^ Penetration thus provided for, 
and helped maintain? a system which was to some extent self- 
regulating and in harmony with United States interests. 
Consequently any extraordinary intervention by the United 
States/
105* The security and economic interests of the United 
States as constraints on Caribbean decision-makers 
has been outlined in my section * The Preponderance 
of the United States* in 'Xkirt One**
106, In a remark to a United ‘^tates Senate Subcommittee, 
Earl l'hTé Smith, who was United States Ambassador 
to Cuba from June 1957 to January 1959, summed up 
this state of affairs for Cuba as one where "the 
American Ambassador was the second most important 
man in Cuba; sometimes even more important than the 
(Cuban) President", cited in Herbert L. Matthews,
(londons AUen lane,
The Penguin Press, 1969), p,44. Frequently such 
influence was gained by establishing close personal 
relations with the preEvident of the state, for example, 
the friendship between A, Somosa of Nicaragua and 
United States Ambassador Thomas Whelan in the early 
1950*8.
States government? for example, by using demonstrations of 
force or subversion, was either to offset a possible break­
down in the system or to restore the system to normal once 
breakdown had occiu^ red. The most 'concrete* evidence of 
United States involvement in the system in this period was
1 ovthus linked to 'crises' in the system* The most frequent
'crises' were the sporadic developments of inter-state 
conflicts, in all of which the United 8-tjates government was 
involved to effect a settlement, usually via the 
Intervention by the United Urates therefore became linked 
with preserving the status quo*
The final point is the continuity of United States policy in 
the C a r i b b e a n * T h e  definition of whcit constitutes 
'vital' may change with time and with various United States 
admini s trations/
107* Hence the designation of the area as unstable.
However, my conclusions to Fart Two suggest that 
there are many elements of stability in the 
system*
108, Between 1948 and the end of 1953 the 0,A#8. mediated 
nine Interstate disputes in the Caribbean. In the 
mediation of each dispute the United States govern­
ment was intimately involved, generally as a member 
of the Investigating Committee appointed by the 
O.A.S. Council meeting as the provisional Organ of 
Consultation. This presence on the Investigating 
Committee enabled the United States to influence the 
situation as regards determining who was to^blame 
and what possible action might be taken. It should 
be noted that in none of these early eases was United 
States interests directly involved to any large degree#
109. This often stems from perceiving the region as 
essentially unchanged rhereby encouraging the re- 
application of previously successful strategies.
An example of a perception of the 3?egion as unchanged is 
provided by Dana G* Mimro, a scholar and a former 81 Et te 
Department official much concerned with the Caribbean, 
who begins his detailed historical study of the region 
by stating "The problems that confronted the United 
States in the Caribbean in the first two decades of
administrations but the concept of the region as 'vital* 
does not. Similarly, the range of policy options avail­
able to the United States government may vary with the 
situation but ultimately all options are variations of the 
basic policy of unilateral intervention.
Borne Conclusions on International Politics 
in the Caribbean 1946-1958
'From the analysis and description in the four preceding 
sections it is possible to identify two themes around which 
can be grouped many, but not all, of the points raised as 
significant for international politics in the Caribbean 
during this period* One theme is the political basis of 
much of the regional Interaction* The other is the 
prevalence within regional interaction of extra-regional 
factors*
SàaJPsAiM .p^LJ3âgi&..o£Ji9Sl£a^^
A major factor accounting for the political basis of 
regional/
109, (continued) the twentieth century were much like 
the problems that confront us there today". See
qr&oeton, H.J.s i/rinoeton
University Press, 1964), p.vii*
regional interaction Is a negative one in the sense that 
political interaction becomes dominant because of the 
absence of other major forms of interaction. For example, 
two of the most common forms of international Interaction 
with political implications are trade and alliances, yet 
both can be shown as having little effect on Caribbean 
regional politics* In the case of trade this insignifi­
cance stems, quite simply, from the low 3.evel of intra- 
regional trade which is, in itself, a reflection of the 
similar underdevelopment of all Caribbean states. In the 
case of alliances it is a little more complex being based 
on the smallness and equality of capability of states in 
the region as it relates to the preponderance of the United 
States* This has led to a situation where a single state 
cannot impose its will upon another single state by conven­
tional means and where, also, the existence of a state as 
an entity is externally guaranteed* Thus, whilst there 
have been the possibilities for alliances there has, in 
reality, been no need of them except for the brief purpose 
of maintaining a particular governing «^ 11te in power.
Political interaction as dominant, however, rests on 
grounds other than just the negative one. It is, more 
properly, a reflection of positive politics at the political 
sub-system level* Positive politics here refers to a 
concept of politics common throughout the Caribbean during 
this periods that politics was largely an end in itself 
which revolved around the goal of the attainment and 
retention of the executive decision-making power of the 
state,/
state* Xn both philosophy and practice such politics
was, in many ways, analogous to the politics of Renaissance 
110Italy#*’ So that in the Caribbean, as in Renaissance Italy, 
such factors as political illegitimacy, personal ru.le and 
the involvement of quasi-iiidependcnt itinera,iit actors deeply 
inf3.uenoed the nature of international politics* For 
example, political illegitimacy led to a circular and self- 
sustaining political intearaction in that the governing elite 
were frequently illegitimate or branded as sdch, end so 
perceived themselves, or were in fact directly challenged
I '
from both the domestic and regional environment, principally 
by other office-seeking elites using extra legal means*
In these circumstances governing elites felt that such 
challenges could only be met by similar political means. 
Regional intoration thus became intimately linked with the 
question of domestic political power# Personalism further 
reinforced a pattern of political interaction by providing 
a basis for differentiation of policies on grounds other 
than ideology and, as such, created the possibility of co­
operation and conflict between states on purely idiosyncratic 
grounds* Finally, the involvement of quasi-independent 
itinerant actors in regional politics provided a multipli­
city of sources, means and ends of interaction which, inso­
far as all were commonly linked by conscious participation 
in/
110. For the operation of the international system in 
Renaissanee Italy, see ÎC,J. Holsti, Internetiom 1 
Politics 
Ôirffs, N#J
and Winifred Franke "The Italian City-State System 
as an International System" in Kaplan (ed) New 
MPXaiÆli§s.^oJaMm'Sioaa0.e^^ (%ew Yorks 
St. ferYins Press, l§OaT
in politics, generated, by the complexity of defining 
their political relationship to each other, a liigh level 
of political interaction*
What is, therefore, being suggested by the theme of the 
political basis of regional interaction is a tendency 
towards politics assuming significance as the primary 
determinant of regional interaction. * This being due, 
in the main? to the structure of the system in a negative 
sense, and the nature of the political units in the system 
in a positive sense*
The prevalence within regional Interaction of extra-regional 
factors refers, principally, to the effect of the intrusion 
of the %ited States and the O.A.S. into the Caribbean 
'system* i*e* to the fact that the conduct of regional 
foreign policy by Caribbean decision-makers has been 
externally conditioned and modified*
External conditioning was based on a perception by the 
Caribbean /
111* This statement is not to deny the importance of 
economic, strategic, and geographic factors as 
political determinants but to put them in a per­
spective* For, as has already been shown, 
economic interests can create regional co-operation 
and conflict, and geography is of value in predicting 
regional interaction* What is therefore meant is 
that the secondary rSle of such criteria stems from 
a situation where although they are necessary in 
forming a political evaluation their major effect is 
to act upon interaction once it has occurred rather 
tJian to be the direct source of such interaction in 
the first place#
Caribbean decision-makers that their range of options was 
•limited to those meeting the approval of the United States, 
Such approval was to be gained by adherence to a recognised 
formula the sum of which was the creation of a political
IIP
environment reflecting multiple United 'States interests.
To achieve this political environment Caribbean decision­
makers frequently co-operated with the United Spates seeing 
in this their only guarantee of office. Hence virtually every 
input into the Caribbean system carried with it a prior assess* 
ment of the United States response. What was created was a 
form of internal regulation of the region in accordance to 
the United States definition of what the region should be*
Most evidence indicates that the United States relied quite 
heavily on this self-regulating process and that it firmly 
supported individuals and elites who proved themselves 
capable of operating it effectively*
As a second line of defence, that is following a breakdown 
of internal regulation rather than preceding it, the United 
States practised external modification* This was the 
alteration of an input into the Caribbean system by either 
the United States or the O.A.S, so that the input would 
conform either to the United States and/or to the O.A.S. 
practioe*/
112, The significant factors in the formula were;
1, the promotion of orthodox financial policies 
to maintain capitalism as the economic system,
2, uncritical support of the United States in 
the Cold War as evidenced by vigorous opposition 
to 'socialist' oriented movements at home and 
close association with the United States at the 
U.H* and in the O.A.S,
3, the imperative of United States national 
security in a vital region for which the maintenance 
of a degree of stability in regional inter-state 
relations was seen as essential.
practice. ïn the case of the United States modification 
was either unilateral or multilateral this being dependent 
upon the United ^tates .perception of the situation. Thus 
multilateral action through the medium of the O.A.S. was 
considered as the appropriate response to minor trans­
gressions of the formula and unilateral action aiming at 
replacing the transgressor government and restoring penetra­
tion was reserved for a total transgression of the formula. 
What is important to note here is that such a policy was 
retroactive and conservative? i.e. was intervention after 
the event to restore equilibrium? usually to the status quo 
ante* A similar a.pp3?oaoh was adopted by the O.A.S. Thus, 
O.A.S. actions in respect of modification of inputs generally 
extended no further than seeking the immediate containment 
of a conflict between states by means of recognised and 
regularised processes developed within the existing framework 
of inter^American law*
Final3.y, it is clear that the effects of intrusion were not 
all one way* To a limited extent Caribbean decision-makers 
were able to use the fact of intrusion as a means of achieving 
ends. Thus, a Caribbean decision-maker under attack from 
powerful domestic sources could seek and gain United States 
assistance to stay in office by convincing the United States 
that his relationship to the formula was more favourable than 
his opponent's. This tactic could also be extended to the 
regional system in order to secure support for or against 
opposition groups or governments* And could be developed 
in respect of the O.A.S, where the regularised pattern of 
dealing/
dealing with international disputes in the region could he 
effectively utilised to aid a foreign policy end.
The conjunction of these two themes into a distinctive pattern 
of politics is? of course? specific to the period covered by 
this particular section* Nevertheless? aspects of both 
themes have historical antecedents dating at least from the 
beginning of the Twentieth Oentury,^^^ It is, therefore, not 
incorrect to refer to this pattern of interaction as the 
Traditional Pattern; especially as it draws attention to the 
particular historical factors which have generated this 
pattern and? at the same time, distinguishes it from the 
pattern of interaction developed in the region from the begin­
ning of 1959%
115. See T.loyd flecham
â m l s y m J s s K t o c »  leeg-ig^o pp. 171-179, 389-591
and Thomas 1# xcarnes The Failure oi Uni on g . Central
(Chapel Hiiil l'heT^/srslty of 
N or th C ar o1iimi& ess, 1961), pp.183-242,
209
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The pattern of international polities in the Caribbean from 
1959-1966 saw both persistence and change. Persistence was 
evident in the continuation of the 'traditional pattern* and 
is at its most obvious in two situations which had regional 
repercussions - United ^tates-Cuban relations 1959‘-1961? 
and the Haiti-Dominican Republic disputes of 1963. For this 
reason both situations are examined by case studies, but only 
briefly? as the major function of the section is to consider 
the reasons behind? and the nature of, change. To do so is 
to focus on three factorss the effect of Cuba; the series 
of switches in the Caribbean policy of the United States; 
and the involvement of new actors in the sys tern.
The effect of Cuba has clearly been dramatic? but at the 
same time its impact on the Caribbean has been cushioned and 
absorbed in such a variety of ways that its overall effect 
on the region is not easily isolated or assessed* Certainly? 
as 1 have already shown in Part Two, Cuba cannot be considered 
as the sole reason for changes after 1939 in the patterns of 
political interaction between states. Nevertheless? it is 
indisputable that the Caribbean states have reacted to the 
Cuban Revolution? and can be distinguished from the majority
o.f/
c : . L u
1of South American states by the vigour of their reaction.
Yet? in the final analysis, it is difficult to avoid con­
cluding that, at least as far as the international politics 
of the Caribbean states is concerned, the real initiatives 
for dealing with Cuban Revolution have been left to the
p
United States. Any attempt to assess the impact of Cuba 
on the international politics of the Caribbean, states without 
reference to the United States is thus vio^tually impossible, 
for g in reality. United States policy towards Cuba and that 
of the Caribbean states have become almost Inseparable.
This is not to say that the United ^totes and the Caribbean 
states have always been in agreement as to policy towards 
Cuba but it is to recognise that differences have been 
marginal, generally over emphasis, and have been resolved 
most often in favour of the United States.*^  Such a subor­
dinate/
1* i#e. by favouring repression at home and some form 
of intervention against Cuba within the O.A.S. See 
Kalman H» 8livert "A hemispheric Perspective" in 
Jolm Plank (ed) SyJa
lîange, Perapectivea .(Washington D.C.s ïhe Brookings 
lîistilaition 1967)| Boris Golden'bergj $ksJM>SS 
Revolution and 3^atln America (londons George Allen 
and Unwin Idmited 1965), pp.305-3225 and PW :a_,Glrm: 
Der.rota del Impe: 
luternae i onal*
1962), p p .57-132
2. ïhe national/International distinction Is here crucial.
All evidence suggests that it is the effects of Cuba 
within the domestic political process of each Caribbean 
state that have attracted the attention of Caribbean 
decislon-makero. TIiIe? has occasioned some degree of 
co-operation among Caribbean states, e.g* G.A.D.C. in 
Central America, but basically the problem has been 
tackled unilaterally and/or with United States assis­
tance*
For example, at the Eighth Meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the O.A.S* the Caribbean states were 
threatening to withdraw from the O.A.S* if Cuba was 
not expelled* Their concern at this time is, perhaps, 
best/
3*
subordinate rôle accepted by the Caribbean states, as well 
as the total yet diffuse impact Cuba has had on the region, 
Indicate that it is best not to consider Cuba separately 
but rather to consider it as it has affected specific situa­
tions in which Cuba was not necessarily a leading actor# 
Consequently, references to Cuba are to be found throughout 
the section and, in particular, in the studies of the United 
States role in the region#
As before, an adequate treatment of the United States I’ole 
requires both a spécifie case study and a brief comment on 
the United States position in any particular issue or 
development; with, this time, a fuller treatment of the 
United States rôle, to accoimt for the greater complexity of 
United ^tates policy in this period# A focus on the United 
States role in the Dominican Bepublio as the case study is 
especially relevant since it illustrates this complexity in 
that not only were a variety of United States policies applied 
but also the relationship of these policies in respect of 
overall United States-Latin American relations, and the 
question of Cuba, can be examined from a single reference 
point «* that of United States intervention In the Dominican 
polity. Particular areas of focus will be on the long-term 
approach/
3# (continued) beet shown by the fact that Panama,
peripheral to regional interaction as X have already 
shown, was among the leading advocates of this 
course of action* Indeed, in January 1962, i.e. 
just prior to the Eighth Meeting, Panama's Finance 
Minister, Gilberto Arias, had proposed the creation 
of a common front against Cuba to include Guatemala? 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Haiti? Honduras, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Venezuela and Panama# See Sheldon B.
Re la. t ions (Notre Dame: university of Hovre Dame
Press7T9'6?), Chapter 5 and pp. 105-106 in particular.
approach of the United ^tates to the Caribbean; the short­
term regulation of international politics in the region by 
a mix of multilateral and unilateral military intervention*
The involvement of new actors in the system refers speoifi- 
eal3-y to the functioning of the O.A.C*M. as a sub-regional 
actor and the entry into the region of Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago as two new independent state actors* The case 
study of the G.A.O.K. traces the changes in international 
relations between the member states which are attributable 
to the development of the C.A.O.M#; and the study of 
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago focuses on the regional 
aspect of their foreign policies*
#10 Persistence of the Traditional Pattern 
The ’traditional pattern* has been analysed by reference to 
two major themes* The following case studies, of the 
dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1963, and 
of the United States-Cuban relations 1959—1961, are brief 
illustrations of both themes but with an emphasis given to 
the theme of 'the political basis of regional interaction' 
in the former study and to the theme of ’the prevalence 
within regional interaction of extra-regional factors’ in 
the latter*
The dispute was, in essence, two crises separated by a 
period of tension* The first crisis ran from the 27th 
April to the 15th Hay and the second from the 5th August 
to the 25th September*
The immediate origin of the first crisis was the violation 
of the Dominican Embassy in Port-au-Prince by members of 
the Haitian Public Forces yet as the crisis developed other 
factors became apparent, and, in the end, the crisis could be 
seen as one largely engineered by Juan Bosch, President of 
the Dominican Republic, for a number of specifically political 
ends# Ohief among these were the immediate overthrow of
President Duvalier of Haiti for personal and ideological 
reasons and the retention of presidential power within the 
Dominican Republic* To accomplish both ends Bosch needed 
the prompt and committed support of the O.A.S. and the United 
States. Such ends and actions clearly fit the ’traditional 
pattern*. For example, idiosyncratic factors were to the 
fore in Bosch’s belief that Duvalier’s desire to kill him 
had supernatural rather than political originsQuestions 
of political illegitimacy were involved in Bosch’s decision 
to/
4# Bosch’s character has been the subject of much 
unfavourable comment from North Americans in the 
Kennedy Administration who had come into contact 
with him# Variously described as ’mercurial’,
’a paranoid schizophrenic* and ’better as a short 
story writer than as a statesman*. It is quite 
clear that if their assessment is correct, that 
Bosch could easily imagine the most malignant 
intentions from Duvalier, a man whose incredible 
actions were more in tune with the Rome of 
Suetonius than with the 20th Century. (The 
comment on Duvalier is an observation by Graham 
Greene in his introduction to Diederieh and Burt, 
PgfiâJDoG, pp.vil-Tili),
K
to involve the O.A.S. and the United States. This
approach also conformed to the recognised practice of
increasing the possibility of a successful outcome by the
6temporary involvement of other interested actors.
Finally, the influence in politics of quasi-independent
actors was evident in Bosch's attempt to preserve his
fragile domestic power base in the face of the hostility
7of the Dominican military.
The second crisis, though not of Bosch’s doing directly 
led to his downfall in a coup d’etat on the 25th September, 
Behind both events as the major actor was the Dominican 
military; and precipitating these actions was their exis­
tence as a group with specific privileges* That is, they 
actively supported the two invasion attempts into îïaiti by 
a/
5* The actions by the O.A.S* in support of representative 
democracy against the Trujillo dictatorship, plus a 
recent verbal approval fœ collective action to 
establish representative democracy in Latin America 
by United States Assistant Secretary of State, Edward 
Martin, appeared to Bosch to give him, through his 
position as a democratically elected president, great 
advantage over Duvalier who, in 1961, had declared 
himself re-elected by acclamation for a further six 
years*
6* The most important 'other interested actor’ was the 
United States* Indeed, the development of the crisis 
by Bosch was largely determined by his expectations of 
support from the United States State Department which, 
at this time, was attempting through a variety of 
means to replace Duvalier, Throughout the crisis 
Bosch and the United States Ambassador to the Dominican 
Republic, J*B* Martin, were in frequent contact,
7. The Dominican military were able to effectively de- 
escalate the confrontation with Haiti by reporting to 
Bosch that because their trucks were in no condition 
to transport troops no advance into Haiti could be 
contemplated* This action was reinforced by the 
circula tion/
a group of Haitian exiles led by Oantave for the same
politioal and pecuniary reasons as they planned the coup.
Thus the political end of supporting Oantave was not the
overthrow of Duvalier but the overthrow of Bosch? a purpose
which was seen as necessarily requiring a, further confron-
8tation with Haiti. And the pecuniary reason for supporting 
Oantave were the immediate benefits from providing training 
and weapons to Haitian exiles, and the long term gains
Qassociated with the retention of the 'system® for graft.
The last point? in particular, appears to have been among 
the immedi£ite causes of the coup in that Bosch had, but a 
few days previously, refused the military permission to 
proceed with the negotiation for the purchase of / six 
million worth of aircraft from Britain - a contract promi­
sing over / one million in commission for the Dominican 
Military. /
7* (continued) circulation among Dominican army
officers of a report prepared by the United States 
military mission in Haiti which detailed the diffi­
culties facing a Dominican invasion of Haiti.
Thus the United States was able to use the power 
of the Dominican military to restrain Bosch from 
ordering an invasion of Haiti*
8. In view of the public statements by Bosch a renewed 
confrontation with Haiti would be extremely embarras­
sing for him, not only in the Dominican Republic, but 
also in his relations with the O.A.S. and the United 
States* Renewed confrontation would therefore 
provide an excuse for the coup as well as an effective 
cover for preparations for the coup*
9. Immediate benefits were payments to Colonel Garrido 
of the Dominican Army of some 0400 a week in respect 
of training facilities, plus the expected lucrative 
business of arms sales to and from the Oantave group. 
Long-term benefits were the retention of the practice 
of commissions - generally around 10 percent - on 
purchases of military supplies.
Military* Also significant is tiiat once the military had 
secured their immediate and long-term position by replacing 
Bosch v/ith a government representing a conservative coalition 
of interests, a gesture of goodwill towards Duvalier was 
made in first disarming and then dispersing Cantave*s group* 
Thus central to this conflict and indicative of the 
’traditional pattern’ were such factors as ’inclusiveness’, 
i#e« the role of the Dominican military as conscious initia­
tors of foreign policy, and ’subversive intervention’, i.e.
A
the role of Gantave’s e%ile group in internal Dominican 
politics.
United States-Cuban Relations, 1959-1961
The majority of commentators on the Bay of Pigs has 
recognised similarities between it and the Guatemalan 
Affair. A comparative approach to both establishes the 
following parallels I
1. The early policies of the Castro government
TOreflected those of the Arbens government."
2. The key men in the United States responsible for 
defining the situation as requiring intervention - 
President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles - were also 
key /
10. The Castro government (a) enacted and set in 
motion a far-reaching Agrarian Reform Daw,
(b) legalised the Communist Party and allowed 
its advancement within the polity and (c) 
became the source and focus of regional conflict 
insofar as it was both the recipient and creator 
of a large number of political exiles bent on 
intervention.
1 Tkey men in the Guatemalan Affair.
3# The development of intervention by way of two
independent but linlced strategies echoed the
1Papproach to intervention in Guatemala.
4. The .plans for the invasion of Cuba were clearly 
based on repeating the formula for the invasion 
of Quatemala.
On the whole, then, it is fair to conclude that the Bay 
of Pigs dramatically demonstrated the continuity of United 
States policy in the Caribbean-. That is, in the face of 
certain types of development - specifically a government 
which constituted a multiple threat and challenge to inter- 
American policy in a region of particular significance for 
United States government decision-makers - the United 
States response was intervention - its aim being to restore 
penetration and reaffirm inter-American policy by replacing 
the Castro government with one more amenable to United 
S ta t es influeno © *
11* A pattern reflected further down in the policy 
process in that Whiting Willaeur, who as United 
States Ambassador to Costa Rica in 1954 had acted 
as regional co-ordinator of the Guatemalan Affair, 
was asked at the end of I960 to constructively 
criticise the O.I.A, plans for the invasion of 
Cuba* lot surprisingly he approved them and 
recommended they go ahead*
12* That is by simultaneously developing (a) a preferred 
overt multilateral strategy involving the O.A.S. at 
the highest level and (b) a covert unilateral strategy 
involving the 0*1.A, to be used in the event of the 
failure of the multilateral strategy*
13* The plan being to employ pro-Unlted States anti-Castro 
Cuban exiles to use military means to force a bridge­
head on Cuba into which an ’alternative* Cuban govern­
ment could be flown to make an appeal for support, 
especially from the United States*
other epleodeB of United States Cuban Relations 1959-61 
also demonstrates the continuity of United States policy.
If or example, among the most important points made in respect 
of the Ha^aditional pattern* was the United States reliance 
on self-regulation* In Cuba this system, had already broken 
down for not only had Castro come to power without the assis­
tance of the United States, but also, once in power, his 
character fî the leadership of the 26th July Movement and the 
social structure in Cuba interacted to preclude policies
other than towards development and against any form of self- 
I è%'egulatlon*"Yet, in the face of this new situation the 
United States government did not respond with a new diplomacy 
but merely put forward the old* That is, through its 
ambassador, fhilip W* Bonsai^ it reiterated United States 
interests in Cuba in an attempt to persuade Castro to
% K
accommodate himself to these interests.' And the State 
Department "transmitted* a number of ’signais’ varying in 
strength from minor non co-operation, through a variety of 
diplomatic/
14* Frequently underestimated is the fact that forces
stemiing from the prerevolutionary social structures 
were such as to exert, in terms of constraints and 
options given to the revolutionary leadership, 
powerful .pressures towards initiating a thorough 
social, economic and political revolution* On 
this point, see, In particular, Maurice Eeitlin 
’’Cuba - Revolution without a Blueprint" in Irving 
Iioui s H or owl ts ( ed ) Ouban. Opmmund sm ( Uni t ed S bates: 
AldiaiG Publishing Company 1970)*
13* Bonsai notes that during hie meetings with Castro
early in 1959 he stressed "the actual and potential 
value of the American investment" as a result of 
being aware of certain radical proposals being put 
to Castro* See his "Cuba, Castro and the United 
States" Vol.45,, Uo.2,, 1967, p.268*
diplomatic gestures, to embargo, to reinforce Bonsai in his
attempts to secure such an accommodation»^^ Previously
very effective in terms of persuading Caribbean decision-
makers to change policies this approach did not work with 
17Castro* Bather, the opposite occurred in that he became 
less accessible to United States reasoning and more deter­
mined in his policies* Eventually, with the failure of
several more attempts at mediation in early I960, the 
situation between Cuba and the United States became one in 
which the United States saw a form of extreme modification 
as the only eolution*^^
Policies in pursuit of this end were again modelled on the 
* traditional/
16. Minor non co-operation refers to such moves as refusing 
to return Cuban war criminals for trial in Cuba.
Diplomatic gestures to such moves as delaying for up to
three weeks the departure of Bonsai to take up his post 
in Cuba and recalling him for three weeks after his 
meeting with Castro on the 3th September, 1959. Embargo 
to such moves as extending the operation of the arms 
ban, originally developed against the Batista government,
to apply to the Castro government as well#
17# However, the approach did have an effect on members of 
Castro’s government, The day after the United Bfates 
government delivered an official note of protest on the 
terms of the Agrarian Reform Daw, five Cabinet Ministers 
resigned, among the% were Roberto Agramonte, Minister of 
State, Hemberto So^i Marin, Minister of Agriculture, and 
Louis Orlando Rodrxguea, Minister of the Interior*
18. After the delivery of the United States note on the
Agrarian Reform Law, 11th June 1959, Bonsai had to wait 
until the 5th September to see Castro although he had 
requested to see him some six weeks before. During 
this period Castro manoeuvred to replace various govern­
ment ministers and officials who were not fully committed 
to his policies, the most significant being Castro’s 
success in forcing President Urrutia to resign on the 
18th July, 1959#
19* The United States attempted to mediate the dispute in 
January/
’ tj^ 'aditional pattern*. Modification followed the establ­
ished practice of the development of inter linlced twin 
strategies of unilateral and multilateral involvement, with 
the former directly leading to the Bay of Pigs and the latter 
to the various efforts of the United States to secure hemi-
O A
spheric co-operation via the The multilateral
efforts met with little success even though the United
States government reversed a number of previous policies
23towards Latin America, " Indeed, so unsuccessful were the 
United State’s government’s attempts to build goodwill in 
Latin America, or to promote an effective propaganda campaign 
against Cuba, that at the Seventh Meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the O.A.S. it was forced to abandon any concep­
tion of a firm line on Cuba and accept, instead, the 
Declaration of San Jose which carried, at best, only a 
limited /
19, (continued) January I960, through Dr, Julio Amoedo, 
Argentinian Ambassador to Cuba, and in March I960, 
through Rufo Lopes Presquet, Castro’s Finance 
Minister, In February'I960 a Cuban attempt to 
mediate, through the good offices of Brazil, was 
rejecjted by the United ^tates government,
20, The multilateral strategy began with ^resident 
Eisenhower’s trip to Latin America in late February 
and early March I960, On his return he initiated 
the unilateral strategy when on March 17th, the 
C.I.A, were ordered to begin training Cuban exiles#
21, Moving, for example, from support of Trujillo to 
opposition to Trujillo and reversing, in order to do 
so, its position on non-intervention in the hemi­
sphere* Contrast the speech of Herter at the Quinta 
Reunion de Consulta de Ministres de Relaciones 
Exteriores. Actas v Documentos 0,B,A,/Ser.F/iil5
espanol) 2nd Plenary Session Doc#36 with his speech 
a year later at the Sexta Reunion de Consulta de 
Ministros do Helaolones Exterloïee, MtaB_j_pocjMen;kgg.
0.U.A./ser.ï'/ili.6 (espanol) 2nd Session of the 
General Committee, Doc. 22#
pplimited and oblique oondemnation of Cuba. Such an
unequivocal rejection of United States moves signalled
the go ahead for unilateral action which, as in the
previous case with Guatemala, was developed covertly and
pursued resolutely, especially in the closing days of the
Ei8enhower Adminis tration♦ A simi1ar militancy, if
slightly less insistent, was also the mark of the new
24.Kennedy Adminis tratiouo
22. Even this was too much for Mexico which insisted 
on adding to the official record the view of its 
delegation that the Declaration was not in any way 
directed at Cuba# The Guatemalan delegation, 
however, felt the opposite and insisted on adding 
to the official record its view that stronger 
action against Cuba would have been warranted.
23* Following an abortive army coup d’etat against 
Ydigoras in Guatemala 15th-l?th November, 1960^ 
Elsenhower^ who had already decided he would 
support Ydigoras if necessary by moving in "without 
delay", sent naval units to patrol the,Caribbean 
coast to ensure the survival of the Ydigoras 
government and so the training base for Cuban 
exiles. The reformist and mildly pro-Cuban 
military government in El Salvador, brought in by 
a coup d’etat on the 26th October, I960, plus unrest 
in Nicaragua, provided a further impetus to rush 
moves.
24, Of those who had knowledge of the plan within the 
Kennedy Ac[mims tratlon, only Assistant Secretary of 
State, Chester Bowles, opposed it.
The Role of the United States 1959-1966
The policy of the United States in the Caribbean during this 
period has been, above all, a response to developments in 
Cuba. Nowhere is tMs more apparent than in United States 
attitudes towards the Dominican Republic from i960 onwards 
where concern with preventing another Cuba has resulted in 
massive United States intervention into every aspect of
OK
Dominioan life. Parallelled to a lesser degree in all 
other states of the Caribbean except, of course, Cuba after 
1961, what was new in the Dominican Intervention was not the 
fact of United ^tates intervention but the aims, style and 
degree of intervention. For example, whilst previous inter­
ventions, as in Guateiimla, 1954, were in favour of the status 
quo and by traditional means, the intervention in the 
Dominican Republic, at least initially, (1960-1963) was by 
novel means and in favoua? of limited changes* Another 
distinction is that whilst intervention in Guatemala was 
relatively simple, brief, limited and successful, in the 
Dominican Republic it was complex, long, extensive and, 
arguably, unsuccessful. The effect of Cuba has therefore 
been/
23. Howard J. Wiarda, in a recent book on the Dominican 
Republic 5 has pointed out that United States 
intervention has been so significant that "the 
question must be raised of just how extensive 
Dominican sovereignty over its own affairs . At 
times, it is difficult to determine whether the U.S. 
Embassy or Dominican officials are actually formu­
lating the policies and making the decisions". See 
his
(Londons Pall Mall Press 1969) p.213.
been not to change the hasis of United "^ tatea policy, but 
only it B t one * ^^
li’urther support for the essentially unchanged basis of
United States policies in the Caribbean is apparent if the
effects of innovations introduced into the United 8•'gates -
Latin American Policy by the second Eisenhower Administration
and taken up and expanded by the Kennedy Administration, are
considered* Overall, the raajon? thrust of such innovations
has been towards an increased commitment of United States
resources to Latin America which has, in its turn, led to
further involvement by the United States in Latin American 
27politics. ' This trend has been transmitted into the 
Caribbean by way of the integration of the United States 
Caribbean policy into the general posture of United States 
Latin American policy, but, because of the already high degree 
of United ^tates penetration into Caribbean polities, its 
effect has been muted# That is, the innovations have en­
larged/
26* The most unequivocal statement supporting this comes 
from *^ ohn H. Plank, a former State Department 
official, who intimates that future overt large scale 
United States Interventions may be necessary in Haiti, 
Honduras, Guatemala and Panama* See his "The 
Caribbean: Intervention, When and How", Foreign
A&f&ira, Vol.44., Ko.l., 1965*
27* The extent to which any Latin American polity îiae 
become further penetrated by the United States is 
obviously dependent on the specific characteristics 
of each polity. It is, however, important to 
recognise that the general characteristics of all 
Latin American politics, irrespective of levels of 
economic development, are such as to make them 
particularly responsive to external factors* The 
indications are that the United States Innovations, 
by their very nature, have served to increase such 
responsiveness particularly as it relates to represen­
tatives of United ^tates Embassies and the United 
States/
enlarged rather than revised previous United States policy.
In only one instance, that modification now preceded rather 
than followed any breakdown of the system, can any real 
reversal of United ^tatee policy be detected, and this 
stemmed, of course, primarily from the particular problems 
facing the United ^tates Caribbean policy by the continuation 
of the Cuban Revolution as a potentially destabilising factor 
in the region and not from the general posture of United 
States Latin American policy. Again, certain United States 
policies in the Dominican Republic during this period provide 
a particularly good example of the relatively minor changes 
United '^ tates innovations brought about, as well as pointing 
out that enlargement of penetration created confusion and 
contradiction among particular United States strategies*
During this period, United States policy was directed by 
three different administrations. The confusions and con­
tradictions of United States policy in the Caribbean arising 
from the scale of penetration were thus further exaggerated 
by the different use each president made of the governmental 
decision-making structure and by the different perceptions 
of each president and his advisers as to what was happening 
in/
27# (continued) States supported international agencies. 
See Douglas A. Chalmers "Developing on the Periphery: 
External Factors in Latin American Politics";
Teresa Hayter Aid as Imperialisms and R. Harrison 
Wagner
(Stanfords University Press 19?0), Chapter 8, 
particularly p.203#
in the region. For example, characteristics of the Kennedy 
Administration’s Caribbean policy - innovation and mzgenoy, 
and characteristics of the Johnson Administration’s 
Caribbean policy - "inelastic insistence", can, in some 
measure, be attributed to the shift of the centre of policy­
making for Latin America from the \Vhite House to the State 
Department,Other internal United States factors such as 
the enormous lobby on Cuba also exerted a constant Influence 
on United States policy formait ion. Thus, as in the previous
period, the political basis of United States policy tended to 
be emphasised although, unlike before, the direct intrusion 
of the Gold War into the region served to exaggerate the 
importance of the security factor. Especially from 1964 
onwards this led to the political and military dimensions of 
United States Latin American policy being stressed relative 
to the economic and social dimensions* The military inter­
vention of the United States into the Dominican Republic in 
1965 demonstrates this most clearly.
A case study of United States policy to the Dominican 
Republic can, obviously, provide only a partial picture of 
United States policy in this period. Many factors other
28. That is, different actors perception of the Caribbean 
situation and how to respond to it were brought into 
play* Under Kennedy, United States Latin American 
policy was generally directed from the White House, 
particularly by Goodwin and Schlesinger, whereas 
under Johnson, his Special Assistant on Latin American 
Affairs and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, Thomas Mann, favoured a conservative 
approach and greater reliance on the State Department. 
See Jolm Geraesi, 
pp.262-263, 279-280, 414.
than the Cuban Revolution precipitated changes in United 
States policy to Latin A m e r i c a , A l s o  there is evidence 
that United States policy in the Caribbean recognised, to 
some extent, the distinetiveneas of each state in the 
region,)Nevertheless, such a study does illustrate the 
major aspects of United States policy in the Caribbean 
during this period and does focus on
what the United States government unquestionably regarded 
as one of the ’key* states in the region*
United States - Dominican Republic Relations 1959-1966
At the end of 1958 relations between the United States and 
the Dominican Republic were cool but not etrained# During 
1959 no improvement took place despite the emergence of 
the Dominican Republic as the Caribbean government most 
bitterly denouncing Castro and events in Cuba. Then, 
from the beginning of I960, the Eisenhower Administration 
launched a strategy aimed at inducing changes in the 
Dominican/
29. Among the most imp03?tant were:-
1. the poor economic performance of Latin American 
states between 1955-1960 which, when coupled with a 
developing interest by the Soviet Union in the area, 
served to put the United States at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
2. In 1958 - the attacks on Nixon in Caracas5 the 
proposals of ICubltschek for an Operation Ran America; 
the report of Milton Eisenhower after a visit to 
Central America, all of which pointed to widespread 
discontent in Latin America and #.e need of social 
reforms to alleviate it# See Robert N. Burr, Our 
SraMêâJisMSj2heriy_,.P0£ga^^
: ;&e
Brookings Institution, 1967); H. Harr.ibon Wagner 
United States Policy Toward Latin America,
30. What is meant by this is that within the general
posture of United States policy in the Caribbean a 
degree/
Dominican polity. The fij?st move was a three hour meeting 
with Trujillo by Senator George Smathers and special a,siss- 
tant to State and Defense, William Pawley, in which Trujillo 
was pressed to resign and permit free elections in order to 
facilitate a smooth transition to democracy• Trujillo’s 
refusal was followed by the State Department’s annomceraent 
at the end of February that from June military aid to the 
Dominican Republic would cease. Ami by the Secretary of 
State, Christian Harter’s clear reference in March to 
Trujillo as a dictator*' Trujillo’s reply to these moves 
was a counter aimed at asserting maximum pressure on the 
Administration to relax its militant policy towards him. 
Relying ona carefully built Congressional base to exert 
direct pressure in V/ashlngton, informal agreements were 
sought with Cuba and Eastern Europe as a means of exerting 
Indirect p r e s s u r e . These moves, however, came to nothing, 
and the United States continued its policy of steadily 
increasing /
30. (continued) degree of flexibility was apparent 
at the operational levol of policy within each 
state, i.e. the ’means’ were not wholly directed 
by the ’ends’.
31. Pawley and Smatliers wo3?e old friends of Trujillo* 
The decision to send them as negotiators plus the 
nature of their mission, was therefore a clear 
indicator to Trujillo that times had changed*
32. In this speech Herter also referred to Nicaragua 
and Paraguay as dictatorships* Later, however,
a clarification was issued in which it was stressed 
that Nicaragua was making progress towards 
democracy* The trend of united States policy in 
the Caribbean was thus made fairly explicit*
33. Given the visit of Mikoyan to Cuba in February in 
which an agreement was signed whereby the Soviet 
Uni Oil would lend 0X00 million to Cuba and buy five 
million tone of Cuban sugar from 1960-1964, the 
counter adopted by Trujillo was, at the time, among 
the strongest which could have been made*
inerGaoing presoux^ es* To this end the United States 
ambassador, Joseph S. Farland was instructed to make 
contact with the growing Dominican ’underground*,.
Finally, Farland left the Dominican Republic in Hay - an
unequivocal demonstration of withdrawl of United States
. 34 support.^
By this time other United States moves fox* action against 
the Dominican Republic and Cuba had met with success* Two 
reports of the Inter-American Peace Comittee, by revising 
the non-intervention principle as Inapplicable in certain 
circumstances, had prepared the way for t he possibility of
"%K
effective multilateral action* The opportunity for such 
action was then presented with the failure of the Dominican 
directed assassination attempt on Betancourt and the subse­
quent call by the Venezuelan government for O.A.S# action 
against Dominican "Intervention and aggression". The 
United States, previously supporting Venezuela in its dispute 
with the Dominican Republic, now actively ranged itself 
behind Venezuela to ensure tbixt the O.A.S. inveetigation of 
the assassination attempt would lead to concrete O.'i .S.  
action. /
34. Farland had been recalled in March and was recalled 
again on May 6th. He returned on May 22nd but was 
made unwelcome* In June he was appointed Ambassa­
dor to Panama*
35. In the âagclglJJ^DWt^onJMJiêJMiQa^ 
âBBLaââsXatijmJagaaoæâs^aM-^
Mpo£t
ta.X^.J,sXeûSâ.iieejLtoa_of_ÇOTSiy,aJîion^ 
o.Æ.X!!orMPÆ.Affaira (on the violation of human rights
in the Dominican Republic and tensions in the 
Caribbean). This latter report was vociferously 
denounced by the Dominican Republic. See Here is 
oug-Ansa^. (Ciudad Krujillo, I960).
action. When the Sixth Meeting of the Foreign Ministers 
of the O.A.S. met in August, however, différences between 
the 1|gited 8-|;ates and Venezuela emerged# Whereas 
Venezuela requested the immediate imposition of sanctions 
the United States attitude was that sanctions should only 
be applied following the failure of a prior attempt at 
modifying the Dominican polity in the direction of repre­
sentative democracy# As Slater has pointed out, behind 
this United States attitude were the experiences of the 
Cuban Revolution*
"Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to 
 —  - - -■ ". was the implicit assumption,
and Washington wanted to insure it could 
help fill in the blank"*
The United States proposals, however, were rejected as too 
interventionist, whereupon the United States then backed 
the Venezuelan proposals which were passed unateouoly and 
required all O.A.S# member states to partially interrupt 
economic relations and to suspend diplomatic relations with 
the Dominican Republic# ' If not exactly the O.A.S. 
decision the United States wanted, it was, nevertheless, 
fully exploited by the Eisenhower Administration to further 
its Dominican policy* Thus it was cited as the reason 
behind the executive decision of imposing a fee of two 
cento/
36. Jerome Slater, P.7*
37. As has been frequently observed, Herter’s proposals 
were developed with as much an eye to future action 
against Cuba as present action against the Dominican 
Republic* Their rejection was thus, to some extent, 
a reflection of the sympathetic support the Cuban 
Revolution enjoyed in Latin America, especially 
among the larger states*
cents per pound on Dominican stigar - a move which
effectively neutralised Trujillo’s base of support in 
38Congress* And then, in December, was developed when, 
against much opposition in the O.A.S#, the United States, 
argued for the necessity of further sanctions, this time 
on oil and oil products, trucks and spare parts.
The mix of multilateral and unilateral pressures developed 
by the Eisenhower Administration were continued by the 
Kennedy Administration during 1961#^^ Robert Murphy, a 
State Department ’trouble shooter’, was sent to the 
Dominican Republic in mid-April in a new attempt to persuade 
Trujillo to permit a degree of liberalisation#^^ The 
failure of this mission again clearly identified Trujillo 
as the major obstacle to United States policy, a fact which 
appears/
38* This resulted in a loss of /22,750,800 for the
Dominican Republic - the oxpacted premium accruing 
from the transference of the bulk of Ouba’s sugar 
quotei to the Dominican Republic* The allocation 
of the sugar quota was a Gongresolonal prerogative#
39# Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and more significantly, 
Paraguay, Guatemala and Haiti abstained from voting 
on the measure* The uncharacteristic opposition 
of the latter 3 states to the United States move 
demonstrates, quite clearly, their fear that United 
States policy was aimed at providing a basis for 
further Intervention, possibly, given the nature of 
their domestic regimes, against them#
40* The incoming Kennedy Administration gave the Trujillo 
lobbyists another chance to Influence United States 
policy* Adolph A* Eerie* Jr., head of the new Task 
Force on Latin America, Chester Bowles, and Joseph 
Kennedy, the influential father of John Kennedy, were 
approached in an effort to rescind the sugar tax.
41* The timing of this mission as coincidental with the
Bay of Bigs suggests that it was as much an ’offshoot’ 
of United States-Cuban policy as a new United States 
initiative towards the Dominican Republic*
appears to have been appreciated by high-ranking members 
of the Dominican elite who, on May 38th, carried through
4 9Trujillo’s assassination. ' With Trujillo gone, however, 
no changes in United States policy were immediately 
apparent, even though Balaguer, the nominal president, 
took some steps towards the liberalisation of the Dominican 
polity. Then, in early September, the Dominican question 
was reviewed. Jolm Bartlow Martin was personally sent 
by Kennedy to study the situation in the Dominican Republic 
and deLesseps Morrison, the United States Ambassador to 
the O.A.S. was instructed, whilst he was in the Dominican 
Republic, as a member of the *sajactiono’ subcommittee of 
the O.A.S. to meet Balaguer to press for further liberal- 
1sation. The separate reports of Martin and Morrison 
concurred in concluding that Balaguer and ’Ramfis’ Trujillo 
were doing little to press for real changes in the Dominican 
polity and that, because of this, the best policy was to 
negotiate the ’Trujillo machine’ out of power and out of 
the country, replacing it with a broad based provisional 
government until free elections, under O.A.S* supervision, 
could be held* Their recommendations were accepted and 
adopted as policy from the beginning of October. In doing 
so the United States government began to move from the mix 
of multilateral and unilateral pressures as the basis of 
its/
42. There is general agreement that the C.I.A* were 
involved in some capacity or another, probably 
along the lines of possessing foreknowledge of 
the plot but taking no action to prevent its 
development.
its strategy into an emphasis on the latter only - a
move most dramatically illustrated in mid-November by the
ostentatious deployment of a United States naval task
force three miles off Santo Domingo as a show of strength
designed to deter the threat of a re-establishment of
dictatorship occasioned by the return to the Dominican
Republic of leading members of the Trujillo family.
The final moves in ensuring the non breakdown of order in
the Dominican Republic after Trujillo’s assassination thus
became one of decreasing O.A.S. participation and increasing
44
United States unilateral direction of events. This was 
to remain the basis of all subsequent United States policies 
in the Dominican Republic.
For most of 1962 and 1963 John Bartlow Martin was United 
States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic. His 
"exhaustive" account of the period in Overtaken by Events 
demonstrates that, above all, he was preoccupied with 
three problems: communism in the Dominican Republic,
protection of United States economic interests, and setting 
up institutions capable of effecting controlled trans­
formations in the Dominican economy and polity* All 
three problems were centrally related to one major concern - 
the prevention of the Dominican Republic becoming another 
Cuba.^  ^/
43# The task force of eight ships and 1,800 marines, 
remained in Dominican waters for some time after 
the Trujillo family had left. Its presence was 
translated into Dominican politics by the broad­
ening o.f the government to"* include the U.O#H#, the 
’civic-patriotic’ political party which the 
United States had fostered as the major oprjosilion 
t o the Tru j i11o * madi ine’.
44# Prosecuting the Dominican case in the O.A.S. had
become increasingly difficult for the United States 
bo/
Guba.*^ '*^
Martin’s attitude to communism in the Dominican Republic 
has been described as "obsessive"* Such a judgment has 
been based on an evaluation of his policy of seeking the 
harrassment and expulsion of communiste even thouqgh he 
recognised the few who were active had no real chance of 
operating effectively in Dominican p o l i t i c o A s  a 
’firm’ approach it was fully endorsed by the Kennedy Admin­
istration as the translation into the Dorainlcan context of 
the United State’s government’s general *over-reactlon’ 
policy towards communism in the Caribbean* Martin’s 
"obsession" was thus in accord with the essence of United 
States policy and was sustained by that policy^ This 
’over-reaction* or ’play safe’ policy was based on two 
considerations* Firstly, the conviction of United States 
policy makers that communists were, in Latin America,
A *7
making headway at the expense of the United States* 
Secondly/
44* (continued) so that even without the October policy
shift there would have been difficulty in maintaining 
let alone, expanding, the existing O.A.S. Commitment. 
The O.A.S* vote to lift sanction on January 4th, 1962 
was, excepting for Cuba’s abstention, unanimous.
45* An example of how much this association between Cuba 
and the Dominican Republic had entered the Kennedy 
Administration’s thinking is the story that, as Martin 
left the President’s office after accepting the post 
of Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Kennedy 
referred to him as the Earl E.T, Smith of Ills 
Admini s trat i on*
46. According to a 0*X*A. report made available to Martin 
there were "not more than one hundred well-trained, 
fully-committed and fully-disciplined" Dominican--^  
communistsÿ and these were split between the P.S.P. 
(Soviet-orierited) 5 M.P.D. (GÎiina-oriented) and 
Fourteenth of June Movement (Cuba-oriented)•
47* See 
Amer
York: The Free Press of mencoe, 19^4)
C - J - J
Secondly, and more Importantly, that the "example* effect 
of the Cuban Revolution in the Caribbean, especially that 
part of it relating to guerrilla warfare as a strategy, 
was a major destabilising element in regional politics*
For if the Cuban ’model* was particularly appropriate in 
South America, where it led to a spontaneous outburst of 
Fidelista guerrilla movements, then it was even more so in 
the Caribbean where the existing political environment had 
created and legitimised the exile group - a political unit
/ 8
which could easily adapt guerrilla warfare to its purposes. 
The imitiediato United States response to gtierrilla warfare as 
a tactic in the Caribbean was therefore the projection of a 
policy of closer control over the region* Surveillance of 
all ’leftist* political activists in the region was increased 
as was the patrolling by the United States navy*'^  ^ Above 
this, policy makers, quite often at high levels, concerned 
themselves with the existing or potential threat posed by 
what were only very small groups of communists or communist 
sympathisers.^^ later, ae counter-insurgency training 
became/
48* Here it is important to recognise that until the
almost complete destruction of the armed forces of 
Castro’s 26th July movement on the 5th December,
1956 only 3 days after the original landing in Cuba, 
the practice of the Movement had more in common with 
other exile groups In the region than with the 
accepted notion of the guerrilla group. Only later, 
after the oiroumetances consequent upon this defeat 
had been absorbed and a renewed effort based on the 
Sierra Maeetra begun, did the guerrilla character of 
the Movement become obvious* See Ernesto Oiie Guevara,
( London:
George Allen and Unwin Limited 1968)*
49. An example of this are the events immediate^following 
Trujillo’s assassination* Bosch in The Unfini shed
lent, p.4*, relates that on hearing news of the
assassination, a decision was taken to call a meeting 
ill Costa Eioa of the leadership of his party, the 
P.R.D. However, only two, who happened to hold United 
States/
234
'became increasingly a feature of the various national 
armies in the region, the United States sense of urgency 
passed. However, as the intervention in the Dominican 
Republic in 1965 was to show, an exaggerated fear of 
communism remained a powerful conditioning factor for 
policy,
Martin’s attitude regarding United States economic interests
is best described as conservative, For example, on one
hand Martin opposed, as being against the Interests of the
United States the proposals of George Walker, a lobbyist
for the Businessman’s Council on International Understanding
that he should try to persuade the Council of State to sell
61the confiscated Trujillo properties to private investors#
On the other hand, Martin did nothing to advance United 
States/
49, (continued) States passports and Miolan, travelling 
via Panama to Costa Rica, actually arrived. The 
rest ran foul of a ruling forbidding airline offices 
to book passages for Dominicans in the Caribbean area 
until the situation in the Dominican Republic was 
settled* At the time a United States Navy task 
force, composed of nearly forty ships patrolled the 
Dominican coast ready either to intervene in the 
Dominican Republic or to prevent interventions from 
any other source*
50,
among others, were .President Kennedy, Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, 
Assistant Secretary of State Bob Woodward, Richard 
Biesel of the C,I*A. and himself, a great deal of 
discussion took place in respect of policy towards 
only twelve communists in the Dominican Republic* 
Eventually it was decided that Morrison was personally 
to seek a meeting with Balaguer and inform him that 
Kennedy viewed the expulsion of all twelve communjs te 
as a priority matter*
51* Martin argued that "If Americans bought them, we 
would be accused of having sent the fleet to throw 
the Trujillos out in order to get our hands on their 
properties". p.116.
States interests among the rural poor by pressing for an
acceleration of the Alliance for Progress type land reform,
based on these properties, which was the declared policy
62of both the Council of State and the Bosch government.^
This concern with protection of the status quo became 
particularly apparent as the Bosch government took office 
and promulgated a Constitution containing an indirect attack, 
ill parts, on the private but not the social function of 
p r o p e r t y . Immediately denounced by United States business 
interests and a major part of the Boniinic an "elite Martin 
acted as a high-level spokesman for these interests by 
pressing Bosch for changes in the Constitution. Fully 
behind him in this was the State Department which had already 
become alarmed by Bosch’s efforts to cancel an oil refinery 
contract with Standard Oil of New Jersey and to rescind the 
sugar contracts negotiated between United States companies 
and the Council of State.Ma,rtin’s actions were thus 
again/
52. In the 3 years, 1962-1963, the National Institute 
of Agrarian Reform distributed land to only 3,070 
families.
53. Chiefly in: Article 19 - the principle of profit
sharing by workers in agricultural and industrial 
enterprises; Article 23 - the prohibition of large 
landholdings; Article 25 - the restriction of the 
right of foreigners to acquire Dominican Land; and 
Article 28 - the requirement that landholders sell 
that portion of their lands above a maximum fixed 
by law, excess holdings to be distributed to the 
landless peasantry.
54# After prolonged negotiations the Standard Oil contract 
was quietly dropped. The sugar contracts, however, 
were honoured, partly because the United States 
government threatened to i^ ivoke the Hickenlooper 
amendment which would end United States aid.
again well within the framework of ’Washington approved* 
Caribbean pplicy. The real nature of this policy ie 
apparent in Martin’s comment on Bosch*s success in obtaining 
a /I50 million credit from Europe* Although vitally nec­
essary for the economic development of the Dominican Republic, 
and raised in Europe partly because of difficultlGS met in 
trying to raise it in the United States, Martin was distressed 
that the provisions of the repayment of the loan were such
"we might have to come in with virtually 
no-interest loans which would not help 
us economically" and that "generators 
and everything else needed for the dams 
would be bought in Europe - sales which 
should have been ours"*
The third major area of goubtii for Martin was the establish­
ment of institut ions necessary for economic development along 
capitalist lines and political development towards represen­
tative democracy* To accomplish this thousands of United 
States teohnioians were recruited and brought to work in
56the Dominican Republic at all levels of its administration.
In particular, United States personnel were responsible for 
establishing a host of specialised institutions, such as the 
National Planning Board, the Industrial Development Corpora­
tion, the State Sugar Council, the National Confederation of 
Free/
*sae.'):<$Mw*c6s*s
5 5. Martins Ox^tetlîSiOxXYSBia» P.570. ïhe loan was to
build the Tavera Dam on the Rio Yaque del Norte, a
power plant at Puerto Plata, a waterworks in the
capital, and another dam*
36. So many, in fact, that at the beginning of 1962 a
housing shortage developed*
Free Workers (trade im.lon), and the Inter-Amerioan Centre 
for Social Studies (research and planning)• Added to this 
were, the Peace Corps (160 in September 1963) and A.Ï.D. 
officials (who made available from March 1962 to September 
1963 some /84 million - the highest per capita aid to any 
Latin American country at the time.) Not surprisingly, 
however, much as he tried, Martin could do little to co­
ordinate these efforts, and contradictions and confusion
were apparent everywhere, even with particular agency
57 /programmes* Significantly, following the coup d’etat
on September 25th, 1963, and the poor economic performance
of the Dominican Republic during this year, the whole basis
of the United States programme was brought into question and
subsequently scaled down. Prior to the coup, however, there
were few doub% especially as to the "showcase for democracy"
58ideal as the goal for planning. 
lU/
57* the C.X.A. for example, was simultaneously channelling 
funds to two rival peasant unions. To the National 
Federation of Peasant Brotherhoods via the Inter- 
American Centre for Social Studies, and to the National 
Confederation of Free Workers via the Regional Inter- 
American Labour Organisation. The effect was to split 
the Dominican labour movement making, according to 
Martin, communist infiltration easier and labour- 
management relations more difficttb.
58. Schlesingor, PP.769-773. The oholoe
of the Dominican Republic for such an exercise was, 
of course, based on the need to demonstrate that in what 
Washington considered as two remarkably similar countries 
the Alliance for Progress offered a better model for 
development than the Cuban Revolution.
<s::?o
It is this eommitaent to the idea of buooosb which largely 
explains the Kennedy Administration’s immediate response 
to the coup* Prestige was at stake and so the early moves 
were directed towards displaying maximum displeasure with 
the new Dominican government - Martin was recalled, as were 
the heads of the A.I.B* and M.A*A.G. missions; and recogni­
tion witMield*^^ Beyond this, however, the Administration 
had no fixed policy, with the result that from the beginning 
it was susceptible to arguments from other branches of the 
government that some form of accommodation with the Trium­
virate could be reached* The early firm approach was 
fleetingly strengthened by the coup d’c^ tat in Honduras on 
October 3rd, but soon after, against a background of unsuc­
cessful diplomacy by the United States, the feeling that to 
delay settlement was against United States interests 
gathered momentum* By mid-October the onus for settlement 
had been firmly fixed on the Administration which, given the 
extraordinary Intransigence of the Triumvirate, inevitably 
meant/
39# At the time no real attempt was made to save Bosch
although subsequent negotiations with the Triumvirate 
focused, in part, upon formulae involving the inclu­
sion of elements from the P.R.D, The United States 
government was thus basically dissatisfied with Bosch 
and not with the type of policies his party represen­
ted, although of course, aspects of P.R.B. policy were 
opposed by the United States*
60* Delaying settlement was seen as generating
instability by inviting other political groups 
to oppose the Triumvirate, perhaps in a violent manner 
leading, inevitably, to either the emergence of a 
Castro oriented government or to a Trujillo ’type’ 
military regime* Kennedy was certainly very worried 
about armed resistance to the Triumvirate*
63meant a fall back from the original position, ' Indeed,
in less than a. month from this point the original demands,
including the central one of * constitutionality * had been
set aside for the inconclusive commitment of the Trium-
62virate to hold free elections within a year. Recognition, 
on the basis of such an understanding, was eventually 
granted on December 14th,
For the next sixteen months the United States government 
played a less flamboyant, but still appreciable, role in 
Dominican politics. The new United States Ambassador, W, 
Tapley Bennett, continued to involve himself in Dominican 
politics, but not as closely as Martin. The A,I.D. and 
M.A.A.G, missions began operating again, although the 
involvement of United States technicians in ’institution 
building* was run down. Offsetting this, however, was the 
expanding rôle of United States business which, encouraged 
by the shelving of the 1963 Constitution and the I.K.F, 
approved austerity programme of the Triumvirate, sharply 
increased investment. After four years of intensive 
involvement/
61. A measure of this intransigence is that after one 
particular session of meddling by the United States 
charge d’affaires in Santo Domingo, the Triumvirate 
officially complained to the O.A.S, about his 
behaviour, labelling it "intervention",
62* The acceptability of a settlement on these lines 
was made public by Kennedy in a press conference 
on November 14th.
63. During the seven months of the Bosch government some 
/64 million in private investment flowed into the 
Dominican Republic; in the first nine months of the 
Triumvirate some 075 million. An additional factor 
stimulating this flow was the renewed emphasis by the 
Johnson Administration on the rôle of private United 
States capital in development in Latin America - a 
role dramatised in the Dominican Republic by the 
activities of Deter Uehemkis, who has alec justified 
a policy of more private capital for Latin America in 
his boote ^ork:
Mentor Books, Revised Bdifion, 1963),
invoXveDient in Dominican affairs the United States govern­
ment was thus returning to policies characteristic of its 
rôle in the Dominican Republic before the advent of Oastro, 
although now, of course, modified in accordance with 
experience learned from the Cuban Revolution# In this 
brief period, as Dowenthal has pointed out, the United 
States government was trying
"to treat the Dominican Republic as one 
of the very many nations with economic 
and political problems; which would 
not become a matter for priority 
attention in Washington unless American 
security appeared directly to be 
threat ened * "
On April 24th, 1965, a section of the Dominican armed 
forces favouring the return of Bosch staged a coup d'etat. 
lot wholly successfully executed, this move precipitated 
the Dominican crisis and the subsequent military interven­
tion by the United States •» at the peak, on May 17th, over 
22,000 United States troops were in Santo Domingo with a 
further 10,000 aboard an off-shore 'task force*. Quite 
clearly then, the Johnson Administration had perceived 
American security to have been threatened# Precisely how 
such security was threatened has since become the subject 
of extended debate among commentators from which has arisen 
a/
64* Dowenthal, "üOhe United States and__the Dominican 
Republic to 1969Î Background to intervention", 
p * 54 •
65* I have adopted the normal procedure of referring to 
those supporting the coup as 'constitutionalists' 
and those opposing the coup as 'loyalists'#
concensus that the official reasons given for interven­
tion - to protect American lives and property and to fore-
66stall a. communxBt takeover - are at best only half-true#
Almost equal to this concensus, however, has been the
disensua among these commentators as to the real reasons
67for Intervention* With so much disagreement, and also 
so many contradictions in official policy, any assessment 
must at the moment remain tentative* Yet, at the same 
time, it is possible to detect, both at the time of the 
Immediate intervention and in the negotiations that led to 
the establishment of the Provisional government of Hector 
Garcia Godoy, a degree of consistency in United States 
policy, although, of necessity, this can be seen at only a 
very general level* Such a 'general* policy seems to have 
been concerned with the following pointss
1* To m"event a communiet take-overs This became the 
major official reason for intervention with Johnson's 
statement on Hay 2nd that
"What began as a popular democratic 
revolution that was committed to 
democracy and social justice moved 
into the hands of a band of Communist 
Conspirators * * *• /
66# The official case is set out in Martin, Overtaken bv 
Events# Part Pour; Jay Mallin, Caribbean%'Ï8is
% Garden City, Mew York: D oub 1 eday S d  Co* Inc * 1965);
and Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies, 
Dominican Action - 1965: lMterTOnM_Qn,-Or
(Washington D.O*; 1965) Nearly all other published 
work in book form on the intervention is hightly criti­
cal of the United States*
67. See, in particular, the interpretations of Slater,
Dpper, "ïhe Dominican 
Revolt"; and Goff and looker "The Violence of Domina­
tion: U.S. Power and the Dominican ’Republic".
C onspira tors,...Our goal, in ko epIng 
with the great principles of the inter- 
American system, is to help prevent 
another Oommmiist state in this hémi­
sphère"
Very apparent, however, io that right from the beginning 
fear of such a take-over constituted an important part of 
United States policy. The day after the coup the military 
attaches of the Unit eel States Embassy in Santo Domingo were 
urging the chiefs of the armed forces to resist the 
'constitutionalists* and using, as their main argument for 
euch a course of action, the possibility of the present 
chaos or a future 'constitutionalist* government as creating 
the conditions for a communist take-over. William Connett, 
Charge d'affaires in Bennett's absence, took up this theme 
the next day, i.e.' the 26th April, when his cables to 
Washington began including references to the existence of a 
serious threat of a communist take-over, a situation possibly 
requiring the use of United ^tates armed forces.Bennett 
arrived/
68* "Statement by President Johnson, May 2nd" cited in
Goff and Booker "The Violence of Dominations U.S.
Power and the I)ominican Republic", p.278.
69* Oonnett, who had been in the Dominican Republic only
five and a half months was responsible with C.Î.A.
Chief 33.1, Terrell, for all the early 'on the spot* 
definitions of the situation* The accuracy of such 
'definitions* was not helped by the absence of 
eleven members of the MAAG group, also Bennett had 
left on the 23rd April. Obviously, with so many 
away, Washington was unprepared for the coup. As 
such, within Washington, ah early assessment of the 
coup was left to the top officials most concerned 
with the region, i*e* Under Secretary of State, Thomas 
îtam, and Kennedy M* Crockett, Chief of the State 
Department's Bureau of Caribbean Affairs. Mann, in
particular/
arrived back in Santo Domingo on the 27th April and 
immediately met all the major leaders of the 'constitu­
tionalists* g they having come to see him to seek mediation. 
His argument, which presumably reflected Washington's 
thinking in th a t he had been briefed only a short while 
before, was tîmt the P.H.l). had been infiltrated by 
communists, that "bearded men" on television had been 
"spouting pure Castroism" and that their cause was hopeless. 
With no chance of United States support the 'constitution­
alist' leadership split with some abandoning the fight and 
others returning to it convinced of United States 'bad 
faith'. Indeed, among those continuing the fight, this 
rejection by Bennett proved decisive by forcing them to 
rely on themselves rather than external support. Renewed 
efforts were therefore made and by late afternoon on the 
28th April the 'constitutionalists* had gained the initia­
tive and were on the offensive. At this point Bennett 
cabled Washington requesting
"armed intervention which goes beyond
the mere protection of Americans" to
70"prevent another Cuba".
69. (continued) particular appears to have been haunted 
by the Cuban and Guatemalan 'models* (he had been 
appointed deputy chief of the United States mission 
in GuateiiicUla after the overthrow of Arbeng) and to 
have 'd e fin e d  the situation* with reference to them. 
The importance of 'models’ in the minds of key 
decision-makers in this type of situation, with 
reference to the Caribbean, is to be found in Herbert 
8
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Johneon acted on this by ordering United States armed 
forces into Santo Domingo - the first arriving almost 
immediately* As Senator Eulbright, who has held secret 
Senate foreign Relations Committee hearings on the inter­
vention, has said of the events of this period
"On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's 
messages to Washington, there is no 
doubt that the threat of Communism 
rather than danger to American lives 
was his (Johnson*s] prime reason for
71recommending military intervention"»
: Im m ediately before
the cable requesting  intervention to prevent anotlBr Cuba 
Bgnnett sent a cable pointing out that the commanders of 
the armed forces resisting the coup were demoralised and their 
men unwilling to contemplate further action# The initial 
^nited States policy of the encouragement of 'loyalist' 
elements in the Dominican armed forces to resist the coup 
had thus met a serious set-back* More Importantly, 
however, the basis of this challenge - the distribution of 
arms to civilians - presented the opportunity for United 
States decision-makers to draw parallels with the last few 
weeks of the Cuban Revolutionary War and with the 
Guatemalan Affair# The former in terms of the easy victory 
of a civilian militia over a collapsing army and the latter 
in terms of the key role of the army as the decisive inter­
nal factor affecting the outcome of intervention# External 
aid aimed to prevent a possible futur'e radical restructuring 
of the Dominican military following on from the loss of 
their/
71* Quoted in D raper, "The Dominican Cris^", p.50,
their'monopoly of violence* plus the necessity for action 
before it was too late for the Dominican military to be 
of any value in c o -o rd in a tin g  their action with United
pjf)
States policy, thus became to be seen as necessary,
It constituted a further reason for immediate intervention. 
Various actions by the United States armed forces once 
they were in Santo Domingo confirm this supportive role* 
following hard on the Marine landings to protect the United 
States Embassy units of the 82nd Airborne landed at San 
Isidro, the military base providing most of the 'loyalist* 
armed forces, thereby acting as a powerful morale booster 
to the 'loyalist * officers* More than this the Airborne 
proceeded to occupy the area around the Duarte bridge, 
previously the major area of fighting and now the main line 
Of thrust into the 'constitutionalist* sone* At the 
same time United States Marines estab lished  an International 
Security 2ione which, when extended on May 3rd, divided the 
'c o n s t i tu t io n a lis t *  gone in to  two and cut off the main body 
of the 'constitutionalists' from the countryside* Finally, 
when on May 14th, the reconstituted 'loyalist * forces broke 
the /
72. Although no certainty can be attached to the 
exact numbers of the armed forces on both sides 
at ths time, it would appear that, at least
from the beginning of May, the 'constitutionalists* 
had 1,800 regular troops including officers and 
men and some 4,000 civilian fighters* The 
loyalists, commanded by Wessin y Wessin, had some 
1,500 in the Army, 900 in the Air Force, plus part 
of the Navy and the Police.
73. Between the 26th-28th April some 2,000 had died 
in the fighting, mainly in this area*
^40
the cease-fire agreement to * clean-up* the weaker of the
two 'constitutionalist* Bones the United States did not 
74intervene. Providing political, and later logistical 
and strategic support to the * loyalists*, United States 
policy prior to and immediately after the intervention was 
thus far from neutral, even though the Johnson Administra­
tion was claiming this to he the case.
3* To guarantee stability through a legitimate but
^rom the g g m - W t h  April, when the
situation in Santo Domingo was still fluid, the * constitu­
tionalists* contacted the United ^tates on five separate 
occasions to ask them to mediate with the 'loyalists* - 
each request was turned down# Further, the United States 
did not contact Bosch until May 1st even though on the 25th  
April it had become clear that those staging the coup, plus 
popular feeling in Santo Domingo, favoured his return as 
president# Determining this attitude of the United States 
was, of course, the fear that the 'constitutionalists* would 
be unable to successfully counter the communists, especially 
if Bosch returned.  ^ However, even when the fear of a 
communist/
74. Whether or not United States troops actively helped 
the ' lo y a l is t *  forces at this time is still disputed. 
What is certain is that the United States did nothing 
to stop the extensive preparations for this attack, 
i.e. movement of tanks by sea from San Isidro to 
Haina, fresh troops drafted into SantoDomingo from San 
Cristobal, and substantial movement of 'loyalist* 
troops within Santo Domingo itself* Qnoe the attack 
was under way, 'loyalist* forces were allowed to 
freely pass through United States lines.
75* In  contact w ith  special representatives of the Johnson 
Administration from May Is t -S rd  Bosch made repeated 
requests for an aircraft to take him to Santo Domingo - 
all were flatly rejected.
commmiiBt take-over had been averted by the direct military 
intervention of the United States the concern with the 
'risk* of Bosch continued. Thus when the United States 
opened a line of communication with him and Gaamano in an 
attempt to find a political settlem ent via the 'constituti­
onalists* the talks revolved around alternatives to Bosch. 
Eventually, on the 15th Hay, HcG-eorgo Bundy, Special 
Assistant to President Jolinson, and Bosch agreed to the 
Gusman formula whereby in return for Bosch dropping his 
earlier demands for an immediate withdrawal of United States 
armed forces, Antonio Gusman, a leader of the moderate 
wing of the P.E.D. would servo out the rest of Bosch's 
term wader the provisions of the 1963 Constitution* This 
plan, however, proved unacceptable to the 'loyalists* as 
they f e l t  it to be, in essence, a victory to the 'constitu- 
tlonaliets*.^^  At this point Gusman also * stuck', refusing 
to contemplate the deportation or detention of communists 
and leading 'oonetitutiora lists' as being forb idden by the 
1963 Constitution under which he was to govern* On Hay 
24th/
«3ïn«a-4*'SMW5«ï*aer.C3vrflLi<îyyr4itei>iT*tmt.».*iw*r'ia*«jp»*;iwiiïi;waû.iwwtoriMr^
76* The 'loyalists* were now represented by the Govern­
ment of N a tio n a l Reconstruction led by Antonio Imbert* 
The exact purpose of the United States in setting up 
this government and then supporting i t  financially - 
some |i21 million during Hay-June - are unclear unless 
it wae simply a device aimed at pressurising the 
* constitutionalists' into making concessions. If this 
were so then it probably failed as the 'constitution­
alists* refused to negotiate with it, citing the 
character of Imbert as the reason. The 'constitution­
alists* p o s itio n  was thus strengthened and not weakened 
by this move* l a t e r ,  as the Imbert government failed 
to gain support among the Dominican people and then 
began resisting United States direction, Washington 
took the decision to exclude it from any real involve­
ment in a final settlement.
24th talks finally broke down* As Draper has pointed 
out, the Gusman formula foundered on the fact that
"the proposed Gusman government was 
expected to do the United States 
bidding even before it was formed* *
After a further three months of complex negotiations, 
conducted mainly by Ellsworth Bunker, the United States 
Ambassador to the 0*A.S* but also Involving In a comple 
mentary role the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the O.A 
a more flexible governmentwas finally found in the accept­
ance by the 'constitutionalists' and 'loyalists* of a
78compromise and interim government headed by Garcia Godoy* * 
The United States had thus, at last, been able to construct 
a government it could hope to control, something clear3,y 
that would not have been the case by supporting a 'loyalist* 
or 'constitutionalist* government aa the solution to the 
problem* /
.S*
77* Draper, "The Dominican Oriels",-p*63
78* Bunker had a dual role at this time as both chief 
negotiator for the United States and as the repre­
sentative of the United States on the O.A.8. appointed 
Ad Hoc Committee (the other two representatives on 
this committee were Ilmar Penna Marinlio of Brazil and 
Ramon do Olairmont Buenos of El Salvador)* The 
United States was therefcr e 'at the centre of the 
negotiations - a factor allowing it, via access to 
greater flow s of information and the ability to block 
or approve various initiatives, disproportionate 
control over the outcome of the negotiations*
79* Once the Garcia Godoy government was established the 
United States supported it fully* On the 6th 
September it guaranteed i t  militarily when General 
Palmer, Commander of the United States contingent of 
the Inter-American Peace Force, told his troops they 
were no longer 'neutral* but there to support the 
Garcia Godoy government. United States economic 
assistance was stepped up so that between July let 1965 
and June 30th 1966, the Dominican Republic received the 
highest per capita economic aid from the United States/
problem. Moreover, insofar as it .had 0*A*S. approval
the Ctaroia Godoy government also had a degree of legitl' 
80macy#
Although these three points were the major ones relating 
to Intervention two othere need brief consideration:
Vietnam and domestic political considerations. The problem 
of Vietnam certainly preoccupied the %hest decision­
makers in the United States government at this time, and
there is strong evidence that Johnson,at least, linked the
81crisis in the Dominican Republic with that in Vietnam.
What, at any rate, is certainly true  is that Johnson took 
the critical decision for the military intervention in the 
Dominican Republic immediately a f te r  leaving a policy- 
making meeting on Vietnam. More important than Vietnam, 
however,/
79# (continued) States to any Latin American ooun.try - 
/32.1 compared to /13.4 for Chile, the nearest rival* 
Co-ordinating the United ^tates programme was a 
greatly increased embassy staff "rivalling only the 
one in Saigon for siKie and multiplicity of operations*
As in Vietnam of the Diem era, a U.S. counterpart was 
appointed for every major Dominican official".
Hlchard J. Bsjmet  ghe
J M iM i,..a S â jiâ fi-A îL J i3 â J 3 l^  v|ow York! m e
Woria Publishing OOEipany, 196877 p.177.
80* Throughout, the role of the O.A.S. was peripheral.
The unwillingness of the Latin Americans, as a group, 
to challenge the United ^tates violation of the non 
intervention norm of the inter-American system resulted, 
very early on, in conflict between Latin American 
states which, in its tu rn , served to reduce the possi­
bility of any effective independent O.A.S* action 
contrary to United States interests. Ultimately the 
O.A.8* was left to 'rubber stamp* United States initia­
tives without any enthusiasm* Significantly, although 
every Latin American state was asked to contribute 
troops to the Inter-American Peace Force, only seven 
did so, even though the resolution to establish such a 
'Force* had been approved by a 14-5*1 vote (Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay voted against, 
Venezuela abstained)* The states contributing to the/
however, were domestic political considerations. Martin 
puts this very well when he says
"Aside from the danger to U.S. lives, aside
from the question of whether a Oommimist-
dominated government would truly have
threatened our national security, I think
we could not permit it on the simple ground
that public opinion in the United States
would not have tolerated a second Cuba in
no
the 0 ar1bbean".
Johnson has been quoted as remarking, at the time of the 
intervention s
"When I do what I am about to do, there'll 
be a lot of people in this hemisphere I 
can't live with, but if I don't do it, 
there'll be a lot of people In this
country I can't live with".
Two/
80. (continued) the 'Force' were Brazil (1,113)5 Costa 
Hica (21)5 El Salvador (3-General Staff Officers)§ 
United States (10*900); Honduras (250); Nicaragua 
(I64); Paraguay (183). Figures for troops as of 
3-7-1963*
81. Arriving, in Washington on April 3Cth, Martin saw 
Johnson who stated that he did not intend "to sit here 
with my hands tied and let Castro take that island*
Vdiat can we do in TietnaBi if we can't clean up the 
DoailnicaM Republic?" Martin, ££s;ptj,]f^ .Jx,J52gnts,
p.661* A focus on the internal policy-making process 
at the time of the intervention indicates that Secretary 
of State, Rusk, and^Secretary of Defense, McNamara, 
played very minor roles, both being concerned with 
Vietnam. See Draper "The Dominican Intervention 
Recoilsidered", pp.9-13*
82. Martin, OmiLtafeeiLJx.JxglLtja. p.739
83. Charles Roberts, b.B.J.'s Inner Circle,. P.205 citefl 
in Slater, tiatlop. p. 199
i*wo central actors In the intervention thus felt Impelled 
to act, at least in some part, because of domestic factors# 
Also, as Goff and Looker have demonstrated, United States 
economic interests in the Dominican Republic were well 
represented in the upper echelons of the United States 
government#®^' The risk of taking noaction in the Dominican 
Republic therefore carried with it the probability of sig­
nificant domestic repercussions, irrespective of whether this 
was right or not#
United Grates policy to the Dominican Republic during this 
period was, quite clearly, multi-dimensional. Various 
strategies were applied ranging from mult Hater 0,1 co­
operation via the 0»A#B# to unilateral military intervention. 
Policy switched from support of conservative governments to 
support of a reformist government and then back again. 
According to circumstances in the Dominican Republic itself, 
and Latin America as a whole, the United States intervened 
to a, greater or leaser extent in Dominican polities# Yet, 
as different as these approaches may have been In practice, 
they all stemmed from one common belief held as 'axiomatic' 
in every administration - that there could be no second 
Cuba /
84* "The Violence of Dominations U#S, Rower and the 
Dominican Republic", pp#280-283* This is not"to 
imply economic interests as determinate but it is 
to recognise that the sugar corporations had been 
among the first, for obvious reasons, to oppose 
Oastro#. With the Johnson Administration possessing 
the benefit of hindsight, suggestions from represen­
tatives of sugar corporations, and in particular 
from those holding government jobs, that the 
Dominican Republic was 'another Cuba in the making* 
were bound to be heeded rather than rejected#
Cuba In the Caribbean. Anticipatory and/or retroactive 
regulation of the regional environment with which the 
Dominican polity interacted, plus the more traditional 
close association with Dominican affairs, being seen as 
necessary to prevent such a situation developing.
ÏHB EMEEQÎ5H0E OP HEW AC® OHS
The emergence of new actors within an international system 
as from the environment in which an International eyetern 
operates is generally held to be a proba,ble source of
OK
system change* Here this proposition is examined in the 
light of the emergence from within the system of the C.A.O.H, 
as a sub-regional actor, and the emergence f2*om the environ­
ment of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as two new inde­
pendent state actors poesessiong 'regional attî^ibutes * *
In the case study of the C*A,C*H* the focus will be on 
whether it oan truly be considered a sub-regional actor, 
and, if so, to what extent it has affected International 
politics in the region* In the ease study of Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago the focus will firstly be on their 
'regional potential*, and then on their evolving foreign 
policies in respect of the other Caribbean states*
The signing of the General Treaty on Central American 
Integration on the 13th December, I960, by El Salvadoaz, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, greatly accelerated 
the process of economic integration in Central America* 
Within/
85. See, for example, Andrew M. Soobt, .ÏÏk%.fmç:t4oBing
ew Yorks
She Macmiliaa Company, 1967), Chapter 2, particu­
larly p.36; and P.A. Eeynolds, An Ijrt^djKition to. 
laMmâiimmlJisi&kimâ (londons longnan, 1971,
Chaotor 11.
Within five years there wae a 316 percent increase in
regional trade - from p'32,675,000 in I960 to #135,976,000
in 1965 “ whloh began, at least partially to offset
86Central American dependence on world markets. Providing 
crucial support to this expansion was the institutionalis­
ation of the itegration programme in S.I.P.O.A., for this 
organ, more than any other, promoted the numerous confer­
ences covering every aspect of Central American life thereby 
generating £i Central American 'awareness*. Moreover, these 
conferences were themselves .frequently institutionalised in 
one form or another so that by 1965 not only were Central 
American governments participants in the integration 
programme, but also such interest groups as the Federation 
of Central Ameri can Chambers of Commerce and the Federation 
of Central American Associations and Chamber's of Industry. 
The political repercussions of this rapid increase of 
Central American interaction was felt most strongly in 
ODEOA the regional organisation for political integration. 
Thus following a re-examination of ODECA's rôle in the early 
sixties a new Charter was adopted at the end of 1962 in 
which the processes of economic and political integration 
were seen as being closely linked, with political inte­
gration to be stimulated by institutional Innovations and 
changea /
86. Inti^ a-Centrai American imports increased from 
6.4 percent of total trade in i960 to 18*4 per 
cent of total trade in 1966* Exports to the 
rest of the world were reduced from 92*4 per 
cent of total trade in I960 to 80*8 percent of 
total trade in 1965.
07
changea modelled on the G.A.G.M."' Panama also responded 
to the Inoreased Central American interaction by expanding 
its involvement in regional common service organisations 
and then, in 1963, by applying for "association" with the
AO
C#A*G#M* Beyond the region such purposive activity 
resulted in teolmioal assistance and aid being offered, 
principally by the United States which by early 1966 had 
funded more than 0Q3 million in support of the integration 
programme.
This growth of the has, however, had less effect
on Central American politics than might be thought. 
Political decision-makers at the national level have clevel- 
oped a regional response in only a few areas, the most 
noticeable/
87, Whereas the 1951 Charter of San Salvador establishing 
0*]),E#G#A, saw the goal of 0,D.E,0,A. as largel^ r * the 
union of five parts of one whole * the goal of the 
revised 0#D.E.C*A* was the achievement of an *economic• 
political commimlty*. Among the means to achieve 
this were annual Instead of biennial conferences of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, increased powers to the 
Secretary-General, and a new organ, the Executive 
Council, to meet weekly and be responsible for direc­
tion and co-ordination of policy, Seo Salo Engel 
"The New Charter of the Organisation of Central 
American States"
Vol*58; Ho#l., 19&4, and balo Engel, "The New 
0 ,xi. E. c.A. " ,
Vol,60, 140.4.5 W6Ê.
88. For Panama's role In Central America during this 
period see Felix Fernandez Shaw,
(Madrid: Ediolones
Cultura Î11span!oa 1964)#
noticeable being commmiism, where co-ordination of 
foreign policy in the O.A.S. and in the h . i l .  with respect 
to Cold War politics was paralleled by co-ordination of 
internal policy to counter guerrilla warfare*®® In 
other areas consensus was virtually non-existent except 
in th© broadest sense of seeing the C.A.C.M. as necessary 
for economic development - this to proceed with as little 
political authority being delegated .from the national level 
as possible*®® Indeed, it Is these two factors - 
nationalism and a limited view of the purpose of the 
C.A.C.M. - which have, more than any others, retarded the 
process of integration and restricted the ability of the 
C.A.C.M* to operate as a sub-regional actor* A focus 
on the attitude of Costa Rica to 'union* in Central 
America and the question of the Convention on Integrated 
Industries illustrates this particularly well*
Costa Rica has expressed a more cautious attitude towards 
'union* than any other Central American state,citing, 
among/
89» Co-ordination of foreign policy on the issue of
communism preceded the, development of the C.A.C.M. 
and therefore cannot be attributed to the C.A.C.M. 
What oan, however, at least in part, is the ease 
with which co-ordination was able to develop after 
1961 in the field of internal security, although, 
of course, the * threat* of Cuba and the interest of 
the United States in promoting such co-ordination 
were of greater importance* See John Saxe-Fexniandez 
"The Central American Defence Council and Pax 
Americana"*
90. Illustrated most strikingly by the fact that loading 
participants in the integration programme have 
differing opinions about when political union will be 
achieved - in 23 years according to Trabanino,
Secr0tary Genera1 of O.D.E.C.A.p but in 70-80 years, 
according to Luis Somoza, President of Nicaragua*
91. 'Isolationism* has been a constant theme of Costa 
Rica's history* Of the 25 conferences held on the 
question of 'union* from 1842-1951? Costa Rica /
among other factors, that the period of transition was 
not long enoughj that it would lose its industrial develop­
ment policy, and that the economies of the Central American 
countries were competitive, not complementary. Costa 
Rica refused to take part in the negotiations for the I960 
General Treaty and delayed ratification of the Treaty until 
23 September, 1963, when it became clear that it would lose
Dp
more by staying apart from, than by joining, the C.A.C.M.
A long period of delay also preceded the ratification of
Q'5
the new Charter of OBECA*'  ^ Particularly important here 
was the widespread belief of Costa Ricans that their poli­
tics were different from and superior to those of the other 
Central American countries and Panama.®^ Uncertain 
benefits flowing from the C.A.C.M. (due,in part, to distance 
from the focal point of economic integration - the Gulf of 
Fonseca),/
91. (continued) Costa Rica participated in just one-third 
whereas El Salvador and Honduras participated in nearly 
every one and Guatemala and Nicaragua in just a few 
less. T*L* Karnes, Ihr^^gf p pp.247-249
92. Other important reasons for the changed position in 
1963 were (a) deteriorating market prices of agricul­
tural products as a spur for re-evaluating 'pastoralism* 
as the basis for economic development, and (b) the 
return of a *pro-market* administration in the presiden­
tial election of 1962*
93. Ratification being on the 30th March, 1965, as compared 
to Guatemala - July 19th, 1963, El Salvador and 
Hondui'as August 23rd 1963, and Nicaragua - November, 
19th, 1963.
94. See Daniel Goldrich §ong_gf_t^3j^^
(Ohloago: Rand McNally
and Co. 1966); James 1. Busey No;b 
Demppiiagy (Univexusity of Colorado Studies: Series in
Bolftloal Science Ho.2., University of Colorado Press, 
1962), and James 1. Bueey "Foundations of Political 
Contrasts Costa Rica and Nicaragua" in R.D. Tomosek 
(ed)
25B
Fonseca), plus an attitude of political distinctlYenGss 
vis-a-vis the rest of Central America have thus served 
to perpetuate the traditional cautious approach and to 
provide the basis for a willingness to take unilateral 
action to defend Costa Rican interests even if such 
actions were contrary to the law or the spirit of the 
integration programme. A furtlier desire for the assertion 
of national identity by avoiding too close an association 
with Central America has been Costa Rican activity in 
promoting an extension of the integration programme to 
Panama, and then to the Caribbean as a whole*®® This 
policy was quite clearly linked to offsetting the two major 
disadvantages set out above by spreading the benefits of 
economic integration over a wider area and by introducing 
other 'democratic* two-party oriented politics into negotia­
tions for political union.
The Convention on Integrated Industries has been another 
source of contention. Originally drafted in 1958 to 
•balance* development it was ratified only after consider­
able delay* In 1966 Honduras was still maintaining a 
negative attitude on the grounds that it woxild receive 
fewer benefits from participation than would the other 
Central American states. Determining this attitude was a 
perception by Honduran decision-makers, in part borne out 
■by/
95. For example, Daniel Oduber, Costa Rica's foreign 
minister, spoke in favour of Caribbean countries 
joining the C.A.C.M. when on a visit to Jamaica 
in 1963.
by the facts, that Honduras was gaining the least from 
economic integration. Bo that, for example, while intra- 
Gentral American trade had increased enormously from 
1960-1965 this had been more rapid in industrial products, 
where Honduras was weak, than in agricultural products, 
where Honduras was strong.®^ Reinforcing this uneven 
pattern was the common external tariff which operated 
against Honduras by making it pay higher prices for region­
ally produced industrial goods than it had previously paid 
for the same goods from the United States, Less, but 
still significant opposition to the •scheme* came from El 
Salvador, this time from the opposite perspective that 
dispersal of industry throughout Central America would 
undermine its position as the major Central American pro­
ducer and trader in industrial goods, The same fear also 
motivated its opposition, with Guateimla, to Panamanian 
entry into the C.A.C.M,
A further crucial factor operating against the Integrated 
Industries scheme has been the opposition of the United 
States government on the grounds that the scheme was un­
necessary, likely to be aribtrary, and would create mono­
polies,®'^ /
96, A 532 percent increase in industrial goods, from 
/15,500,000 to /9B,000,000 as compared to a 108 
percent increase in agricultural prodaicts, from 
#15,872,000 to ^33,000,000.
97, Profitability of United States investment in the 
region was also almost certainly a factor. As 
a report submit ted to A. I,I), in 1963 by the 
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration 
pointed out "On the basis of profit data given to 
the researchers by various companies we would say 
that/
monopolies.®^ Such direct opposition to integration in 
Central America was, however, the exception and throughout 
this period United States policy to 'union* in Central 
America could he more properly characterised as one of 
'guarded support*. Thus a focus on regional integration - 
by 1966 the Regional Office of Central America and Panama 
was as large as any of the country missions - was counter­
balanced by a continued emphasis on bilateral aid.®® 
Similarly, financial support of regional organisations 
contrasted with the limited pressures towards increasing 
their effectiveness.®® In short, United ^tates policy 
acted to reinforce divisions as well as to promote 'union* 
in Central America .
What energeo is the fact that economic integration has 
not, by Itself, been sufficient to establish the O.A.G.H. 
as anything more than a marginal sub-regional actor. As 
well as promoting co-operation the C.A.C.M. can also be 
seen as having enhanced the possibility of conflict by 
creating /
97# (continued) that returns of 30 percent on net worth 
are fairly typical. This figure is further rein­
forced by the generally accepted rule of thumb that 
an investment should pay back within three years.
It is not too unusual to find companies with returns 
up to 75 percent and 100 percent of net wcr th".
GxtBâ in John 3?. McCamant,
Central America (Hew York: Frederick A. Praeger,
19^8), p.2831
98. From 1961-1965 some /300 million was given in bi­
lateral aid*
99* In 1965 O.D.E.C.A* received 60 percent of its blTdget 
from the United States but employed only 10 persons. 
Behind this, of course, was the desire of the United 
States to retain the O.A.S. as an instrument of its 
foreign policy by ensuring that the five 'favourable* 
votes of the Central American states were not reduced 
to less than that number by the growth of O.B.E.O.A. 
to a point where formalisation of arrangements between 
it and the O.A.B. was required#
creating new areas of contention#Regional economic 
development has not substituted for national development, 
aa is shown by the costly improvements to Pacific Ports 
by Guatemala and Honduras even though adequate ports 
already existed in El Salvador and Nicaragua; and by the 
retention of the right of each state to have an oil refin­
ery# In other fields economic integration has not been 
allowed to proceed at all, bo that although by 1966 the uni* 
form external tariff had been extended to 98 percent of all 
items in the tariff schedule, the remaining two percent 
represented thirty percent of total imports and between 
twentyfive percent to fortyfive percent of custom revenue# 
As Gary Wynia has pointed out, the effect of this has not 
been to create 'spill-over * but 'spill-aroimdS i*e# no
real political authority has been given but a multiplicity
103of functional agencies have been created*" ' Consequently,
it is not sm^pil sing that national politics in Central
3 OPAmerica have largely ignored the C.A.C.M# And that
internat1onal/
100. The ease of uneven development within the C.AAI.M.
as a stimulator of conflict is made by Tinoent Gable, 
"The 'Football War* and the 6entrai American Common 
Market" %&lsinat&a&&l^A22&&28, Vol.45, No#4., 1969.
101# Gary W# Wynia, "Central American Integrations The 
Paradox of Success".
Vol. 24, No*2#, 1970#
102, The C.A.C.M * was not, for example, an issue of the 
1966 presidential elections in Oce ta Rica and 
Guatemala# See John Tochelson, "V/liat Price 
Political Stability? The 1966 Presidential Campaign 
in OOP ta Elea" .
Vol. 5., No.l., 19é7; J.W. Sloan, "ïhe ig^FEreei-
dential Election in Guatemala" Inter-Amerioan
^°p22, 110.2.7 T5|8§ ana
dohnsosi,
— An Analy.Bis (Washington, h.O.s
Institute for the Comparative 'Study of Political 
Systems, 1967).
International politics in Central America and the region 
as a whole, as has already been established in Part iVo, 
have been only slightly changed, mainly in intensity and 
not direction of interaction*
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as 'New* State Actors
Earlier, it has been suggested that because Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago were not too dissimilar from the
other states of the region they qualified for inclusion
on the basis of a common setting* This is particularly
obvious if reference is made to size and underdevelopment*
As is shwon in Table Twentythree they must be considered
as small states with no great capability advantages or
disadvantages vis-à-vis all other states in the region
except for Ouba* The strategies open for each state to
follow are thus identical with the other states of the
region - a situation reflected in their recent history by
the continuing debate on the merits and consequences of
10 "5differing types of alliances and political unions*" In 
degree and kind of underdevelopment both are analogous to 
the other states of the region* The historical dominance 
of /
103* At least as far as Trinidad and Tobago was 
concerned, this debate still flourished in 
1968. In that year, at an address given 
to the Institute of International Eolations, 
University of the West Indies, Brio Williams 
referred to three radically different alter­
native forms of external alignment then under 
consideration by his government*
TâBIiB TIOTTY-THREB
Some Regional 'Attributes' of Jamaloa 
and Trinidad and Tobago
'Jirlnldad and 
Jamaica Tobago
Area (Kilometres) 10,962 5,128
Population (1963) 1,698,000 924,000
O.N.P. (1965) #810,000,000 #618,000,000
Exporte f.o.b. #220,000,000 #403,000,000
# Sxports/O.H.P. 27.2?S 65.2^
Armed forces 1,500 1,000
Sources: IJ*1* Statist leal Y ear Book, 1968 (Hew
York: Statistical Office of the United
Hâtions 1969) Tables 18 and 151: Wood,
America Tables 1 and 2
of the plantation economy has been particularly strong 
and the simple two-sector model still offers an adequate 
explanation of their economies and indicates the same 
development needs as elsewhc-^ re in the region. The only 
two divergent factors - the significance of the extractive 
sector as against the agricultural sector and the exis­
tence of several major outlets for trade - are balanced 
by the fact that the productive sector Is integrated with 
one or more external s t a t e s I n  accordance with the
criteria/
104, In Jamaica, 1962, 13 percent of the Gross Domestic 
Product derived from agriculture and 9 percent 
from mining* The figures for Trinidad and Tobago 
were 10 percent and 29 percent respectively. 
Jamaica's ex|3orts for I960 went to Britain - 31 
percent and the United States - 26 percent and 
Canada - 24 percent. For Trinidad and Tobago 
the figures were 31 percent, 20 percent and 5 
percent respectively.
criteria developed to draw up Table Seventeen It ie 
therefore possible to suggest a close apprend mation 
by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to the Meal Type' 
for the 'particular indicators' of 'Size' and 'Under- 
development'«
.Less obvious is the extent to which Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago correspond to the two other 'particular indi­
cators'* With reference to the 'Internal Political 
Characteristics' indicated it is generally accepted that 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean the military remain essen­
tially involved in politics and that political instability 
and violence have been inconsequential*^®'^ At the same 
time the importance of personalism in immediate pre­
independence and x f^>st-independence politics has been 
recognised, particularly by Gingham who argues that the 
colonial heritage and small size of the territorels in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean have created, and are liable to 
perpetuate, personalist forms of government#^®^ This has 
certainly been true of Trinidad where, since 1956, Eric 
Williams has been, a force in shaping events* The same can 
also be said of Alexander Bustamante and Norman Manley in 
Jamaica* With reference to 'The Preponderance of the 
United /
105* The observation on political instability and violence 
is a reference only to the period under review*
Prior to independence, political instability and 
violence were a consistent featmze of the colonial 
system, and of late political instability and 
violence have re-appeared in the politics of both 
states*
106. A.V/. SIngham, Ihe„Hej?o_^d.^e_C3^wO
Polity (lew Havens Yale University Press, 1968), 
ppT353-530 passim*
United ^^ tates* indicator the overall strategic and
political interests of the United States In the region
ensured that the limitations on the exercise of state
power outlined in the military and political dimensions
of this indicator would also apply to Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago# Immediately both states gained independence
the British government relinquished responsibility for
their defence and emphasised that the question of external
alliance now rested on arrangements between either state
3 07and the United States. Thus from the beginning
political decision-makers in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago were made aware, above all, that it would be the 
attitude of the United States which would count in the 
fields of defence and foreign affairs# Significantly, 
within a year of independence Jamaica had signed a defence 
agreement with the United States and followed the general 
regional policy of hostility towards Ouba#^^^ Trinidad 
and Tobago, however, was more cautious, partly because 
the already existing defence arrangements with the United 
States - the use of air and naval facilities at Chaguaramas- 
was an * explosive* domestic issue, and partly because 
distance from Cuba made the question less m?gent than in 
Jamaica. Nevertheless, in 1963 Williams went out of his 
way to make a strong condemnation of the Cuban experiment# 
These/
107* Speech of the Marquess of Lansdowne, Under Secretary 
for foreign Affairs, to the House of lords, July —  
1962, cited in Hispanic Amex*loan Report. Vol.15.,
Ho.7*, p.615.
108* Although no diplomatic relations with Cuba were 
established the presence in Cuba of some 25,000 
Jamaicans working mainly as field labourers meant 
that a Consulate was maintained.
These expressions of conformity with United States *norms * 
for the region w ere rewarded, and underpassed, hy an 
increasing inflow of United Utates private and public 
investment. Jamaica was the immediate beneficiary with 
such companies as U.P#0.0* and Kaiser Bauxite announcing 
expansion of their programmes, and such international 
agencies as A.I.D. and lOT announcing loans for develop- 
Trinidad and Tobago was only fractionally less 
quick on the uptake and by the end of 1963 substantial 
A.I.D* loans had been secured and Texaco was expanding 
its range of operations. ' Evolution towards an 
économie dependence on the United States similar to that 
of other states in the region was thus becoming an increa­
sing possibility, p a r t ic u la r ly  as Bustamante and Williams 
actively sought increasing United States investment for 
what has been characterised as a strategy of "industrial­
isation by invitation". Bellowing the same procedure as 
before it is thus possible to suggest a partial approxima­
tion by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to the * ideal type* 
for the *particular indicators* of 'Internal Political 
Characteristics* and *The Preponderance of the United 
States*•
109. In December 1962 U.F.C.O. announced a new 02 
million investment in bananas, and in May 1963, 
Kaiser Bauxite announced a /10§ million expansion 
programme. In October 1963, for example, a 
credit of 03 million from the I.M.f. - Export 
Import Bank was approved for Jamaica*s Develop- 
meiit *Blnanoe 0orporation#
110. In May 1963 Texaco announced the move of its head- 
quarters for Batin America from Venezuela to 
Trinidad, and in June 1964, opened a new 0AS 
million lubricating oil plant* In September 1963, 
for example, a United States A.I.D. grant for 03 
million was secured.
The sum of tho ovidenoe in the above two paragraphs 
suggests that a ease can he made for claiming that 
from 1962-1966 Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago possessed 
regional, but not core, potentiel* The focus on the 
rest of this case study extends this conclusion by 
examining the regional aspects of their foreign policies.
The overall foreign policy of Jamaica has been static 
and cautious* designed to consolidate existing relations 
with Britain and the United States rather than seek alter­
natives. By way of direct contrast the overall foreign 
policy of Trinidad and Tobago has been dynamic and 
aggressive, as much designed to seek alternatives as to 
consolidate existing relations* As might be expected, 
then, Trinidad and Tobago has had a much deeper involvement 
in regional affaire than has Jamaica. Thus it was 
Trinidad and Tobago which first initiated serious moves 
towards co-operation with Batin America and towards co­
ordination of policy in the Oommonwealth Caribbean*
Jamaica either followed on much later or remained aloof.
Trinidad’s approach towards Latin America was founded on
economic interest. Much of the wealth of the country
derives from oil and oil refining, with Venezuela playing
a major rèle as the supplier of crude oil for refining in 
111Trinidad , prior to export to the United States. The 
importance/
111* The importance of Venezuelan oil can be guaged 
by pointing out that in 1961, 24.7 percent of 
Trinidad's total imports were from Latin America 
(chiefly Venezuela) as against 3.2 percent of its 
total exports.
importance of t'hie Venezuelan connection meant that even 
before independence Williams was discussing with Venezuela 
such matters as delimiting territorial waters, illegal 
immigration, fishing, contraband and discriminatory trade 
practices. While after independence Williams quickly 
went ahead to cement relations between the W o  states by 
announcing that he would be establishing an embassy in 
Caracas and be visiting Venezuela at the invitation of its 
government. Minor disputes sometimes occurred - one 
broke out over fishing in May-June 1964 - but on the whole 
harmonious relations prevailed and in the end gestures of 
goodwill by Williams, such as denying the use of Trinidad 
as a base for Venezuelan left-wing movements, were reci­
procated by the Venezuelan government, particularly by 
the abolition in 1965 of the 30 percent surtax imposed on 
products originating from the independent Oommonwealth 
Caribbean. By 196? relations between the two governments 
were on such a firm footing that a Mixed Commission was set 
up to study a whole range of problems associated with
Trinidad's economic development in relation to Latin 
11PAmerica*
For Jamaica, there appeared to be no overwhelming reason 
why close relations should be established with any Latin 
American state* Trade with Latin America was negligible 
and /
112. Terras of reference included the preparation of 
Trinidad's participation in Latin America 
integration schemes, expansion of tra d e ,  
tourism, migration and joint planning in Indus* 
trlalieation.
and matters relating to the oare of Jamaican migrant 
workers in Cuba, Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama were 
organised mainly through the British embassies in those 
countries Therefore, not until Nov ember 1963 did
Jamaica indicate it would seek to open a diplomatic post 
in Batin America and not until 1966 was such a post 
e s t a b l i s h e d * T h u s , as with Trinidad, economic 
factors directed Jamaica's policy to Batin America, 
although, unlike Trinidad, these were of a negative rather 
than a positive kind* The pattern of relations established 
with external powers was seen as of overwhelming importance 
and not to be jeopardised in any way by 'arrangements' with 
Batin America•
This very limited and highly specific interest of Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago in Batin America did not go unnoticed by 
the Batin American states. Reaction by them to moves from 
Jamaica/
1115* In 1961 Jamaica sent only 0.10 percent of its total 
exports and received only 2.0 percent of its total 
imports from Batin America. Migrant Jamaican 
labourers occasionally became a political issue as 
in August 1963e when the Cuban authorities refused 
permission for a Jamaican team, to visit Cuba to 
investigate allegations of maltreatment towards 
Jamaicans. Otherwise little was heard about them.
114. An embassy was opened in Mexico. In 1965 Jamaica 
had accredited diplomatic and consular relations 
with the following Batin American states - Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, .Haiti, Panama and Venezuela. This was 
less than Trinidad which, in the same year, had 
accredited diplomatic and consular relations with 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Hiea, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Peru 
and Venezuela.
115* In particular, closer 'arrangements' with Batin 
America were seen as acting against Jamaica's 
attempts to seciure, following a British entry into 
the European Economic Community, either association 
with the E.E.O. or continued access to the Common­
wealth preference system.
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to join the 0.A.8# were
generally unfavourable and for over two years the question
316of their membership was " s h e l v e d * . When finally it 
had to be resolved the Latin American states sought to
117
impose stringent conditions for entry." In so doing, 
they asserted that their interest in Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago centred around the form of internal government 
in the Oommomwealth Caribbean states and the comprehensive­
ness of the collective security s^^em in the hemisphere.*^’^ ^ 
Territorial disputes were an additional issue for Argentina, 
Guatemala and Venezuela all of whom added reservations to 
the Act of Washington to the effect that their assent to 
the Act in no way compromised or set aside their claims, 
respectively, to the Falkland Islands, British Honduras 
(Belize) and Guyana. This "narrow* and in some senses 
"nationalist" viewpoint of the Latin American states 
undoubtedly dampened enthusiasm for the O.A.S* in Jamaica 
and/
116» That is, from May 16th 1962, to November 4th 1964 
the question was "under study’ by the O.A.S. 
Frustration at this delay is said to have created 
the possibility, from October 3.964, of Trinidad 
and Tobago complaining to the U.H. that the O.A.S* 
was unable to fulfil its role as a regional 
organisation by failing to provide rules for the 
admission of new members.
117. The leading advocate of such action being Guatemala 
which, from early on, had mounted the most persis­
tent and vociferous opposition to Jamaica or Trinidad 
joining the O.A.S.
118. By emphasising that Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Charter of the O.A.S. established obligations wTtth 
respect to collective security in the hemisphere - 
an inference that Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
should also become signatories to the Hio Treaty.
This viewpoint was underlined and recorded in the 
Act of Washington by statements from Ecuador,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
and Trinidad who saw their entry, anyhow, primarily in 
terms of access to inter-American aid programmes other­
wise denied them# Thus it was not imtil 1957 that 
Triuidad joined the O.A.S. and not until 1969 in the case 
of Jamaica#
With the failure of the West Indies Federation a recent 
hitter memory for the leading political decision-makers 
of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tohago, relations between the 
two states after independence were slow in developing.
Trade between them was minimal so that vhien, in February 
1953s Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago agreed to exchange 
High Oommissioxiers this was essentially a political act.^^^ 
Following this Williams again took the initiative in 
promoting clearer regional relations and in July, 1953, 
the first West Indian "summit conference* met in Trinidad 
attended by the prime ministers of Barbados, Guyana,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago* At this conference 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago agreed to work for closer 
regional co-operation, but significantly, nothing had been 
achieved by the time the second West Indian * summit 
conference* met in Jamaica in January, 1964* Here again 
broad resolutions were passed but no specific steps towards 
regional co-operation taken. Indeed, it was not until 
December /
119. In 1951 Jamaica sent only 2.8 percent of its 
total exports and received only 5.17 of its 
total imports from the Oommonwealth Caribbean. 
The figures for Trinidad and Tobago were 6.8 
percent and 2.26 percent respectively*
I «L.
December 1965 that "an area of functional co-operation" 
was created with the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement between 
Antigua, Barbados and Guyana# and not until mid-1968 that 
all the major Commonwealth Caribbean states were co­
operating in one regional organisation - the Caribbean 
Free Trade Association,
What is quite clear is that the possession of regional 
potential by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago did not auto­
matically make them participants in regional interaction. 
Some interest as to the nature of the relationship between 
the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America was in evi­
dence, but this was only of secondary importance to all 
interested parties* Likewise, regional co-operation 
among Commonwealth Caribbean states was a low priority.
For Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, then, independence 
meant no radical break from the pattern of relations with 
the region established by the departing colonial power 
but only the modification of this pattern in accordance 
ivith the new realities of United States power. Insofar 
as this required membership of the O.A.S. and moves towards 
regional integration then Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
would comply. Otherwise their regional policy, except in 
a few instances, can be described as "one of casual acknow­
ledgment ".
The conclusion must be that neither the O.A.O.M. nor 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago had any great impact on 
the/
the international politics of the region during this
period. Certain hopes for greater regional co-operation
were raised, it is true, hy their entry into regional
politics, hut nationalism and the previous patterns of
interaction effectively braked movement in this direction.
Only in those areas of mutual interest where the United
States was anxious to see co-operation and/or integration
develop - such as in the field of internal security - did
IPOit proceed without hindrance. “ This again serves to 
focus attention on the centrality of the United States rule 
in the region in general, and on its attitude towards Cuba 
in particular. Compared to the transformation of the 
system wrought by this dynamic the changes induced by the 
C.A.C.M. and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago appear very 
marginal indeed.
120, Co-operation on internal security in Central 
America was, as has already been seen, fairly 
well advanced. Linton, in reviewing the 
regional diplomacy of the Oommonwealth 
Caribbean from 1962-1970 comments that "It is 
regrettable that the closest co-operation so 
far is in the field of internal security - 
the integration of police and political security 
activities - integration to defend the interests 
of the ruling elites or of the incumbent govern­
ments". See his "Regional Diplomacy of the 
0ommonwea1th Garibbean” International Journal, 
Vol.26, Ho.2., 1971, p.417
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Some Conclusions on International Politics 
in the Caribbean 1959*^ 1966
International politics in the Caribbean from 1946-1958 
have been considered as essentially an expression of two 
theories - the political basis of most regional inter­
action and the prevalence within regional interaction of
12 3extra-regional factors# Insofar as both theories
continued to influence international politics from 1959- 
1966 a certain continuity as regards patterns and aspects 
of international politics is recognisable. However, 
beyond this were a number of new distinctive developments 
which, while not fundamentally transforming patterns of 
interaction, did serve to modify them* In increasing 
order of importance these developments can be seen as 
the introduction of a new dimension into regional politics 
by an evolving emphasis on economic development# the 
transformation of a major form of regional interaction 
following the gradual replacement of subversive inter­
vention, by guerrilla warfare# and the extreme accentua­
tion of the involvement of extra-regional actors as the 
United States extended 'penetration* to counter the 
Intrusion of Gold War politics into the region.
From/
121. See my earlier section "Some Conclusions on 
International Politics in the Caribbean, 
1946-1958*.
From 1959-1966 accelerating extra-regional trade and 
economic co-operation in Central America, and more 
generally the increase in United Spates economic aid to 
Latin Amerioa, under the Alliance for Frogress, sharply 
brought into focus for all Caribbean states, the need to 
fully incorporate economic objectives into foreign 
policy. Increasing the scope of regional interaction 
such ’valuable" economic activity also acted as a con­
straint on idiosyncratic decision making in foreign policy 
by widening the circle of advisers each president would 
need before embarking on any course of action, and adding 
to the range and size of repercussions following any 
action* Greater stability and rationality in regional 
politics was thus indirectly encouraged. At the same 
time, though, chances of conflict were also enhanced as 
disputes over economic development became a possibility, 
particuarly as new groups consequent upon economic develop* 
sent but with an ideology of nationalism entered the 
political process* During the early 1960’s, then, the 
basis of far-reaching changes in Caribbean international 
politics was being laid, although up to 1966 these were 
not felt in any marked way as recognition of the economic
dimension required only a limited adjustment over time
122within the existing decision-making process* In
terms /
122. In was thus not until 1969, with the ’football 
war* between El Salvador and Honduras, that 
major conflict stemming from economic and 
nationalist factors broke out.
terms of overall Interaction between states, economic 
criteria therefore supplemented rather tlian supplanted 
political criteria and intensified rather than radically 
altered previous patterns of interaction.
As a distinctive expression of environmental factors in 
the Caribbean, subversive intervention has been a consistent 
feature of the international politics of the region. This 
has led to the widespread acceptance of a view-point 
considering it as the single most significant factor in 
the creation of regional instability. Generally over­
stressed, such an analysis does apply, however, to brief 
periods, such as during 1959 when exiles and governments 
in the Caribbean responded to the success of Castro in 
Cuba by planning and launching a number of invasions.
After 1959f though, there was a sudden drop in the scale 
of this type of activity and by the mid-1960*s it was 
very infrequent. Replacing it, as the form of extra-legal 
opposition, was the model of guerrilla warfare - a change 
with an immediate and long-term impact on regional inter­
action. For whereas subversive interventionhad been 
subject to some degree of regulation by Caribbean govern­
ments guerrilla movements operated independently of govern­
ments and without reference to the established pattern of 
politics among states in the region* In addition, the 
theory and practice of guerrilla warfare constituted a 
direct and total challenge to all existing elites in the 
region - a situation which did not arise with subversive 
intervention given the essentially elitist basis of this 
form/
form of political action in the Caribbean. The develop­
ment of guerrilla warfare, in contrast to subversive 
intervention, thus introduced the promise of radical change 
in the domestic and international politics of the region. 
And, insofar as it gained strength to become the dominant 
form of extra-legal opposition, developed into a central 
issue. To this/ elites in the Caribbean responded in 
three ways. First, seeing Cuba as the direct instigator 
of guerrilla movements in Latin America, they argued that 
it was necessary to go beyond the policy of the interdic­
tion of Cuba by aiming at direct armed intervention in 
Cuba. Secondly, they organised among themselves, a 
number of meetings, formal and informal, to discuss methods 
of countering guerrilla warfare by - joint military operations 
between states and tighter internal security within each 
state. Thirdly, they invited the United States to commit 
itself to greater military aid in the region in the hope 
of finding a military solution to the problem* In sum, 
then, the decline of subversive intervention and the rise 
of guerrilla movementa: in the Caribbean were closely 
related - the total effect being to partially alter the 
pattern of conflict by shifting the dynamic focus of 
conflict from among a few states to only one state, Cuba
The developments outlined in the two preceding paragraphs 
are/
123. See my earlier section "Hypothesis Twos Conflict 
and Polarisation* in Part Two.
123
are closely related to the third change - the accentuation 
of the involvement of extra-regional actors• This can 
he shown quite clearly if the trend of conflict within the 
region is analysed in terms of a scheme drawn up hy Rosenau 
to study internal war. " In this he distinguishes between 
three types of conflict - ’personnel wars*, ’authority wars’, 
and ’structural wars* - according to the goals which the
1 pq
contending forces are perceived as pwsuing."'"' Kosenau 
then goes on to demonstrate that each type of conflict 
generates a specific series of responses# and that with 
’authority* and ’structural’ conflict there is a greater 
likelihood of external intervention than with ’personnel’ 
conflict.Applying this analysis to the situation in 
the Caribbean it is particularly obvious that developments 
after/
124# James h. Rosenau "Internal War as an International 
Event" in James N. Rosenau (ed) Internat!ona1 
Aspep/CB Qfpivll Strife (Princeton N.J.s Princeton 
University fresa, 1964J#
125* "Personnel wars are those which are perceived as being
fought over the occupancy of existing roles in the
existing structure of political authority, with no 
aspiration on the part of the insurgents to alter 
either the substructures of the society or its major 
domestic and foreign policies..*.
Authority wars are those which are pc^^ceived as being 
fought oyer the arrangement (as well as the occupancy)
of the roles in the structure of political authority,
but with no aspiration on the part of the insurgents 
to alter either the other substructures of society or 
its major domestic and foreign policies*...
Structural wars are those which are perceived as being 
not only contests over personnel and the structure of 
political authority, but also as struggles over other 
substructures of the society (such as the system of 
ownership, the educational system, etc.) or its major 
dome Stic*" and foreign policies...*" Ibid, p.63
126. Ibid. pp.63-81
after 1959 directly anticipate an increase in ’authority’ 
and ’structural’ conflict (alongside a decrease in 
’personnel* conflict) and that, therefore, the probable 
outcome is greater external intervention than before.
That is, independently of the will to intervene by external 
actors conditions in the region inviting external inter­
vention were being constructed.
With this, of course, must be considered the repercussions 
following the movement of Cuba away from the United States 
and towards the Soviet Union. For inasmuch as this was a 
development directly introducing the Soviet Union as an 
extra-regional state with ’concrete* Caribbean interests,
i.e. insofar as the Monroe Doctrine was fundamentally 
challenged and the Cold War made a reality in Latin America, 
then so was the will of the United States to intervene in 
the Caribbean dramatically increased. Supporting this 
trend, and making it more likely, was a basic change in 
United States Caribbean policy* That is, the United 
States policy of self-regulation by Caribbean decision­
makers was now judged as carrying unacceptable risks if 
the policy should fail. Consequently, it was set aside 
to be replaced by the previous ’fall back’ policy of 
intervention as the first and only policy for the Caribbean. 
This meant, of necessity, some changes in the style of inter­
vention. In addition to being retroactive Intervention was 
now to be preventative, and in addition to being supportive 
of/
of the status quo it was also, according to circumstances, 
to be towards promoting limited changes. It also meant, 
being a conscious attempt by the United States to direct 
the politics of the region, further penetration by the 
United States and allied agencies* 9)he final result of 
all this WEB that regional international politics, more 
than ever, reflected the interests and the pre-occupations 
of the United ^tates rather than those of the Caribbean 
Bta tes thems eIve
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While no new patterns of foreign policy fully emerged 
during this period to replace the ’Traditional Pattern* 
enough new developments occurred to suggest that the 
system was being transformed from within and from without. 
The exact direction of this transformation was not at all 
clear by mid-1956 but of particular note as future deter­
minants of this were the incorporation of economic and 
security aspects, alongside political aspects, as a basis 
for regional interaction# and the lessening "autonomy* of 
the region's politics as the United States, in particular, 
emphasised its Interest in the total development of the 
Caribbean.
127. Thus, at the extensively publicised meeting between 
the fresidents of Central America, Panama and the 
United States - the Ban Joso Conference of 18.3*1953 - 
the United States insisted on discussing the Alliance 
for Progress and economic integration in Central 
America rather than the question of Cuba, even though 
all the other participants, particularly Guatemala 
and Nicaragua, felt that the question of Cuba should 
be central.
OOHaiiüSlOIB
Kalman Silvert préfacés Ills summation of a number of 
essaya treating of the present problems of the Common­
wealth, European and Hispanic Caribbean with the remark;
"If it is true that only inane generalis­
ations hold equally for the 30-odd 
Caribbean political units of which this 
book treats, it is also true that seeing 
each one as unique is intellectual laziness
that can only impede understanding and
3policy decision*"
He thus raises in a Caribbean context and for a related 
discipline - comparative political analysi8 - a central 
problem of this study* That is, to what extent can 
generalisations on the foreign policies of Caribbean states 
with respect to one another be made when it has been shown 
that these foreign policies are complex and diverse# 
depend on factors outside the region as well as within the 
region# and are in a process of transformation. Unsatis­
factory as it is the ’best* solution appears to be the one 
followed by Silvert in his similar dilemma# auimely to 
list the most significant generalisations that apply more 
rather than, less to the area, and then proceed to comment 
briefly on particular individual states.
1, Kalman H, Silverts "The Caribbean and North 
America" in Tad Szulo (ed) The United States 
and the Caribbean (EnglewoodCliffs/ New 
% r s eyri^rentioe Hall Inc#, 1971 ) $ p. 193.
Some General Characteristics;
ii# ### ! :u i i i i t f— i «iimmmiH *.';'; ,* i i„m i4 w ,  mw'ii»: umiwif f irii
The first, and perhaps most significant generalisation,
relates to the structure of the Caribbean as compared to
South America. A point frequently made with reference
to Latin American international politics Is that all
states operate on a rough basis of party in terms of
power, and all states are subject to United States 
2influence. This is true, but only at the level at
which Latin America, as a region, is compared to other 
regions. If the focus is narrox^ ed to within Latin 
America, differences are readily discernible, so that it 
is possible to assert confidently that only in the 
Caribbean region are states clearly operating with an 
equality of capabilities whilst simultaneously being 
subject to intervention from the United States in all 
its aspects - influence, power, force and authority.
Taken singly, these two structural characteristics should 
have led to frequent coalition formation in the ease of 
equality of capabilities, and the suppression of coalition 
formation by hierarchical tendencies in the case of 
hegemony. However, combined, the structural character­
istics are in contradiction - hence a factor in creating 
tension/
2. See Carlos A, Aetiz "The Latin American Countries 
in the International System", George I. Blanksten 
"Foreign Policies in Latin America" in R. Haeridis 
( ea) (Englewooa
Cliffs, Hew cierseys Prentice hall inc. 3rd editxo] 
1967)# Robert H, Burr, (^ r.__Trat^ 3.ed. Hemisphgrg:
U#t_ed Stato8-Latln Amerioah
Relations Chapter 45 and Fred Parkinson "Latin 
American Foreign Policies" in Claudio Veliz (ed)
C-Uondons Anthony Blond 1968).
tenBion in the Caribbean, Also, they one lire that the 
foreign policy orientation of meet Car'ibbean states will 
be similar among them yet distinct from that of the South 
American states, including Mexico,
The second generalisation revolves around the consequences 
of economic underdevelopment - a condition which asserts 
its own priorities on foreign policy in terms of the need 
for access to the markets and resources of developed 
countries, For the Caribbean this has followed a particu­
lar pattern, That is, in so far as Caribbean countries 
produce similar products for the same dominant market and 
are at an approximately equal stage of underdevelopment 
(thus requiring the same scale and type of * aid * - this 
from primarily one’donor* state) so does the need for 
differentiation among them become imperative as a means of 
securing favourable treatment from the ’target* state* In 
other words, for Caribbean states the close liii2c between 
their economic underdevelopment and the United States is 
a source of inter-state competition in the region. It is 
also, quite obviously* a determining factor in strength­
ening the hegemony of the United States and ensuring a 
pro-United States orientation in any Caribbean states 
foreign policy.
The third generalisation concerns a particular textural 
feature of the Caribbean with implications for the nature 
of/
3. Sqq Gustavo Lagos
âfâlX»ââZâg£ÊMBSâmS2SSElââ. p.bpissim
of interaction in the region* it 18* espeoiaiiy* a
reference to the nature of the political imitk in the
I a
Caribhean, That la, to the fact that although real
diatlnetiona can be made between the types of molltic 
Caribbean, That la, to the fact that althouglx real
distinctions can be made betiveen the types of ÿ^olitical
' \
systems in the Caribbean, common to all are personalist 
forms of government and continuing political inst&bility. 
The former directly leads to particularisation of 'issues 
and unpredictability of actions, and the latter enl'iahces 
the already low adaptability (because of structural^ 
conditions) of each state to the envlronment * The I sum 
of this has been an Indifferent practice of diplomacy 
aiming at modification of state action througji environ­
mental manipulation and a strong emphasis on diplomacy 
focussing on the decision-making system of any Caribbean 
state* The foreign policies of Caribbean states have thus 
been expressly designed to have an impact on the domestic 
affaire of other states in the region* In short, inter­
ventionist polities have become the ’norm* of regional 
international politics and are, in theory and practice.
underwritten by ’rules* - specifically those relating to 
the 3 
end/
right of insurrection and the right of asylumf The
4* Article 175, for example, of the 1950 Constitution
of El Salvador, recognised "the right of insurrection" 
providing that "it is not used so as to bring about 
the abrogation of laws", Inter-American laxf with 
respect to political asylum has been codified in the 
Convention on Asylum (Havana, 1928), the Convention 
on Political Asylum (Montevideo 1933), the Convention 
on Diplomatic Asylum (Caracas, 1954) and the 
Convention on Territorial Asylum (Caracas, 1954)*
end product, inevitably, has been the encouragement of 
mistrust between govermaeits and the frequent outbreak of 
verbal, if not actual, conflict* Periodic ’crises’ are 
thus guar ant e ed *
The fourth generalisation relates to the influence of the 
international system by which is meant, primarily, the 
involvement of the United States and the 0*A*S* in the 
Oaribbean. The former is, of course, by far the most 
significant and has, over time, become more rather than 
less, pronounced* References to the Caribbean as an 
’American Mediterranean’ or a'deep, "deep South"'being, 
in this sense,not particularly misleading* Certainly 
penetration by the United States of Caribbean political 
systems or the exercise of direct unilateral intervention, 
has now come to be regarded by many in the United States 
as ’legitimate’*^  The consequences are, as Lewis and 
8Ingham point out, that the United States
"is reluctant to consid er the Caribbean 
as constituting do facto a subject of 
foreign policy making*"^
Or more precisely, the ability of any Caribbean state to 
sustain /
5* This is conclusively affirmed in Resolution 550 
of the House of Representatives, which approved 
unilateral military intervention in the Western 
Hemisphere (The Resolution was adopted by 312-52 
votes on the 20*9*1955) And in the exchanges in 
"We have the Sovereign Right to Protect our 
Investors Abroad" - "A Case and a Commentary" in 
Marvin D. Bernstein (ed) Foreign Investment in 
Latin America; Gases and Attitudes*
6* V,A, Lewis and A*W* SIngham "Integration, Domination 
and the Small State Systems the Caribbean", p.140»
sustain a regional foreign policy is dependent on the 
degree of coincidence of this policy with United States 
interests* In other words, Caribbean decision-makers, 
if they are rational and if they wish their policies to 
succeed, must make considerable allowances for incorpora­
ting United States responses into their contemplated 
action* Anticipation of ’feedback* from possible O.A.S* 
intervention must also be taken into account. The formu­
lation and execution of regional foreign policies is thus 
dependent to a marked degree on the expected and actual 
reactions of external (quasl-regional) actors*
Finally, a fifth generalisation can be stated by focussing 
within the region on a ranking of stntes determined by 
levels of regional interaction* Two points in particular 
stand out* One is that the level of G*K,P. is related 
to the level of interaction* Thus Oaribbean states with 
a high G.H.P, have high level interaction, those with 
middle range G.U.P. tend to have middle range interaction,
7
and those with low G.H.P, have a low level of interaction.
The other is that the G-.N.P. is related to the influence
of geography - or more precisely, distance* Thus,
Caribbean states with high G.l.P. are loss influenced by
geography as a determinant of direction and level of inter-
8action than those with a low level of G.N.P. However, 
there /
7* See Table 6 and Table 18*
0* See Table 6 and Table 22*
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there appears to he no di3?ect correspondence between 
these two features, so that, for example, If profiles 
are drawn of eaoh state’s Interaction in the region 
then the most nearly similar profiles - B1 Salvador 
and Costa Rica, and Haiti and the Dominican Republic « 
emphasise on3.3?‘ one aspect - respectively, similarity 
of G.H.P. level and geographic adjacency* At the same 
time, many of those states which theoretically should 
show different profiles are, at points, similar* The 
profile of Cuba and Panama after 1958 is an example 
here# Consequently, it is possible to suggest, though 
only tentatively, that the regional foreign policy of a 
Caribbean state, like the foreign policies of many other 
states, depends in part on the économie resources it can 
command and the states it can reach.
Relative to other states in the region Cuba possesses 
the greatest number of attributes for emergence as the 
’leader’ state of the region. Of note, however, is that 
it has never attempted to do so - either before or after 
the revolution. Instead, its focus has, historically, 
been on Latin America as a whole, with, of late, an 
emphasis on the peoples of Africa and Asia as well. The 
challenge by the Cuban government to the hegemony of the 
United States in the Caribbean after 1959 io therefore an 
expression of a wider anti-imperialist policy in which 
the Caribbean is seen as one small, integral, but not 
very important, part*
C 0 5
The interest of Haiti in the Oaribbean, the Dominican 
Republic excepted, has been minimal. A number of reasons 
can be advanced for this but, in particular, the different 
socio-economic conditions in Haiti as compared to the 
Hispanic Oaribbean seem especially important, This has 
resulted, under Duvalier, in a stress on ’negritude* and 
the search for linlcs with Africa rather than a focus on 
the Caribbean. At first by force of c i3?cumstances, and 
then by design, Haiti has thus remained ’outside’ the 
region - a recipient rather than an initiator of Oaribbean 
interaction.
Exploitation of the symbolic value of the Canal for the 
purpose of revision of the Canal Treaty has constituted 
the essence of Panama’s approach to Latin America since 
World War Two. The support of the Caribbean states in 
the pursuit of this goal ^ hae been solicited (and has been 
forthcoming), but, for obvious reasons, Panama has 
concerned itself with mobilizing opinion in the larger 
South American states. This imbalance of interest was 
redressed somewhat in the early 1960’s when both the 
Cuban Revolution and the emergence of the C.A.C.M. spelt 
possible changes in Panama’s relations with the United 
States. The point to note, however, is that no genuine 
reorientation of foreign policy followed this so that, 
in effect, Panama’s traditionally ambivalent attitude to 
South America and the Caribbean continued as before.
The /
zyu
The foreign polioiee of the other eix states in the 
Cari'bhean region - Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Gm-temala, Honduras and Nicaragua differ 
from each other in a great number of respects, yet in 
the final analysis, all are conditioned strongly by and, 
in their turn, determine the international politics of 
the region* They can be said to constitute the ’core’ 
of the region so that, for them all, the Caribbean is the 
mcB t important area of policy after the United States.^
This study began with the assertion that it is meaningful 
and necessary to identify sub-systems within the Latin 
American system. If ’system* is defined in its simplest 
sense as
"a set of components with identifiable 
attributes, among which patterned*j Q
relationships persist over time.""'
then the final conclusion to this study must be that the 
Caribbean, as defined in Part One (a set of components 
with identifiable attributes) and as seen to interact in 
Part Two (among which patterned relationships persist 
over time) must be considered as a system* However, as 
Part Three shows (studies of aspects of the behaviour of 
states in the region) the system is limited and weak.
9* With the exception of Costa Rica all these states 
have also been shown to have "core attributes" 
with respect to the region. However, the exclusion 
of Haiti and Panama from this group, and the inclusion 
of./
limited in the sense that systemic relations are primarily? 
thong):! not exclusively, political this beginning to 
change after 1939 ** and weak in the sense 'lhat penetration 
by the Uni ted States and the inter-American system is bo 
extensive as to severely restrict the capacity of the 
system for 'autonomous* action* Bearing these points in 
mind, however, it Is  still possible, in relation to Latin 
America as a whole, to specify that the Caribbean is a 
particular regional system* One to which the dominant 
external power, the United States, applies a distinctive 
policy and one in which, to a significant but not deter­
mining degree, the specific characteristics of its 
politics have an impact on the functioning of the inter­
im eric Em system* At this point, then, I agree with
Blanksten* 8 decision that it is necessary to view Latin 
American foreign policies in at least two 'sets* - Middle 
America (the nine states of the Caribbean region as I 
have defined it) and South America (Including Mexico), 
but disagree with his assertion that 
"Of /
9* (continued) of OoBta Rica, indicate that no firm 
correspondence between "core attributes" and 
"core interaction" exists* fhere ie though, the 
suggestion of a tentative relationship#
10, Sootts me. .mnqtlomlge M  me. Mter
p*2/
"of the two (sets), Middle America 
ie the more artificial and academic 
deal gna t i on"
For, as I have endeavoured to show throughout this study, 
the Caribbean region, irrespective of how South America 
is considered is meaningful to its member states and 
their foreign policies, in differing degrees, reflects 
this fact# It follows then, that as with comparative 
political analsysis, where for many purposes 'there is 
not one, but twenty, Latin Americas*, then so for inter­
national political analysis, particularly comparative 
foreign policy, there is not one Latin American subor­
dinate system, but several* Equally, there cannot be a 
comprehensive yet adequate theory of Latin American inter­
national politics unless that theory takes into account 
differences between Latin American states and with the 
defining external power as this is manifested in particu­
lar subordinate system activity.
11. BlankstenJ "Foreign Policies in Latin America", 
p.363s Significantly one of the few books 
treating with contemporary United States policy 
towards the Caribbean basin views the same nine 
states as a unit* See Dexter Perkins The 
United States and the Caribbean (Cambridge: 
Harvard university Press, revised edition 1966).
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TABLE 0Î3ÎS: Interaction in the Caribbean 1948-1958
table mO: Interaction in the Caribbean 
Co-operation and Conflict 1948-1958
table TBSEB: Interaction in the Caribbean 1959-1964
TABHO FOUR: Interaction in the Caribbean 
Co-operation and Conflict 1959-1964
TABLE ONE
TOTAL INTERACTIONS;OCTOBER 1948-DECEMBER 1958
o
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CUBA
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\ o
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PANAMA
>  O S o S l\
5 2. i-v
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TABLE THREE
TOTAL INTERACTIONSiJANUARY 19?9-SEPTEMBER 1964
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